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Time present and time past 
are both perhaps present in time future, 
and time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present, 
all time is unredeemable. 
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Distributed knowledge based applications in open domain rely on common sense infor-
mation which is incomplete, indefinite and inconsistent. Incompleteness, indefiniteness 
and inconsistencies are not orthogonal in uncertain knowledge/information and are 
closely inter-related. To draw useful conclusions from uncertain information, one must 
address all three aspects in a holistic manner. To our best knowledge, there is no ex-
isting reasoning framework which adopts an integrated approach on this problem in 
artificial intelligence. In another camp, argumentation is a widely used methodology 
in legal reasoning. Recently, it has been shown to be useful for common sense reason-
ing over distributed uncertain knowledge. This sheds new light in solving the above 
problem. 
In this thesis, we analyze conflicts incurred by uncertain information in the light 
of argumentation theory. We present two integrated frameworks, namely Disjunc-
tive Argumentation Semantics I (DAS-I) and Disjunctive Argumentation Semantics II 
(DAS-II). We show that DAS-I and DAS-II cannot only model incomplete, indefinite 
and inconsistent information but also analyze and resolve them. Furthermore, we show 
that our approach is practical as well as useful by extensive evaluations using a set 
of well-known benchmark problems and a detective reasoning problem. We show that 
both frameworks support multiple views can be defined on a set of distributed knowl-
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. . .formalizing knowledge and mechanizing reasoning, both 
commonsense and refined expertise, in all areas of human endeavor 
Strategic Directions in Artificial Intelligence 
Jon Doyle, Thomas Dean et. aL 
Commonsense reasoning capability is indispensable for artificial intelligence (AI) 
applications. Knowledge involved in these applications is usually uncertain. They are 
incomplete, indefinite and inconsistent. 
Knowledge is incomplete as we cannot represent all things in a finite system. More-
over, we want to make use of the unrepresented part, e.g. "If John is not shown to be 
guilty, John is innocent." There are infinitely many facts for showing "John is guilty" 
but we cannot represent them all. 
Knowledge is usually indefinite as there are facts undecidable at the moment, e.g. 
"If John is betting on a horse, John will either win or loss.”. Problems that have more 
than one solutions usually contained a significant amount of indefinite information. In 
real life, we often tackle this type of problems by reasoning different cases and their 
possible outcomes as the reference model. 
Knowledge could also be inconsistent. Opinions from different experts can be con-
tradictory. Opinions from a single individual can also be contradictory, e.g. "If Mary is 
a penguin, Mary is a bird. If Mary is a bird, Mary can fly." and "If Mary is a penguin, 
Mary cannot fly. ". Sometimes we know how to resolve inconsistencies and we may 
simply suppress inconsistent information for other time. 
In AI, it has been shown that classical methodologies like propositional logic have 
difficulties to handle the above problems. Simply abandoning uncertain knowledge is 
unrealistic, particular in reasoning applications. Since 1960, researchers studied how 
to model and overcome this predicament. Sophisticated analyses have been performed 
9 
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Figure 1.1: Relationships between incompleteness, indefiniteness and inconsistencies 
and solutions have been devised for individual uncertain information type. It seems 
that direct combination of these solutions could give a complete answer. However, the 
metaphor of divide-and-conquer does not apply here. The problems lie in the assump-
tion behind the solutions of the individual parts, i.e. incompleteness, indefiniteness 
and inconsistencies were assumed independent. But in-depth analysis in human rea-
soning shows that this is not the case. Incompleteness, indefiniteness, inconsistencies 
are inter-related, see Figure 1.1. Therefore, a conclusion drawn by considering only one 
aspect of uncertainty is unacceptable and could lead to fatal consequences. Consider 
the following example. 
1. If John is not shown to be guilty, John i s innocent. 
2. If John is not shown to be dishonest, John i s not innocent. 
3. If John is not innocent, John is guilty. 
Sentence 1 use incompleteness modeling technique (i.e. not shown). Sentences 2 
and 3 together show that John is guilty and not innocent. The later result refutes 
the incomplete assumption in Sentence 1. Sentence 1 is inconsistent with Sentences 
2 and 3. Suppose we directly combine both incomplete and inconsistent information 
handling frameworks and further assume that the inconsistencies resolving technique, 
specificity^ is used. Sentence 2 and 1 are equally specific on innocent. There is no way 
to determine which one is preferred. However, everyone would deem Sentence 2 and 
3 together a better argument than Sentence 1 alone as assumption of Sentence 1 (i.e. 
non-existence of guilty) is refuted. On the contrary, assumption of Sentence 2 and 3 
(i.e. non-existence of dishonest) is not refuted. This shows that direct combination is 
unacceptable. 
^We shall discuss the details of specificity in Section 2.2.2. 
秦 
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The objective of our research is, therefore, to overcome the aforesaid problem which 
has been undermining the usefulness of existing commonsense reasoning systems. Our 
goal is to design a reasoning methodology which can handle indefinite, incomplete and 
inconsistent information holistically (i.e. in an integrated fashion). 
1.1 Our approach 
Consider the example mentioned in previous section again. In the analysis, we use 
the concept of "arguments" which is commonly used by human beings. The example 
shows that reasoning with "arguments" is more suitable to analyze relationships be-
tween incomplete, indefinite and inconsistent information. By thinking knowledge as 
arguments, we can identify different opposing opinions in knowledge, which are techni-
cally referred to as conflicts, e.g. inconsistencies and refuting assumptions. 
Argumentation is a newly revival methodology dealing with conflicts. Different 
from approaches in classical logics, argumentation is controversy-oriented. It concen-
trates on modeling relationships between conflicts and resolving conflicts rather than 
simply avoiding conflicts in classical logics. As shown in substantive research efforts 
Kowalski and Toni, 1996, Lin and Shoham, 1989, Verheij, 1996], argumentation is also 
good at unifying different frameworks and methodologies. Thus, we propose an argu-
mentation oriented approach to tackle incompleteness, indefiniteness and inconsisten-
cies as a whole. 
Rather than starting from scratch, we adopt Henry Prakken's strict argumentation 
framework as our basis as it provides an integrated method to incomplete and inconsis-
tent information handling. However, there is no notion of indefiniteness in Prakken's 
framework. This motivated us to extend it. In addition, we analyze relationships be-
tween incompleteness and indefiniteness, as well as inconsistencies and indefiniteness. 
We propose an integrated framework, Disjunctive Argumentation Semantics I (DAS-I) 
to tackle the problem. The design rationale of DAS-I is to be as simple as possible. As 
such DAS-I does not support "reasoning about cases". To overcome this deficiency, we 
propose a second framework, namely Disjunctive Argumentation Semantics II (DAS-
n). 
Our main contribution in this thesis is the proposal of DAS-I and DAS-II. To our 
best knowledge, DAS-I and DAS-II are the only two attempts to merge disjunctive 
logic and argumentation in a distributed setting. They are also novel in identifying new 
kinds ofconfiicts between distributed knowledge bases, namely thinning and unbalanced 
rebut. 
« 
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1.2 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as follow: In Chapter 2, we review the basics of logic program-
ming and basic requirements of practical reasoning frameworks. This is followed by a 
description of the background theories of argumentation, a newly revival approach to 
reasoning, in Chapter 3. We show that there is a variant of argumentation which meets 
all basic requirements set out in Chapter 2. We then present our two formulations of 
disjunctive argumentation semantics in chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 6, we evaluate 
our formulations using well-known test cases and an interesting example. After that, 
we summarize our work and highlight our research contributions in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 2 
Logic Programming 
Our work on disjunctive argumentation is built on top of logic programming. Logic 
programming was chosen because its goal of devising a computation mechanism for 
automated reasoning coincides with the objective of our disjunctive argumentation 
framework. 
Logic programming began with the important work of Robert Kowalski 
Kowalski, 1974]. In 1972, he formulated the important interpretation of clausal form 
logic as a programming langauge. His work was based on previous results in auto-
mated theorem proving, Alfred Tarski's semantic theory [Tarski, 1956], Skolem's model-
preserving transformation, Jacques Herbrand's theorem [Herbrand, 1967] on finite char-
acterization of inconsistency, Davis and Putnam's clausal form logic 
Davis and Putman, 1960], and Alan Robinson's resolution procedure [Robinson, 1965 . 
Based on them, Kowalski presented his seminal paper [Kowalski, 1974] on procedural 
reading of predicate logic programming which pioneered the field of logic programming. 
Since then numerous researchers studied both computational and theoretical asepcts 
of logic programs. Improvements were made on the following areas: 
• Negation-as-finite-failure is proposed for reasoning with incomplete information. 
• Paraconsistency and prioritized reasoning are proposed for reasoning with incon-
sistent information. 
• Disjunctive logic programming is proposed for reasoning with indefinite informa-
tion. 
In this chapter, we outline the basics of logic programming as well as the aforemen-
tioned improvements. In Section 2.1, we describe the properties and problems of logic 
programming in Horn clauses, a subset of First Order Logic (FOL) .^ We then discuss 
iln this thesis, classical notions of First Order Logic will be heavily used. Readers who do not 
familiar with First Order Logic are advised to consult Appendix A. 
13 
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solutions to the problems in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we render the difficulties when 
incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite information co-exist. In Section 2.4 and 2.5, 
we discuss two integrated attempts, stable semantics and well-founded semantics for 
solving parts of the problem in reasoning under incomplete, inconsitent and indefinite 
information. 
2.1 Logic programming in Horn clauses 
Kowalski's framework [Kowalski, 1974] is defined on a special class of clauses in which 
every clause has at most one non-negative atomic literal. This class of clauses is com-
monly known as Horn clauses in memoir of Alfred Horn. Horn clause logic was chosen 
by Kowalski for its goal-directness property, which gives exceptional computational ad-
vantage, and model uniqueness property, which gives a clear cut semantical definition, 
A Horn clause is usually represented as follows: 
r : ai 八 tt2 八• • •八 CLi ^ fli+i 
r is the name of the clause/rule 2. We use r to refer the rule. Rule r's conditions 
are ai • • • ai. Rule r's conclusion is ai+i. It is read as "If ai and a2 and • • • and ai are 
established, a^+i must be established too." 
As each Horn clause has only one conclusion, proving a thesis is a typical downward 
traversal of a tree formed by chainning multiple clauses together. As such, it is easy 
to show that proving a thesis in propositional logic can be done effectively. Horn 
clause logic per se belongs to the class of definite logic. The term 'definite' refers to 
the meaning of Horn clause logic. A Horn logic program has an unique interpretation 
characterized by Tarski semantics .^ The existence of a 'canonical' meaning for every 
clauses rendered Horn clause logic popular in earlier artificial intelligence research. 
The popluarity of Horn clause logic is further strengthened by the introducition of 
PROLOG (PROgramming in LOGic) [Colmerauer et al., 1973], a Horn clause reason-
ing system. PROLOG was introduced nearly at the same time as Kowalski published 
his seminal paper [Kowalski, 1974]. Ten years later, David Warren introduced an ab-
stract machine [Warren, 1983], the Warren Abstract Machine (WAM). WAM boosted 
the efficiency of PROLOG making real-life PROLOG programming practical. 
More than two decades after Kowalski's pioneering work in the field of logic pro-
gramming, the framework of Horn clause logic was regarded by many as too rigid for 
knowledge based applications. Not only does it fail to capture some practical features 
in knowledge representation, like incompleteness and indefiniteness, but it also behaves 
^In the rest of this thesis, we use "rule" and "clause" interchangeably. 
^This is different from an indefinite logic program which usually has more then one possible readings 
(see later). 
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Figure 2.1: Example of knowledge in a database 
penguin{t) ^ bird{t) 
bird{t) ~> cari-fly(t) 
penguin(t) ~> ^can.fly{t) 
">• penguin(t) 
Figure 2.2: Symbolic representation of an inheritance hierarchy with exceptions 
strangely in the presence of inconsistent information. Nevertheless, inconsistency is 
unavoidable in knowledge. In the following subsections, we highlight three deficient 
aspects of Horn clauses. 
2.1.1 Problem with incomplete information 
Consider the program ofa consumer product's vendor in Figure 2.1. Based on classical 
Horn clause semantics, it is impossible to infer "not customer(dongdongy, from the 
program. Every piece of derivable information must be mentioned in a Horn clause 
program. In other words, the vendor would need to store the rest of 23 billions non-
customers on this planet in order to infer "dongdong" was not a customer. However, 
this type of inference is widely employed in commonsense reasoning and known as 
default reasoning [Reiter, 1978]. 
2.1.2 Problem with inconsistent information 
In a knowledge based system, it is not uncommon that knowledge modelled by different 
domain experts conflict with each other. There are conflicts which even domain ex-
perts find difficult to resolve. This is especially true when conflicts are arised because 
of principal difference in beliefs, e.g. athesists versus christians, and modek, e.g. opti-
mistic economists versus pessimistic economists. The program H in Figure 2.2 is such 
a typical example in which the classification of a penguin and the feature of a bird is in 
conflict. Our expectation of "birds can fly" is inconsistent with "penguins cannot fly" 
where "penguins" are regarded as "birds" by common sense. 
In Horn clause theorem proving, we can deduce anything from the program H 
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">• interest-rate_rise 
interestjratejrise ^ running_costJncrease V sellingJndex-drop 
runningjcostJncreate ~> doseshop 
sellingJndex-drop ^ doseshop 
Figure 2.3: Example of knowledge involving indefinite information 
(Figure 2.2). Let us consider the derivation of a thesis P : I-amM-FBI-agent from 
n. By the principle of Davis-Putnam procedure [Davis and Putman, 1960], it is only 
necessary to show that a thesis ^P is inconsistent with EL However, H is inherently 
inconsistent due to H — cari-fly{t) ^ and H \= ^cari-fly{t). Thus, P will follow from 
n as the theorem prover can derive 丄 from P U cari-fly{t) U ^ can.fly. In fact, it is 
not only I_am_a^FBI_agent provable from H but also Elvis_PresleyJsstill_alive and 
any other beliefs. 
In very large scale knowledge bases, which may probably involve tens of thousands 
of clauses, it is impractical to maintain global consistency due to conflicting interests 
between different knowledge owners. For example, it is surely unnecessary for the Pen-
tagon and Soviet Union Military Service to change their respective knowledge bases 
because of inconsistency within themselves. Failure in handling inconsistent informa-
tion would lead the computer to always answer "yes" to whatever statements it is asked, 
e.g. the computer will answer "yes" to "Is it suitable to start the third world war ？" 
because two tiny inconsistent propositions : "bird can fly." and "there are birds which 
cannot fly.，，In this regard, plain Horn clause logic is unacceptable to be used directly 
in real life applications. 
2.1.3 Problem with indefinite information 
Another aspect of knowledge based applications is related to the indefiniteness of in-
formation. Consider the program in Figure 2.3. By common sense reasoning, it is 
clear that the conclusion “doseshop,, should be drawn after analyzing and exhaust-
ing different cases of interestjrate_rise. However, Horn clause logic does not allow 
rules like interest_rate_rise ^ running_cost_increase V sellingJndex-drop. This is 
unacceptable in practice. 
2.2 Logic programming in non-Horn clauses 
The term "non-Horn clauses" here is different from the classical sense of "non-Horn 
clauses". "Non-Horn clauses" is classically defined as "Horn clauses" extended to allow 
4f= is the classical entailment symbol in FOL，see Appendix A. 
« 
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~> writing 
writingA �usejright_hand ~> useJeftJiand 
writingA �useJeftJmnd ^ use_right_hand 
Figure 2.4: Example of knowledge involving incomplete information 
more than one conclusion in a clause. We use the term "non-Horn clauses" to include all 
classes of clauses except "Horn clauses". In the following subsections, various solutions 
to the above Horn clause logic problems are outlined. 
2.2.1 Reasoning under incomplete information 
Ray Reiter [Reiter, 1978] and Keith Clark [Clark, 1978] have shown that real world 
knowledge bases are mostly "incomplete" in the sense that they do not store things 
they do not need. If a knowledge base is a relation R^ failure of finding a clause p in R 
usually means ^R{p), which is known as negation-as-finite-failure (NAF). The notion of 
NAF is the core concept of reasoning under incomplete information. Reiter introduced 
the idea of Closed World Assumption (CWA) to capture this idea. CWA states "that 
for any n-ary relation symbol R and any n-tuple of ground terms ai，...，a^ one may-
assume ^R{a i , . . . ,an) unless the contrary can classically proved" [Witold, 1990]. In 
logic programming discipline, this is done by introducing a new operator � w h i c h is 
called the non-provable operator or default negation. Reconsidering the program in 
Figure 2.1, we may introduce a rule “ � c u s t o m e r [ X ) ^，customer(X)” to represent 
"Mr. X is not a customer if it cannot be proved as a customer". Nowaday, default 
negation � a n d explicit negation，are used together in practical reasoning frameworks. 
It is easy to see that � i s neither an ordinary operator nor a truth-functional 
operator. Its evaluation depends on the knowledge base as a whole and on the meta-
level. Consider the program in Figure 2.4, which has two interpretations: use_leftJiand 
and usejrightJiand. Thus, the introduction of � b r e a k s the unique model properties 
of definite logic. 
Incidentally, logic programs that contain only default negations are called normal 
logic programs; and those contain both default and explicit negations are called ex-
tended logic programs [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1990 . 
2.2.2 Reasoning under inconsistent information 
Logical consistency assumed in early formulations of symbolic logic has been shown 
to be problematic. In the presence of inconsistent information, we are opened to the 
choices of resolving, enduring or by-passing inconsistencies. The last action is surely 
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Legend: 
• Support 
1 ^ ~ ~ • Against 
• ^ L ^ 
x^upport 
； 7 ^ 
penguin{t) T T l can_fly(t) 
against 
Figure 2.5: Diagram of an inheritance hierarchy with exceptions 
financialJumour ^ financialjpolicy_decision_required 
financial-policyjdecisionjrequired ^ government-decision 
financial-policy-decisionjrequired ^ financial_department_decision 
government-decision ~> increaseJnvestment 
financial-department-decision ^ increase-investment 
Figure 2.6: Example showing a conflict between the duty of and benefit of a government 
undesirable. Currently, inconsistency resolution and endurance are under active re-
search. 
Conflicts due to inconsistencies can be resolved in several ways depending on the 
nature of the conflicts as well as the reasoning framework. Thomason, Horty and 
Touretzky proposed the ingenuious conflict resolution framework, namely the Skeptical 
Inheritance Framework [Thomason et al., 1986]. Thomason et. al. proposed speci-
ficity as the conflict resolution metric. In a conflicting situation involving multiple 
sentences, the one which is most specific always wins. Reconsider the example in Fig-
ure 2.2, a schematic representation of it is shown in Figure 2.5. From Figure 2.5, it is 
easy to see that "bird" is less specific than "penguin" and is thus outweighted. 
Specificity is a general mechanism to resolve conflicts. However, there are domains 
in which specificity is inappropriate. An example is the legal domain. Consider the 
example in Figure 2.6 which shows the following scenarios: 
After some extensive cost-benefit analysis on the monetary market, the fi-
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nancial department of a government suggested to stop increasing investment 
during a financial turmoil. However, the government, owing to its politi-
cal duty and social commitment, decided to continue its effort to increase 
investment even at the price of financial losses. 
In classical specificity analysis, the financial department's decision would override 
the government's decision as the former is derived from a special-purpose department 
which is part of the latter and thus it is more specific to the problem concerned. This 
was, however, counter-intuitive to our understanding of a government which should 
always have a higher priority on decision-making. The reason behind this was due 
to the conflict between duties and benefits. Duties are always "general" norms and 
"benefits" are always "specific" incidents. Owing to social commitment, we "should" 
and "ought to" prefer the more "general" norms instead of "specific" benefits in this 
circumstance. This example illustrates a wide class of "contrary-to-duty" problems 
in legal reasoning [Prakken and Sergot, 1997] which cannot be resolved by specificity. 
More general conflict resolution techniques, like arbitrary order or priority, are required 
for real-life applications. 
Conflict resolution with arbitary priority is generally known as prioritized reason-
ing. There are no assumptions nor restrictions in the setting of priority. Specificity 
reasoning, on the contrary, relies on a priority restricted by a set of fixed rules. As 
that set of rules is domain-independent, specificity reasoning naturally fails to capture 
the context of reasoning , e.g. it cannot discriminate between the conflicts of zoology 
(e.g. Figure 2.2) and contrary-to-duty (e.g. Figure 2.6). There is no way for users to 
change the priority in a specificity reasoning framework. Prioritized reasoning usually 
mediates this through a binary relation R. A tuple consisting of two conflicting rules 
< Ta,rb > in R means rule ra has a higher priority than rule r^  when they are in con-
flicts. In practice, there are many situations where conflicts are unavoidable and yet 
priority between conflicting rules are unavailable. For those cases, conflicts toleration 
is used to prevent disastrous result as the one discussed in Section 2.1.2. 
Paraconsistent logic, pioneered by Jaskowski [Jaskowski, 1969], is a cluster of logic 
which tolerate conflicts. Fifteen years later, Newton da Costa introduced his formulated 
system [da Costa, 1963] to attack the same problem. After that, da Costa published 
some tens of formulations on paraconsistent logics and established the name 'para-
consistency' (see [Newton C. A. da Costa, 1995] for historical remarks on the term) to 
describe conflict tolerating reasoning, da Costa's approach was mainly an attempt to 
provide a rigorous calculus for paraconsistent logic. Alternatively, Graham Priest ar-
gued the necessity of paraconsistency as a consequence of existence of real inconsistency 
Priest, 1979]. Priest's attempt was philosophical and contraversial. Nevertheless, para-
consistency is now widely recognized as a necessary feature for real-life knowledge-based 
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^ penguin{t) 
penguin{t) ~> bird{t) 
penguin{t) ~> wing-degenerate(t) 
bird{t) ~> cari-fly{t) 
wing.degenerate (t) — ^can.fly{t) 
Figure 2.7: Paradox of penguin 
applications. 
A system is paraconsistent if it can draw non-trivial results from an inconsistent 
knowledge base. Consider Figure 2.7 which is a modified version of Figure 2.2. It 
gives an intuitive description of a penguin and shows that specificity cannot help in 
this situation as both ^^wing-degenerate {t) “ and “bird^, are equally specific in this 
setting. Classical techniques in paraconsistent logic is to extend the truth-valuation 
system of classical logic from 2-values to 3-values or more. For 3-valued logic, Kleene's 
"Strong" is a well known system [Kleene, 1952] whereas Nuel D. Belnap's bi-lattice 
logic is a famous reference of 4-valued semantics [Belnap, 1977]. In 3-valued logic, the 
extra truth value usually represents "unknown" status of a proposition and in 4-valued 
logic, in addition to "unknown", the fourth truth value denotes "inconsistent" status 
of a proposition. 
2.2.3 Reasoning under indefinite information 
Besides incomplete and inconsistent, real world knowledge is usually indefinite. For 
example, Figure 2.8 shows a gunman with a wounded right hand intending to kill an-
other man. Rather than by-passing indefinite information, human beings use indefinite 
information to model possible rules. The second rule in the gunman example is an in-
tuitive representation of indeterminate state of conclusions. It is also an usual practive 
to employ the technique of "reasoning about cases" over indefinite information. In the 
"gunman" example, we consider both cases of "a gunman holding a gun with his left 
hand" and "a gunman holding a gun with a wounded right hand" and conclude that 
the "gunman" can kill his enemy either way. Thus, the benefit of allowing indefinite 
information is two-folds: power in both representation and reasoning. 
The line of reasoning under indefinite information is pioneered by the study of rela-
tions between logic and databases. The class of logics that allows indefinite information 
to be modelled is called disjunctive logic. A specific version of disjunctive logic, which 
combines two kinds of negations, is called extended disjunctive logic program (EDLP). 
It is more expressive than Horn clause logic. 
The gain in reasoning power under indefinite knowledge is achieved at the expense 
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~> right-hand-recovered 
holding-gun ~> rightJiandJiold V leftJiandJiold 
rightJmndJwld 八 rightJiand_recovered ^ kill 
left-hand-hold ~)> kill 
Figure 2.8: Gunman with a wounded right hand 
of increased complexity in both meaning and computation. It can be shown that 
systems with such reasoning power usually have more than one interpretation on the 
same piece of informatin. To define the meaning over different interpretations/readings, 
heuristics must be introduced. Traditionally, there are two heuristic approaches to the 
problem, namely credulous reading and skeptical reading. Credulous reading usually 
means that a thesis is established if it is established in at least one reading. Skeptical 
reading means that a thesis is established if it is established in all readings. The choice 
between credulous reading or skeptical reading is application dependent. For example, 
for mission critical applications, we would favour skeptical readings. In this research, we 
focus on skeptical reading of logics which gives results of a higher calibre in correctness. 
For reasoning under skeptical reading, Michael Gelfond's Stable semantics 
Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] and Kenneth Ross's Well-founded semantics [Ross, 1989 
are most widely used. Jack Minker and Ruiz have performed a comprehensive survey 
for stable and well-found semantics as well as other existing frameworks of extended 
disjunctive logic programs [Minker and Ruiz, 1993]. 
2.3 Coexistence of incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite 
information 
The difficulty of common sense reasoning is very difficult when information is not 
only incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite individually. When the three forms of 
uncertainties coexists, direct combination of individual handling methods are futile. 
Consider the example in Figure 2.9. It is clear that the truth value of e relies on handling 
methods of all three kinds of uncertainties. The groups of rules {r1,r2,r3,r4} and 
{^Sj^e} show intricacies between incomplete information modelling and inconsistency 
handling. The former entails e which is inconsistent with ^e entails by the later. The 
later entails b which refutes � b . It is clear that methods reviewed above cannot give 
answer on this scenario. 
There are several attempts to cover part of the scenario. Currently, stable semantics 
and well-founded semantics are the most widely practiced. 
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7*1 :^ a 
7*2 : €Lt\ � b ^ c V d 
rs ： c ~> e 
r4 : d ^ e 
r5 : � f — ] e 
r*6 : ">e ~> b 
Figure 2.9: Co-existence of incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite information 
2.4 Stable semantics 
Pioneered by Michael Gelfond and Liftschtz [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988], stable se-
mantics mimics the properties of stable points in mathematics. Briefly, a stable point 
P of a domain D is a transformation E such that n(Z), P) =^ P whcih means the 
transformation of P is itself. The transformation operator in stable semantics is the 
Gelfond-Liftschtz transformation IicL which takes in a set of literals P and operates 
on a set of logical rules D. 
^Gh{D^ P) is defined as the logical consequence oiD by assuming all literals 
involving � 5 are true ifthey are not in P and false otherwise. A set of literals 
P is a stable model of D if and only if P = UoL(D, P). 
A proposition is established with respect to a knowledge base KB if and only if it is 
established in every stable model of KB. In this regard, stable semantics is skeptical. 
Consider a rule R involving � 1 in its conditions, e.g. R :�/,½,... ,1几 ^ ln+i-
We may read the rule as “R is the case for most of the time". The exceptional case 
for R is then 1 is provable and true. Intuitively, the set of literals involving � a r e 
what we regarded as assumptions in daily arguments. The sentence in the definition of 
HGL(^5 P), i e. "assuming all literals involving � a s true . •.，’，can then be interpreted 
as pruning all rules with assumptions denied by P. This process is similar to what we do 
in daily arguments in which we attack our opponents' assumptions. As such, pruning 
of rules with weak literals ^ always succeeds. The requirement of P 二 J^GL(D,P) 
represents the self-sufficiency of P. P prunes all "unnecessary rules". The set of 
remaining clauses is sufficient to derive P. In this perspective, a set of literals is a 
stable model if and only if it is self-sufficient and attacks all unused rules. 
Following the original stable semantics, several extensions have been proposed. 
Przymusinski extended Gelfond and Liftschtz's formulation to disjunctive logics 
Przymusinski, 1991]. Przymusinski also provided a three-valued extension of stable 
5~ is the non-provable operator in Section 2.2.1. 
®A literal is a weak literal if it involves the non-provability sign � . I t is weak because a rule consisting 
of such a literal can be attacked. 
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r*i ••�a ^ b 
V2 : � b — a 
r*3 : � c ^ c 
r4 : a ~> c 
Figure 2.10: A sample program showing the difficulty of computing stable models 
semantics which sheded light on paraconsistent stable semantics. Chiaki Sakama and 
Katsumi Inoue extended stable semantics to potentially inconsistent disjunctive logic 
programs [Sakama and Inoue, 1995]. Sakama's extended stable semantics in four dif-
ferent ways which allowed, in addition to tolerating inconsistent information, computa-
tion of the preferred stable model and, introduction of suspicious and semi stable ones. 
However, the framework of Przymusinski and Sakama was not applicable to conflict 
resolution with explicit priority. Yan Zhang and Norman Foo proposed a direct exten-
sion of stable semantics [Zhang and Foo, 1997] to overcome that. But, the approach 
proposed did not account for reasoning with indefinite information. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, computation models for EDLPs is complex. The 
same is true for computing stable models. Consider the EDLP in Figure 2.10 showing 
a KB with four rules, r*i - r4. It is easy to show that the only stable model is {a, c}. How-
ever, although the status of a depends on r3 and r4, neither of them has a as its head. 
Thus, there is no fully top-down procedure for computing stable semantics, not even 
for non disjunctive cases. It should be noted that the operator UcL is anti-monotonic. 
Thus, it is not even possible to approach the stable model through iteration directly. 
Katsumi Inoue et. al. invented a bottom-up procedure [Inoue et al., 1992] for calculat-
ing such stable models. Lobo and Fernandez developed a nearly top-down procedure 
Fernandez and Lobo, 1993]. Both approaches relied on transforming the original logic 
program into a new one. It is worth noting that Inoue's approach exhibits high potential 
parallelism due to its non-backtracking bottom-up computation characteristic. 
2.5 Well-founded semantics 
A. Van Gelder, Kenneth Ross and J. S. Schlipf first proposed well-founded semantics 
in [Gelder et al., 1988]. Well-founded semantics is also based on skeptical reading like 
stable semantics. According to Brewka [Brewka, 1996], well-founded semantics can be 
regarded as an efficient approximation of stable semantics and relies on a transformation 
operator JlcL (see Section 2.4 for definition). In Brewka's formulation of well-founded 
semantics, the transformation operator Q(D,P) is a double application of U.GL opera-
tor, i.e. Q(D,P) = IiGL{D,UGL{D,P)). A set of literals P is a well-founded model of 
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�economic-up ^ economic_down 
�6conomic_dcm;n ^ economicjap 
~> ^economicjup 
Figure 2.11: Example showing unintuitive results drawn by well-founded semantics 
�~ib ~> b 
�~>a — a 
� a ~>" ~ia 
Figure 2.12: Example showing disastrous effect of conflicts in well-founded semantics 
an EDLP D if and only if P = S(D, P). 
The operator B involves double application of U.GL- As U.GL is anti-monotonic, 
B must be monotonic. Thus, the fix-point or stable point of G can be approached 
by iteration starting from an empty set. It is also possible to show that a reverse 
traversal method exists leading to a top-down procedure for well-founded semantics 
Alferes et al., 1994]. Moreover, every logic program has a well-founded model but not 
all logic programs have stable models. Although well-founded semantics is computa-
tionally efficient, it has some undesirable properties. Consider the program in Figure 
2.10, we can show that the well-founded model is an empty set. In general, well-founded 
semantics draws less conclusive results than stable semantics. Besides the weakness in 
conclusive power, double iteration of GL operator would also introduce abnormalities. 
Consider the example in Figure 2.12. It was shown that the original formulation 
of well-founded semantics gave an empty model in Brewka's paper [Brewka, 1996]. 
However, the stable model of the program is non-empty {6} which is closer to our 
intuition as the conflicts of the last two rules have nothing to do with the top one. 
Brewka showed that such abnormality in classical well-founded semantics could be 
removed by a small modification to the semantics [Brewka, 1996 . 
Consider another example in Figure 2.11, we can see that well-founded seman-
tics implies that，economic-up is true whereas economicjap and economic—down are 
unknown. This is counter intuitive as we expect that economic_down is true and 
economicjup is false. It is unresolvable even in Brewka's modified well-founded seman-
tics framework. This shows that the major weakness of well-founded semantics lies on 
its correctness. 
Besides the above modifications to well-founded semantics, various extensions have 
been proposed to facilitate reasoning with incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite in-
formation. Ross extended well-founded semantics to handle indefinite information 
Ross, 1989]. Przymusinski added classical negations into well-founded semantics 
» 
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Table 2.1: Summary of difficulties and solutions of Horn clauses 
DIFFICULTIES SOLUTIONS 
•Reasoning under incomplete information •Default and Explicit Negation 
•Reasoning under inconsistent information *Paraconsistent and Prioritized Reasoning 
•Reasoning under indefinite information •Disjunctive clauses 
Przymusinski, 1990] such that reasoning with incomplete information can be done 
with two kinds of negations. Brewka introduced prioritized reasoning abilities into 
well-founded semantics [Brewka, 1996] which allow conflict resolution in reasoning with 
inconsistent information. Sakama added paraconsistency to well-founded semantics in 
Sakama, 1992] to allow conflict toleration in reasoning with inconsistent information. 
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we reviewed the three major difficulties encountered by classical Horn-
clauses logics. Table 2.1 gives a summary and the corresponding possible solutions. 
As we have discussed in the introduction of this chapter, knowledge in real life 
applications commonly consists of incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite information. 
A logical framework must address all of them. Extended disjunctive logic programming 
has been shown to be an effective tool which can satisfy this basic requirement. The 
desirable framework should be based on EDLP and integrated with both paraconsistent 
and prioritized reasoning. 
Prom the viewpoint of computational complexity, well-founded semantics is the best 
existing semantics for the desirable framework. However, the inherent abnormalities 
in well-founded semantics is impractical for mission critical applications. For example, 
in applications where quality is essential , stable semantics is the ideal choice, e.g. we 
would certainly like a medical expert system to draw conclusions with high quality. 
Thus, properties of stable semantics are desirable for our framework. 
In the next chapter, we will discuss a new approach, i.e. argumentation, to the 
problem of reasoning with incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite information. It bor-
rows the well-practiced conflict resolution methodology from legal domain. We will 




Argumentation is a simple and yet general approach to tackle a wide class of problems 
in artificial intelligence research including reasoning under incomplete and inconsistent 
information. For this reason, we choose argumentation as our basic framework for rea-
soning. In this chapter, we review the theory of argumentation from the viewpoints of 
philosophy and artificial intelligence. We give a brief account of existing argumentation 
models, highlighting their inovations and related aspects to reasoning under incomplete, 
inconsistent and indefinite information. 
Argumentation is the process of seeking out truth through dialectic. In Republic, 
Plato described dialectic as the paramount of all studies, the methodology of study. 
Dialectic, the backbone theory of argumentation, has been studied by philosophers 
for many years. It originated from the concept of dialogues in which arguments were 
proposed, justified and/or defeated. Its operating model and structure are closely 
related to verbal conversation in legal process. 
Stephen Toulmin founded modern argumentation study. In his revolutionary book 
Toulmin, 1958], Toulmin argued that traditional formal logics are fallacious and failed 
to capture complex and diversified conflicts in real life problems, e.g. contrary-to-duty 
problem in Section 2.2.2. Then, he went on to proposed an informal method to solve 
these problems. Later, Nicholas Rescher gave a formal characterization of a reasoning 
methodology for argumentation, dialectics, from a radically different starting point 
from Toulmin's, [Rescher, 1977]. Both Toulmin's and Rescher's argumentation studies 
did tackle the problems of reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information, yet 
from a philosophical perspective. It was John Pollock who bridged argumentation and 
artificial intelligence. His life-time project OSCAR [Pollock, 1995, Pollock, 1996] is an 
attempt to build real intelligence based on argumentation. Other major contributors 
include Lin and Shoham, Gerard Vreeswijk, Robert Kowalski, Ronald Loui, Phan Minh 
Dung, Bart Verheij and Henry Prakken. 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the necessary features of an argumenta-
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广 N 
Rebuttal V y 
/ ^ / \ f N 
Ground ~~^ Modality ~ ^ Claim 
V V V J V 夕 
广 ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ \ 
Warrant V V 
/^“"“^N 
Backing 
V _ _ y 
Figure 3,1: Toulmin diagram : components of an argument 
tion framework which can reason over incomplete, inconsistent and indefinite informa-
tion. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: We describe the basic ideas be-
hind Stephen Toulmin's and Rescher's (philosophical-base) argumentation frameworks 
in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Section 3.3 outlines the existing argumentation 
frameworks employed in artificial intelligence; and their pros and cons are summarised 
in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Toulmin's informal argumentation model 
Toulmin's contributions to argumentation are three-folds [Toulmin, 1958]. He identified 
fallacies and incapabilities of formal logic in modelling knowledge and further presented 
an informal setting on arguments for avoiding these problems. 
Toulmin argued that naive formal logic "is an unrepresentative and misleadingly 
simple sort of arguments" [Toulmin, 1958]. As a consequence, the problems of formal 
logic in argumentation are caused by the "misapplication" of formal logic to common-
sense reasoning. Formal logic, in Toulmin's comments, cannot cope with inconsistent 
information nor indefinite information which correspond to the problems we have dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.2. Toulmin then proposed his own informal theory to mediate 
these problems. 
Toulmins' argumentation theory is based on the central idea of "Toulmin diagram"， 
see Figure 3.1. It is a pictorial description of relations between different components of 
an argument namely, warrants, grounds, claims, backing, rebuttals and modality. Claims 
are inferred from grounds through warrants in argumentation which is an analogy of 
the way conclusions are inferred from facts through rules in formal logic. Different from 
rules in formal logic, warrants are defeasible and can be set aside by rebuttals which are 
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defined as counter-arguments of claims. Modality is defined as how likely a warrant is 
set aside. Backing is the support of warrant It is easy to notice that formal logic does 
not have the concept of rebuttals, modality and hacking. To defeat an argument, it is 
necessary to meet the rebuttal requirements ofthe argument. Such an analysis on defeat 
is not available in formal logic. It is interesting to note that all the six components do 
not assume any form of syntax. It is also applicable to informal verbal arguments. 
Notice that Toulmin's work (1958) was well before the inception of logic pro-
gramming (1965) and was around the time McCarthy raised the problems of com-
monsense reasoning [McCarthy, 1958, McCarthy and Hayes, 1969]. The formal logics 
Carnap, 1950, Strawson, 1952, von Wright, 1951] attacked by Toulmin's book were 
mostly theory before 1953; at that time, the field of artificial intelligence was still 
in its very early stage. From today's point of view, Toulmin's argument theory are 
rudimentary yet informal [Hample, 1977]. It is impossible to characterize Toulmin's 
theory literally in rigorous logics. Moreover, today's formal logic includes preliminary 
capabilities of defeasibility analysis which are capable to tackle the problems raised by 
Toulmin. In the next section, we shall describe another famous argumentation model. 
It employs sophisticated techniques based on a new extensions of formal logic. 
3.2 Rescher,s formal argumentation model 
In [Rescher, 1977], Nicholas Rescher attempted to give a formal characterization of 
argumentation. Compare to Toulmin's framework, Rescher's argumentation theory is 
better structured and more rigorous. Its reasoning methodology, i.e. dialectics, appears 
in the form of formal logic. Syntactical restrictions are explicit in the form of logical 
rules and propositions like formal logic. 
Besides classical operators in formal logic, Rescher's framework is based on three 
additional operators namely, '!，categorical assertion, 'f ' cautious assertion and ' / ' pro-
visoed assertion. Assertions forwarded by arguing parties form basic moves. Basic 
moves can further be combined into three types of complex moves. The process of 
argumentation is a sequence of such moves. Each move must be controversy-oriented 
and must be able to defeat the last move made by the opponent. Figure 3.2^ shows the 
Rescher's process of argumentation. Similar to Toulmin's framework, Rescher's theory 
can also represent defeasible rules. Sentences modified with categorical and cautious 
operators represent classical logic sentences and those modified with provisoed operator 
represent defeasible ones. A provisoed assertion P implies that P is "generally the case" 
but it may be overriden by other assertions. 
Besides defeasibility, Rescher analyzes four aspects of "dialectics"，namely "tolerat-
^This diagram is an excerpt from page 19 of Rescher's book [Rescher, 1977]. 
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Figure 3.2: Rescher's process of argumentation 
Rescher, 1977' 
Table 3.1: Summary of the four aspects of dialectics in Rescher's theory 
PROBLEMS IN DIALECTICS CORRESPONDING PROBLEMS IN 
LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
•Tolerance of self-inconsistency •Reasoning over inconsistent information 
•Curtailing the consequences of *Reasoning over inconsistent information 
inconsistency 
•Potential indeterminacy .Reasoning over indefinite information 
•Constructive negation •No comparative case 
ing self-inconsistency", "curtailing the consequences of inconsistency"，"potential inde-
terminacy" and "constructive negation". The first two concern how to tolerate incon-
sistency. "Potential indeterminacy" is related to the indefinite status of a proposition 
which can easily be obtained by considering both pieces of inconsistent information. 
It belongs to the class of reasoning over indefinite information. "Constructive nega-
tion" is, however, arguable. In Rescher's framework, negation is the syntactical form 
of rebuttal. In the process of argumentation, negation can only be applied when more 
supporting information is available than the previous arguments. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the four aspects in dialectic under Rescher's theory. 
The importance of Rescher's work not only lies on the formalization of argumen-
tation but also on its influence in artificial intelligence research. Rescher has tackled 
part of the problem in reasoning over inconsistent, incomplete and indefinite infor-
秦 
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mation. In particular, he gave a complete analysis on the first case. Comparing to 
classical approach in logic programming, his analysis is still more philosophical than 
computational. 
3.3 Argumentation in AI research 
Around the same time as Rescher, several A.I. reseachers, such as John Pollock, Lin and 
Shoham, began to recognize that argumentation was a promising approach to common-
sense reasoning. In this section, we outline several major argumentation frameworks in 
artificial intelligence research. In particular, we shall focus on the following aspects of 
existing frameworks in our discussion: 
• Reasoning over incomplete information 
Default and Explicit Negation or other forms of incompleteness modelling tech-
niques (see Section 2.2.1) are applicable. 
• Reasoning over inconsistent information 
Paraconsistent and Prioritized Reasoning or other forms of conflict tolerating and 
resolving techniques (see Section 2.2.2) are applicable. 
• Reasoning over indefinite information 
Disjunctive clauses or other forms of indefinite knowledge modelling techniques 
(see Section 2.2.3) are applicable. 
We shall use the term rebuttal and undercut in the same sense as in 
Prakken and Sartor, 1997 . 
3.3.1 Poole's Logical Framework for Default Reasoning 
The simplest existing argumentation theory was proposed by David Poole in [Poole, 1988 . 
Poole's framework does not require any additional operators other than those found in 
propositional systems. An argument is simply a sequence of propositional rules chained 
together. Conclusions of an argument is the set of propositions entailed by the sequence 
of rules. Two arguments are in conflict if their conclusions are inconsistent with each 
other. Formally, a logical framework is a binary tuple < R, H > where R is a consistent 
set of first-order rules and H a set of hypotheses in first-order logic. A theory R U D is 
explainable on < R, H > if D is a set of instances of H such that R U D \f 丄. 
Poole's framework only supports one kind of attack, namely rebuttal. However, 
its aim is not to resolve conflict by undermining a weaker one; instead it aims to 
separate conflicting ideas into different interpretations. In this regard, it does not 
support prioritized reasoning. It cannot model non-provability and thus it fails in 
為 
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Figure 3.3: Diagram of an inheritance hierarchy with exceptions (see also Figure 3.4) 
reasoning over incomplete information. It does not support reasoning over indefinite 
information. 
3.3.2 Inheritance Reasoning Framework of Touretzky et. al. 
Proposed by Touretzky, Horty and Thomason [Thomason et al., 1986], the inheritance 
reasoning framework, represents the class of argumentation systems based on graph 
theory. Although it is not explicitly coined as an argumentation system, the intepreta-
tion of derivation paths and the conflict resolution methodology as the basic blocks of 
articulation are essentially argumentation-oriented. Moreover, specificity (See Section 
2.1.2) is pioneered by the inheritance reasoning framework. 
Touretzky et. al. shows that inheritance relation between different classes is a 
general knowledge model. In particular, it can easily model the derivation of a con-
clusion in common sense knowledge. Each path formed by chaining arcs of rules in 
an inheritance graph entails the derivation and the ending node on the path is the 
conclusion. The root node of a sub-tree formed by backward chaining from a con-
clusion denotes the support of the conclusion. Figure 3.3 shows a typical inheritance 
graph/network. Figure 3.4 shows its meaning in symbolic form. The number of arcs 
in a path is the metric count of the path. When conflicts present, inheritance relation 
and metric counts of the two conflicting paths are calculated to determine which one 
is more specific, e.g. Pi = {penguin(t) ~> bird(t), bird{t) ~> can.fly{t)} is definitely 
less specific than P2 = {penguin(t) ~>> ^can.fly(t)}. In this example, the conflict in 
can.fly(t) is resolved by P2 overriding Pi. 
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penguin(t) -^ bird{t) 
bird{t) ~> cari-fly(t) 
penguin(t) ~^ ^can.fly(t) 
~> penguin{t) 
Figure 3.4: Symbolic representation of an inheritance hierarchy with exceptions 
Inheritance reasoning does not address the notion of default negation and thus 
provides no means for reasoning over incomplete information. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.2，inheritance reasoning only provides a very restrictive mechanism, namely 
specificity for reasoning over inconsistent information. For reasoning over indefinite 
information, there is no explicit support for disjunctive logics in inheritance reasoning. 
3.3.3 Pollock's Theory of Defeasible Reasoning 
John Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning [Pollock, 1994] is one of the most influ-
ential argumentation frameworks. Both of his argumentation-oriented approaches and 
the notion of an argumentation agent were novel at that time. In addition, it was Pol-
lock who showed that bridging argumentation and artificial intelligence was a fruitful 
approach to common sense reasoning. Pollock described his intuition as below: 
...philosophy has an essential role to play in artificial intelligence. The 
function of artificial agents is to draw conclusions and make decisions on 
the basis of information supplied to them. But we do not want them to draw 
just any old conclusions or make just any old decisions. We want them to 
draw rational conclusions and make rational decisions. ... ^ 
To demonstrate his idea, Pollock created the most famous argumentation system 
OSCAR [Pollock, 1995, Pollock, 1996] which comprised of an argumentation agent with 
common sense reasoning capability. OSCAR was based on his theory of defeasible 
reasoning. The theory borrows ideas from philosophical analysis of defeasibility. For 
example, it uses prima facie and suppositional reasoning to model defeasible arguments 
inference process of human beings. Pollock argued that human beings did not really 
reason with techniques in classical theorem provers. Instead, human beings were used 
to reason with suppositions. Suppositions represent things assumed to be true but not 
yet proved to be. In this way, human beings usually apply both backward chaining and 
forward chaining concurrently in the searching process. Classical theorem provers, on 
the other hand, mostly inference using either backward or forward chaining. 
^See http://www.u.axizona.edu/^pollock/ 
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flY(t)::::=:::::: not fly(t) 
Figure 3.5: An example of inference graph 
Formally, Pollock's OSCAR framework is presented in a special structure called 
inference graph. An inference graph is an extended inheritance network with three 
kinds of links, namely defeasible links • “ • ••，deductive links • and defeat 
links ••. Nodes on two ends of a link are propositions or formulas in First 
Order Logic (FOL). Figure 3.5 shows an inference graph depicting the example in 
Figure 3.4. It is not difficult to see that defeasible links and deductive links represent 
indefeasible and defeasible implications , respectively. A defeat link represents a source 
node undermining a target node. Conflicts are detected through defeat links. They are 
resolved according to intuitions drawn from analysis of classical paradox like lottery 
paradox. Semantics of Pollock's framework is based on natural deduction. He showed 
that OSCAR's inference was sound. 
As nodes in an inference graph are FOL formulas, Pollock's framework allows rea-
soning over indefinite information in the form of disjunctive logic. There is no notion 
of "non-provable" which implies a deficiency in reasoning with incomplete information. 
For reasoning over inconsistent information, the concepts of rebut and undercut are sup-
ported. To resolve rebuttal and undercut conflicts, OSCAR uses probabilistic approach 
and forbids arbitary ordering of rules. 
3.3.4 Dung's Abstract Argumentation Framework 
Pollock's argumentation framework is rich in new concepts. Phan Minh Dung, on the 
contrary, attempted to provide a minimalistic argumentation framework. His argumen-
tation theory [Dung, 1995] is a full abstract analysis of defeasibility. The framework 
only assumes the existence of an attacking relation between arguments and there is no 
syntactical restrictions on the representation language. In this way, Dung has neatly 
detached the subtleties of any particular logics from the framework and introduced a 
CHAPTER 3. ARGUMENTATION 34 
generic conflict resolution methodology. 
Dung's argumentation semantics and proof theory are based on the notion of at-
tacks relation. An argumentation framework AF is a binary-tuple < AR, attacks > 
where AR and attacks are language specific representation of arguments and the at-
tack relation over AR respectively. Argument Argi is said to attack argument Arg2 
if the tuple {Arg1^Arg2) is in attacks. The attacks relation models an uni-directional 
conflicts between two arguments. A mutual conflict occurs when two tuples differ in 
order, i.e. {Arg1,Arg2) and {Arg2,Arg1) model the two mutual conflicting arguments 
Argi and Arg2. An argument is acceptable to an argument set ArgSet if and only 
if all of its attackers are attacked by the arguments in the argument set ArgSet. It 
becomes clear that Dung's intuition is to let every attack succeed "locally". In other 
words, an external order, as an arbitrator between conflicting parties of an attack, is 
not required. The "global" status is determined by who is the last attacker. Let F 
be an operator for mapping a set of arguments P to another set of arguments P' such 
that P' is acceptable to P. T is monotone. Knaster — Tarski theorem stated that: 
"Suppose (L, <) is a complete lattice, and f is any monotone map from L to L. Then 
f has a least-fixed point and a greatest fixed-point."^ Therefore , a fix-point semantics 
for AF is available for finite AF. Further, a sound and complete proof theory for this 
semantics can be obtained easily by reverting the fix-point operator. 
With the above minimalistic framework, Dung showed that a wide class of nonmono-
tonic formalisms could be subsumed through specialization of the underlying language 
definition and the definition of attacks to reflect the forms of inconsistencies. The list 
of subsumed formalisms included the well-known Stable Argumentation Framework, 
Well-founded Argumentation Framework ^ , Reiter's Default Logic and Pollock's In-
ductive Defeasible Logic. In [Dung and Son, 1995, Dung and Son, 1996], it was further 
shown that acceptability can be extended to provide prioritized reasoning mechanism, 
similar to Touretzky's inheritance framework in Section 3.3.2. 
The major strength of Dung's framework is on its abstraction over particular logics. 
As such, abstract argumentation per se sheds no light on reasoning over indefinite infor-
mation which is essentially specific to language representation. The kind of prioritized 
reasoning proposed in [Dung and Son, 1996] is still based on specificity which is shown 
to be too restrictive in Section 2.2.2. Dung does not support prioritized reasoning based 
on external order [Dung, 1995]. As a result, it can only partially support reasoning with 
inconsistent information. The abstract framework itself does not presuppose the notion 
of "non-provable" and thus cannot reason with incomplete information. 
^For details of fix-point theory, readers can refer to [Piotr Rudnicki, 1996] 
^See Chapter 2 for details. 
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3.3.5 Lin and Shoham's Argument System 
Lin and Shoham's argument system (LS) [Lin and Shoham, 1989] was an attempt to 
subsume different nonmonotonic reasoning frameworks within argumentation theory. It 
was shown [Lin and Shoham, 1989] that Reiter's default logic [Reiter, 1980], Konolige's 
autoepistemic logic [Konolige, 1989], Clark's negation as failure [Clark, 1978] and Mc-
Carthy's circumscription [McCarthy, 1980] could all be subsumed within this Argument 
System. 
In LS, there are two kinds of rules, namely monotonic and nonmonotonic rules. A 
rule takes the form of "Ai , . . . , An ^ B,, or "A" (also known as a fact). In the rule 
A i , . . . , An ">• B, Ai... An are known as conditions whereas B is the conclusion. An 
argument is a rooted tree formed by chaining all such rules together. An argument 
structure T of a set of rules R is a set of arguments such that it is monontonically 
closed and consistent. The notion of argument structure is the core of LS. The set of 
aforementioned nonmonotonic frameworks are subsumed by introducing new concepts 
on top of the argument structure. In this way, argument structure is nothing but the 
intersection of subsumed semantics. 
Lin and Shoham's framework enforces argument consistency thus conflicts are avoided 
rather than resolved as in the other cases. It does not address the issue of prioritized 
reasoning in avoidance of conflicts. Thus, LS does not support conflict resolution in 
the strict sense. LS supports reasoning over indefinite and incomplete information in 
two different extensions, namely subsumption of circumscription and subsumption of 
default logic. However, the two extension does not combined to form a unified support 
of reasoning over indefinite and incomplete information. 
3.3.6 Vreeswijk's Abstract Argumentation 
Vreeswijk's framework [Vreeswijk, 1991] is radically different from Dung's abstract ar-
gumentation framework. Although Dung's argumentation framework is intended to be 
abstract, it was essentially geared towards logic programming. Vreeswijk, on the other 
hand, approached the problem from a more philosophical viewpoint. He attempted to 
tackle the philosophical problems found in previous argumentation frameworks includ-
ing Pollock's, Dung's and Loui's mentioned in [Vreeswijk, 1997]. 
Formally, Vreeswijk's Abstract Argumentation framework is defined on rules of def-
inite form 4>i, 4>2,. •. , 4>n�^ over a language L where elements (jn and ^ are members 
of L. The "fake" s y m b o l � a r e actually substituted with either ~^  or => in actual 
rules. ">• and => denote non-defeasible and defeasible implications, respectively. An 
argument is a set of rules chained together through matching elements. An argument 
Arg is based on a member set P of L if all unchained elements on the left hand side of 
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rules are in P. Two or more^ arguments ai, a2,...，an are in conflict if the inconsistent 
symbol 丄 is derivable from them, i.e. a1,a2, • • •，o,n�丄.Conclusive forces of conflict-
ing arguments are calculated through an abstract function H which is provided by the 
users. Vreeswijk enforced that H must be reflexive, transitive and closed. Conflicts are 
resolved by giving preference to the maximal alternative(s). 
There are two points deserved emphasizing in Vreeswijk's argumentation theory. 
First, the concept of n-ary conflict is actually nothing new to our understand of com-
mon sense reasoning. However, it was not until Vreeswijk that it was formally captured 
in argumentation research. Second, Vreeswijk's conflict resolution methodology is some-
what between the fully abstracted approach [Dung, 1995] and the specificity approach 
pung and Son, 1996] — i.e. it is less restrictive than the latter yet more restricted than 
the former. An intermediate degree of restriction is pragmatic and guarantees finite 
computation. 
Vreeswijk's framework provides an in-depth analysis of conflicts due to inconsis-
tency and supports prioritized reasoning. As such, it is a very promising approach to 
reasoning over inconsistent information. For reasoning with incomplete information, 
it cannot model "non-provable" knowledge. Lastly, it does not address the issue of 
reasoning over indefinite information at all. 
3.3.7 Kowalski and Toni's Uniform Argumentation 
Robert Kowalski and Prancesca Toni's argumentation framework 
Kowalski and Toni, 1996] also followed the line of abstract argumentation. Similar 
to Dung, they showed that argumentation could subsume most existing nonmonotonic 
logics like default logics [Reiter, 1980], stable semantics of extended logic programs 
Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988], nonmonotonic modal logic [McDermott, 1982] and au-
toepistemic logic [Moore, 1985], Interestingly, their formulation was based not on a 
inconsistency oriented symbol but the notion of "non-provability". Kowalski et. al. 
showed that most problems in the aforementioned nonmonotonic logics could be trans-
formed into problems of "non-provability". This gave rise to a completely different 
approach with many useful properties which we will mention later. 
Kowalski and Toni's framework is based on definite logic programming with two 
kinds of negation, namely default negation and classical negation. Rules are of the 
form P if Q and � R where � R means “R is non-provable". Explicit negation of a 
literal is modelled by a transformation of every rule "P if Q and � R and � n o t _ P " 
where notJP is a newly introduced literal denoting "the explicitly negated P". Further, 
the framework facilitates transformation of prioritized reasoning to a "non-provability" 
®It is worth noting that a conflict here may involve more than two arguments. Thus, in a more 
general sense, it is n-ary. 
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form. The transformation is done by extending the concept of rule to include unique 
naming. Consider the following two rules: 
rl : P if Q and �not_P 
r2 : not.P if R and � P 
A preference of rule rl over rule r2 can be transformed into the following program: 
not_P if R and � P and �r2_defeated 
r2-defeated if Q and �not_P and �rl_de]Med 
P if R and � P and �rl_defeated. 
It is easy to see that rl.defeated and r2_defeated are references of other rules. Se-
mantically, the meanings of such references must be interpreted at a level higher than 
other normal literals, e.g. P, Q, R. Such interpretations are provided in meta-level 
reasoning ®. 
For reasoning over indefinite information, their framework involves only non-disju-
nctive logic programs and cannot model indefinite information. As it supports both 
default negation and transformation of explicit negation, reasoning over incomplete in-
formation is supported. Furthermore, it facilitates prioritized reasoning through trans-
formation. Thus, it can reason with inconsistent information. 
3.3.8 John Fox's Qualitative Argumentation 
John Fox's argumentation theory, logic of argumentation LA^ focused on reasoning 
over risks qualitatively [Krause P, 1993]. In [Krause P and J, 1995], he argued that 
quantitative reasoning like certainty factors and probability was not universal. There 
are domains in which quantitative measures are difficult to obtain and even if they were 
obtainable, their accuracy would be very low. For example, casting a measure over a 
segment of real number axis usually assumes a linear relation. Intermediate values are 
interpreted according to interpolation or alike. But, how could we quantify "like a 
bit" if the extreme points "hate" and "love" are valued 0 and 1，respectively. There is 
simply no objective measure in domains like this. Averaged value definitely introduces 
errors into specific cases. In qualitative domains, a qualitative measurement is usually 
much more desirable than an exact one. We would certainly like the expert system to 
tell us "like a bit" rather than 0.345687. 
LA is based on minimal logic with operators & (conjunction),�(implication) and 
丄（falsum) on propositional level only. Negation of a proposition or formula a (^a) 
is represented by a〕丄.Zi4 manipulates labelled formula of the form arg : formula 
®It is impossible to cover the field of meta-level reasoning in this thesis. Interested readers see 
[Bowen and Kowalski, 1982, Kowalski and Kim, 1991]. 
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where arg is the argument supporting formula. Arguments axe recursively defined 
through A-calculus and categorical logic?. 
The strength of LA lies in its affinity with categorical logic. It can determine 
whether a proposition is certain, confirmed, probable, plausible, supported or open. The 
sequence represents a decreasing sequence of confidence about a proposition. It is 
interesting to note that six categories are defined solely on the linguistic features of 
LA and without any quantitative measure. These categories enable conflict resolution. 
However, linearity of the ordering sequence implies only maximal or minimal function 
can be used. In either way, the priority hierarchy for conflict resolution is fixed and is 
independent of the context of conflicts nor the underlying content. 
LA does not contain the non-provability operator. As a result, it does not allow 
default negation to be modelled. Thus, it does not allow reasoning over incomplete 
information. The notion of inconsistency is core to LA. However, LA is not paracon-
sistent. Although LA does not have the problematic schema P&z,P�Q, the support 
of 丄 will lead to establishment of all negated propositions. Contradictory data can 
cause disastrous effect. In this regard, LA is insufficient in reasoning over inconsistent 
information. It is also unclear how indefinite knowledge is modelled LA. 
3.3.9 Thomas Gordon's Pleading Games 
Gordon's pleading game {PG) [Gordon, 1993], is a model-theorectic semantics for argu-
mentation. It is a normative formalization and computational model of civil pleading, 
founded in Robert Alexy's discourse theory [Alexy, 1989]. 
In PG, an argumentation system is a tuple < K, E > in which K denotes < L, D >. 
L denotes non-defeasible generic knowledge; E case-specific evidence and D the set 
of defeasible rules. All L,D,E are first order sentences. An argument is a set of 
assumptions A such that A U E U L ^ 丄 where |= denotes the classical entailment 
relation. An argument supports $ ifAU^^UL |= $. PG restricts the set ofstatements of 
the form of claim, argument, rebuttal and denial whose semantics is self-explanatory. 
The set of permitted assertions includes concede, deny, defend and declare. The set 
of permitted moves in a pleading game is the union of statements and assertions. 
As PG is based on first order sentences®, it can represent indefinite information as 
well as expUcit negation. As a result, it supports analysis of disjunctive logic, explicit 
negation and undercut attacks. However, Gordon did not define how conflict toleration 
can be done nor did he address the issue of reasoning under incomplete information. 
^Discussion of A-calculus and categorical logic are out of the scope of this thesis. Interested readers 
can refer to [Barendregt, 1981] and [Wybraniec-Skardowska, 1991], respectively. 
®Here we use Gordon's notion. Effectively, a first order sentence is a rule. 
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3.3.10 Chris Reed's Persuasive Dialogue 
Chris Reed's argumentation theory, Persuasive Dialogue {PD), originated from the 
study of dialogue planning. In particular, Reed focused on how to produce an objective 
plan according to beliefs and intentions using a hierarchical planner. Prom a logical 
point of view, a plan for achieving an objective was similar to a proof to establish a 
thesis. 
The central idea of Reed's argumentation theory is persuasiveness, the strength 
of an argument, which inherently assumes a multi-agent setting for discussion. In a 
dialogue scenario, Reed pointed out that content order in an argument are critical to 
persuasiveness of an argument. The responsibility of an argumentation system is then 
to order argument contents so as to maximize the persuasiveness. Reed borrowed ideas 
from psychology and rhetoric analysis, and proposed a belief framework to tackle this 
problem. 
PD assumes non-disjunctive arguments and thus cannot model indefinite knowledge. 
In addition, Reed did not mention how to model incomplete and indefinite information 
Reed et al., 1996]. Moreover, the issue of prioritized reasoning was not addressed. 
3.3.11 Ronald Loui's Argument Game 
Ronald Loui's argument game [Loui, 1994, Loui and Chen, 1992] was based on a back-
ward argumentation. A proposition would be supported if there was an undefeated 
argument supporting it. Loui's framework [Loui, 1994] could be regarded as a logical 
formulation of Toulmin's model with the extension of "negotiation method". 
Formally, an argument is a 3-tuple < ¢7¾, 6¾, d{Ci) > where Ci is a case, hi a basis 
and d{Ci) a claim. A basis is a set of rules. A case is an instance of facts. A claim is a 
defeasible conclusion inferred from a case based on a basis. Loui's definition of defeat 
among arguments is through classical provability operator 卜 9 s^ follow: 
An argument < Ci,bi,d(Ci) > defeats another argument, < Cj, bj,d(Cj)〉， 
ifand only if case d{Ci)Ud(Cj) h 丄 and bj C 6¾ where 丄 is the inconsistency 
symbol. 
It is easy to see that the above notion of defeat assumes a lower level language in 
which h is defined. Thus, Loui's argument games are generic to any logical languages 
with the derivation operator h. The constraint of bj C bi ensures that inconsistency 
is the result of adding new things. It characterizes the non-monotonic properties of 
an argument game, i.e. adding new information does not yield more correct results. 
9卜 is the proof-theoretic counterpart of _ . For more information on proof theory, readers can refer 
to [Kleene, 1967]. 
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Another interesting feature of Loui's framework is its negotiation method. This method 
resolves conflicts through a matrix with conflicting parties on orthogonal sides. Each 
side is a list of possible alternatives. Negotiation is done through finding the best 
combining options. 
As Loui's framework only assumes a derivation operator 卜 in the underlying lan-
guage, it is applicable to disjunctive logic. It can cope with defeats caused by incon-
sistency. But it does not support defeats due to default negation. Loui's framework 
supports an extensive conflict resolution method through payoff matrix analysis. 
3.3.12 Verheij's Reason-Based Logics and CumulA 
Bart Verheij identified that most existing argumentation frameworks were catered for 
specific applications and were not general enough. He proposed Reason-Based Logic 
(RBL) and CumulA to attack both lower and upper levels modelling of arguments. 
Similar to first order logic and propositional logic, RBL is an alternative for the 
underlying logic for argumentation. Contrast to existing formalisms, RBL is more 
descriptive and yet more complex. For example, it involves complicated conceptual 
analysis of arguments and different argument predicates like Applicable, Applies, Ex-
ception, Excluded, Prevails, Reason, Outweighs, Underlies [Verheij, 1996, p-34]. With 
these comprehensive descriptive predicates, he showed that the system could model a 
diverse set of argument structures. 
On top of argument structures, Verheij proposed CumulA as an upper level mod-
elling tool. CumulA operated on the abstraction of Arguments and ArgumentSchemes. 
Conflicts and process of resolution were modelled with similar techniques as RBL. 
He showed that almost all existing argumentation frameworks , like Lin and Shoham 
Lin and Shoham, 1989], Vreeswijk [Vreeswijk, 1997], Pollock [Pollock, 1994], Dung 
Dung, 1995], Loui [Loui and Chen, 1992], could be subsumed. The resulting frame-
work is capable of characterizing the afore-mentioned frameworks from five aspects: 
type of arguments, argument structure and defeat, individual or groupwise defeat, trig-
ger of defeat and direction of argument. 
Verheij's system is strong in modelling power but weak in the following aspects: 
There is no real correspondence between RBL and CumulA although they are coun-
terparts on conceptual level. Strictly speaking, there is no operational model for RBL 
and CumulA working as a whole. In summary, its strength is on complete analysis of 
arguments and argument structure instead of integrated reasoning, 
3.3.13 Prakken's Defeasible Argumentation 
Prakken's framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] is essentially based on argument anal-
ysis in nonmonotonic reasoning system using extended logic programming with two 
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kinds of negations, namely default negation � a n d explicit negation，. In addi-
tion, Prakken borrowed the ideas from Brewka's extended well-founded semantics 
Brewka, 1996] to come up with an argumentation theory with defeasible priority. Pri-
ority for determining result of defeat was derived dynamically through a meta-level 
operator. The framework not only supports nonmonotonicity in knowledge but it can 
also maintain the order of knowledge. 
Arguments in Prakken's framework was defined as acyclic directed graph of definite 
logic programs. Through explicit negation and default negation, he managed to express 
conflict structures which were not expressible in traditional nonmonotonic reasoning 
framework like default logic. 
For a long time, specificity was considered as one of the most important norm 
for conflict resolution. Prakken pointed out that this does not apply to legal domain 
where preference imposed by hierarchical structure is more superior. In fact, this is also 
true for domains whose knowledge may contain erroneous information. In Prakken's 
framework, conflict resolution is done through an external preference relation. In the 
non-defeasible variant of Prakken's argumentation system [Prakken and Sartor, 1997], 
preference relation are abstracted and can be combined with probabilistic mechanisms. 
In the defeasible variant, the preference relation is embedded in the propositional lan-
guage. 
With all the above features under the same framework, Prakken proved that if the 
input clause set was propositional and was finite in size, both non-defeasible and defea-
sible variants of his framework were sound and complete [Prakken and Sartor, 1997 . 
Prakken's framework does not have all the merits of other frameworks like rich 
descriptive power of CumulA, suppositional power of Pollock's defeasible reasoning 
framework, n-ary conflict models in Vreeswijk's abstract argumentation and abductive 
analysis in Kowalski's uniform argumentation framework. His framework is, however, 
a simple and well-balanced integrated model which caters for the two kinds of nega-
tion, prioritized reasoning and proof procedure. His framework does not account for 
argumentation in disjunctive setting where indefinite knowledge is modelled. Thus, it 
cannot analysis or resolve conflicts arised by indefinite information. 
3.3.14 Summary of existing frameworks 
Among the above thirteen argumentation frameworks in artificial intelligence research, 
we briefly classify them into pioneer works and recent works. 
Pioneer works include those by Poole, Touretzky et. al., Pollock, Dung and Lin 
et. al. Table 3.2 summarized the features and weaknesses of these frameworks re-
garding to reasoning over indefinite, inconsistent and incomplete information. Prom 
Table 3.2, we see that most pioneering frameworks only concentrated on the problem 
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of inconsistency. Although Lin and Shoham's argument framework can cater for all 
three aspects, it tackles the three problems independently in different extensions rather 
than in an integrated system. On the contrary, Pollock's framework is an integrated 
approach for reasoning over indefinite and inconsistent information. The issue of in-
tegrating reasoning over incomplete information was untouched by most the pioneer 
frameworks. Inconsistency, indefiniteness and inompleteness are inter-wined. Their 
subtle relationship renders reasoning with them separately futile. 
Table 3.3 summarizes recent works on argumentation in artificial intelligence. These 
works can be classified into three directions, namely symbolic inferencing (Vreeswijk, 
Kowalski, Verheij, Prakken) , qualitative analysis (Loui, John fox) and natural language 
processing (Chris Reed, Thomas Gordon). Chris Reed and Thomas Gordon concen-
trated on the relation between argumentation and dialogue systems. Loui and John 
Fox focused on qualitative analysis of negotiation and risks, respectively. It is worth 
noting that John Fox's framework already highlighted the uncertainty reasoning which 
naturally points to reasoning over incomplete , indefinite and inconsistent information. 
Vreeswijk, Kowalski et. al., Verheij and Prakken all focused on problems in symbolic 
inference. Prakken's framework deserves special attentions as it is close to what we 
want in an ideal reasoning framework. 
One of the major weaknesses of Prakken's framework is its lack of support for 
reasoning over indefinite information. For those frameworks with this support (e.g. 
Pollock, Lin and Shoham, Thomas Gordon), their abilities to deal with indefinite in-
formation stem from First Order Logic. But they did not address the intricacies of 
indefinite information in any details similar to what we have discussed in Section 2.4 
and 2.5. Despite of that, Prakken's framework provides a sophisticated and pragmatic 
method to reasoning over incomplete and inconsistent information. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed two philosophical argumentation models and thirteen 
existing argumentation frameworks. It was shown that several argumentation frame-
works are particular useful in reasoning over incomplete, inconsistent and incomplete 
information. They are Dung's, Lin and Shoham's, Kowalski's, Gordon's and Prakken's 
frameworks. Among these, Prakken's framework is most practical and simple. It in-
herited the merits of Dung's dialectical proof procedure. Thus, we choose Prakken's 
framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] as our basis. In our research, we focus on how to 
incorporate the ability of reasoning over indefinite information to the basic framework 
of Prakken. We shall study the relations among indefinite information, inconsistent 
information and incomplete information. Moreover, we shall discuss the problems in 
distributed artificial intelligence applications and provide possible solutions. These lay 
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Table 3.2: Summary of pioneer argumentation frameworks 
FRAMEWORKS REASONING REASONING REASONING 
WITH WITH WITH 
INCOMPLETE INDEFINITE INCONSISTENT 
INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION 




Touretzky et. al.'s x x o2. 
Inheritance Network 
Pollock's X V o3 
Theory of Defeasible 
Reasoning 
Dung's X X o4 
Abstract 
Argumentation 
Lin and Shoham's o5 o5 06 
Argument System 
‘V，，denotes good support. "0" denotes fair support, "x" denotes bad or no support. 
1. Only conflict avoidance. No conflict resolution. 
2. Only specificity. No general priority. 
3. Only probabilistic. No general priority. 
4. Only specificity. Abstract proof theory. No general priority. 
5. Support through semantic correspondance. 
6. Only conflict avoidance. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of recent argumentation frameworks 
FRAMEWORKS~~~REASONING REASONING REASONING 
WITH WITH WITH 
INCOMPLETE INDEFINITE INCONSISTENT 
INFORMATION INFORMATION INFORMATION 
Vreeswijk's Abstract x x ^/l 
i^if|^entation 
尊令 




John Fox's X x o4 
Qualitative 
Argumentation 
Thomas Gordon's x y/ o5 
Pleading Games 
Chris Reed's x x 06 
Persuasive Dialogue 
Loui's X X o7 
Argument Game 
Verheij's 0 x 0 
RBL and CumulA 
Prakken's ^| x V 
Defeasible 
Argumentation 
'V，denotes good support. "0" denotes fair support, "x" denotes bad or no support. 
1. Support through abstract prioritized reasoning. 
2. Support through logic programs transformation. 
3. Support through program transformation. 
4. Only rebuttal. 
5. Only rebuttal and undercut attacks. No prioritized reasoning. 
6. Support only inconsistency type. 
7. Support through pay off matrix. 
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In this chapter, we propose an argumentation framework, Disjunctive Argumentation 
Semantics I (DAS-I) [Ng et al., 1998b] which is motivated by the need of a unified 
framework for common sense reasoning over indefinite, inconsistent and incomplete in-
formation. Inspired by the work of Dung [Dung, 1995] and Prakken 
Prakken and Sartor, 1997], our framework is based on logic programming as its com-
putation mechanism is most suitable for achieving our objective. We choose Prakken's 
framework as our basis because it can handle reasoning with incomplete and incon-
sistent information in one integrated framework. In the design of DAS-I, we extend 
Prakken's strict argumentation framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] to handle indef-
inite information. 
Prakken's original framework is based on Extended Logic Program (ELP). Our 
main contribution is the broadening of this base to Extended Disjunctive Logic Pro-
gram (EDLP)i. This enables DAS-I to reason with indefinite information besides the 
other two types of uncertain information in a distributed setting. In this chapter, we 
show that integration of indefinite information handling is non-trivial. There are subtle 
relations between indefiniteness and inconsistency in a distributed setting. The popu-
larity and importance of distributed agent systems make such integration essential. 
This chapter is organized as follow: Section 4.1 highlights the problems in combining 
reasoning with indefinite information and reasoning with inconsistent information. In 
Section 4.2，we describe the formal definition of arguments in the DAS-I framework. 
This shows how we support reasoning with incomplete and indefinite information. This 
is followed by discussions on conflicts within a single agent and between agents in 
Section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. We then discuss the semantics of DAS-I in Section 
iSee Chapter 2 or [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] for details of EDLP. 
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Figure 4.1: A set of distributed knowledge bases 
4.5 followed by an outline of the dialectical proof theory of DAS-I in Section 4.6. The 
relations of DAS-I to existing frameworks are discussed in Section 4.7. In Section 
4.8, we show that DAS-I is paraconsistent; and an illustrative example detailing the 
application of DAS-I is shown in Section 4.9. Lastly, we summarize the chapter in 
Section 4.10. 
4.1 Background 
Instead of a centralized and closed system, our argumentation framework assumes a 
common sense reasoning system comprising of a set of distributed knowledge based 
systems {KBSs) (or agents) as depicted in Figure 4.1. This setting may be due to 
physical distribution of knowledge/information within a single organization or due to 
the two KBSs being owned by two completely different organizations. 
In this setting, conflicts arise in two different situations, namely 
1. Intra-KBS conflicts - conflicts within one KBS\ and 
2. Inter-KBS conflicts - conflicts between multiple KBSs. 
Intra-KBS conflicts are what we have learned in classical conflicts analysis. Conflict 
resolution mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2 presupposed that all knowledge reside 
on one KBS. Conflicts are then analyzed from a single instead of multiple view points. 
Inter-KBS conflicts often exist in a network of KBSs, each managed by parties 
with different interests, such as different departments in a university. Knowledge in 
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the KBSs may overlap with each other either entirely or partially. By overlapping, we 
mean two or more KBSs may contain different variants of a rule. For example, "dark 
sky implies storm" and "dark sky implies storm or at night time" are different variants 
of a casual relation between "dark sky" and "storm". This overlapping usually entails 
different views leading to conflicts to the knowledge base. In the example of Table 
4.1, the industrial development council is usually pessimistic to possible outcomes as a 
result of raising interest-rate whereas the banking authority council usually bears an 
opposite view. 
Table 4.1: Different oppinions of industrial development council and banking authority 
council 
OPINIONS OF INDUSTRIAL OPINIONS OF BANKING 
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL AUTHORITY COUNCIL 
•Raising interest rate lead to drop on *Raising interest rate lead to increase on 
employment rate. employment rate. 
•Raising interest rate lead to pressure on •Raising interest rate lead to pressure on 
industry. industry or stimulate financial related 
sectors. 
Due to security issues and data integrity, it may not be practical to modify the 
KBSs of either the industrial development council or banking authority council just for 
avoiding such subtle conflicts. This is because other parts of the KBSs may depend on 
the modified knowledge. In practice, a sensible strategy in common sense reasoning in 
a distributed setting is to support between various views/opinions; in this way knowl-
edge engineers can draw different conclusions out of them under different circumstances. 
However, discrepancies between distributed KBSs may lead to non-contradictory con-
flicts which is very difficult to be handled simply by classical logic. 
4.2 Definition 
Formally, our argumentation framework DAS-I is defined, in a top-down fashion, as 
follows: A literal is either an atom or an atom prepended w i t h，. If a literal 1 is an 
atom a then lis ~<a. If / is ~<a then fis a. A literaUis the complement or complementary 
counterpart of 1. 
An argumentation system AS is a binary-tuple < Ags^ Pg > where Ags is a collec-
tion of distributed argumentation KBSs/agents and Pg is a preference hierarchy be-
tween these agents. For example, an argumentation system "A<Si = < < Agi, Ag2, Ags > 
, < < A g 1 , A g 2 � ’ < Ag2,Ags〉>〉，，consists of three argumentation agents Agi, Ag2 
« 
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and Ags, and a preference hierarchy << Ag1,Ag2〉，< Ag2,Ag3 » . 
An argumentation agent Ag is a binary-tuple < R, P > where R is a set of rules and 
P is a preference hierarchy between these rules. For example, an argumentation agent 
^^ Agi 二<< Ri,R2〉，<>>" consists of two rules Ri and R2, and an empty preference 
hierarchy < � . 
A preference hierarchy P is a binary relation in which we say “s is preferred than 
沒” (denoted by s > g) if and only if < s,g >G P. Preference hierarchy is used when 
conflicts are detected between two agents or two rules of the same agent. For example, 
the preference hierarchy “<< Ag1,Ag2 >, < Ag2, Ags〉>，，of an argumentation system 
means agent AgiS conclusion is preferred than agent Ag2's and Ag2's is preferred 
than Ag^s if they are conflicting. Consider another example, a preference hierarchy 
" < < R1,R2 > > " of an argumentation agent means that JRi's conclusion is preferred 
over Ba,s if they are in conflict. 
A rule is an EDLP clause of the form, 
r : ai A • •. A a/A � a z + i A . . . A � a m — o,m+i V . . . V (½ 
where r is the name of the rule, ai,...，an are all l i tera ls ,� i s the non-provable 
operator 2. Prepending � t o a literal 1 means the literal must be non-provable in 
the result for � 1 to be true. T h u s , � i s an assumption introducing operator. It is 
introduced to support common sense reasoning with indefinite information. Figure 4.2 
depicts a structural view of a rule r. 
It should be noted that the the term "provable" assumes an inference operation. 
The inference operation in classical logic is clearly defined as the classical entailment 
sign |=. In our framework, a literal 1 is "provable" if and only ifthere exists an argument 
with 1 in its conclusions. This is, however, paradoxical. In order to determine whether 
� 1 is true, we have to determine the result first. However, we need to determine the 
status of � 1 first before we can determine the result. Such paradox can be resolved by 
two levels of defeating, i.e. "defeat" and "strictly defeat" (see later). 
We denote Cd{r) = {a i , . . . ,flrn}, Cn(r) 二 {am+i,... ,(½}, Strong{Cd{r))= 
{a i , . . . ,ai} and Weak(Cd{r)) = {a!+i,.. . ,ayn}. Strong{Cd(r)) is the set of strong 
conditions of rule r. Weak{Cd{r)) is the set of weak conditions. 
For example, in the rule "rs ••�criminal_record ^ ^murderer^^, Cd(rs) is { crim-
inaLrecord }，Cn{rs) is { ^murderer }, Strong{Cd{rs)) is { } and Weak{Cd{r^)) is { 
criminaLrecord }. 
For another example, in the rule "r5 : finger_print ^ murderer V owner^,, Cd{r^) 
2 � a means a is not derivable. The non-provable operator � i s an operator commonly used in 
nonmonotonic logics [Clark, 1978]. 
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Figure 4.2: Structural view of a EDLP rule 
is { finger-print}, Cn(r5) is { murderer, owner } ’ Str0ng(Cd{r5)) is { fingerjprint } 
and Weak{Cd{rs)) is { } . 
We define the function certain{r) under the context of an argument. It denotes a 
literal in the conclusion of an indefinite rule which is not pruned by the certain() 
of previous rule(s)^. Effectively, the function certain denotes a "definite" reading 
of an "indefinite" clause. For example, the value of certair1{r5) is murderer in the 
following argument: { r4 : ~> finger_print, r5 : fingerjprint ^ murderer V owner，ry 
；� o w n e r s h i p ^ ^owner }; this is because ^^owner^^ in r5 is pruned by r7. 
Next, we introduce the core unit for dialectical reasoning, i.e. arguments, as follows: 
Definition 1 An argument Arg is a finite sequence of rules {ro,... ,r;v} in which 
every rule ri satisfies the following conditions. 
1. Ifp G Strong(Cd{ri)) then there exists r G {ro,... ,rj_i} and p = certain{r). 
2. There exists q G Cn(ri), denoted as certain(ri), such that if 1 E {Cn(ri) — q} 
_ i-l 
then 1 G U certain{rj). 
j=o 
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3. There does not exist r G {ro, . . . , r j_i } such that certain{ri) = certain{r) and 
certain(ri) = certain(r). 
Condition 1 ensures that any rule, r^ , must have been supported by previous rules 
or itself is grounded (i.e. when i = 0). Conditions 2 and 3 ensure that a rule must have 
a unique meaning and rules in argument are not redundant, respectively. Restriction 
imposed by condition 2 is for the sake of simplicity in demonstrating inter-KBS conflicts. 
Below is an example of an argument, 
ro : ~> finger-print 
ri :�ownership ^ ^owner 
r*2 : fingerjprint ~> murderer V owner 
To verify that it is indeed an argument, we may check the three conditions one by 
one as follows: 
• For condition 1 : Strong(Cd(ro)) and Strong(Cd{ri)) are empty and 
Str0ng{Cd{r2)) is finger.print certain(ro) is also fingerjprint. Thus, finger.print 
=certain(ro). 
• For condition 2 : Both Cn(ro) and Cn{ri) contain one element only. Thus 
only Cr1{r2) needs to be considered, certain(ro) and certain(ri) are fingerjprint 
and ^owner, respectively. Notice that Cr1{r2) is {murderer, owner} and we can 
conclude that certair1{r2) is murderer as the complement of owner can be found 
in certain(ri). In summary, we have the following certain reading of r0,n,r2: 
—certain(ro) =finger_print 
—certain(ri) = "ioiyn6r* 
—certain(r2) = murderer 
• For condition 3 : It is obvious that there does not exist i ^ j such that 
certain(ri) = certain(rj) or certain(ri) = certain{rj). 
Every argument has its own assumptions. For an argument Arg = { r。，ri, • • •，r„ }, 
its assumption set is the union of all weak literals of its rules, i.e. \Jj.^Arg Weak{Cd{r)). 
Assumption set of the above argument is {ownership}. Conclusion of an argument is 
the set of certain() readings of its rules. For the above argument, its conclusion set is 
{fingerjprint, -^owner, murderer}. 
« 
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4.3 Conflicts within a KBS 
Under our framework, conflicts within a KBS is referred to as intra-KBS conflicts. As 
an example, consider the following segment of a legal knowledge base < R, P � . 
i2 = { 
r4 : ~> fingerjprint 
r5 : fingerjprint ^ murderer V owner 
r7 ;�ownership -^ ^owner 
r*8 :�criminaljrecord -^ ^murderer 
r% : murderer ^ put-into-jail 
rg : ">• criminaLrecord 
} 
P = 0 
Prom the above, the following arguments are found: 
1. Argi is comprised of r4,r5, and r7. 
2. Arg2 entails Argi and re. Irrespective of the outcome of the proof of ownership 
(r7), Arg<2 always leads to the conclusion that the murderer should be 
putJnto-jail. Thus, both murderer and putJnto-jail are certain() in Argi. 
3. Args is formed solely by rg. Thus, certain() of Arg3 (i.e. ^murderer) is incon-
sistent with that of Arg2 (i.e. murderer). This kind of head-on conflicts is called 
rebut. 
4. Arg4 entails rg alone. Note that it attacks the assumption of Arg^. We call this 
undercut. 
From the above example, we define the following: 
Definition 2 Arg undercuts Arg' if and only if there exists a rule r in Arg, a rule r' 
in Arg' and a literal p in Weak(Cd{r')) such that p = certain{r). 
Conceptually, an argument, e.g. Arg^, attacks another, e.g. Arg^, if and only 
if the former (Arp4) rejects some assumptions of the latter {Args). In the previous 
example, Arg^^s conclusion set is criminaLrecord whereas Arg3s assumption set is 
criminaLrecord. Arg4 supports conclusion which is assumed non-exist by Arg^. Thus, 
Arg4 is "undercutting" Arg3. 
^ 
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Definition 3 Arg rebut Arg' if and only if there exists a rule r' in Arg' and a rule r 
in Arg satisfying certain{r) = certain{r') and r' > r 0 P. 
Rebuttal attacks lie at conflicts between two arguments. An argument rebuts an-
other if and only if certain() in their conclusion sets are complementary to each other. 
Consider the previous example again, Arg2^s conclusion set is { finger_print, ^owner, 
murderer, put_into_jail } and Arg^s is { ^murderer } . Notice that the only interesting 
parts of the conclusions are murderder of Arg2 and，murderer of Arg^. The two parts 
are clearly inconsistent with each other. Thus, Args is rebutting Arg2. 
In general, ''Args rebuts Arg2" is not equivalent to ''Arg2 rebuts Args. Rebut is 
essentially directional. But in the above example, Args rebuts Arg2 also because the 
preference hierarchy P of < R, P > is undefined/empty. In this situation, rebuts is 
not directional. If P is defined/non-empty, the statement ''Arg3 rebuts Arg2'' must 
be re-assessed under P. We must first find the set of rules involved in the conflicts, 
namely rs of Arg^ and r5 of Arg2. If r5 is not preferred over rg, Arg3 loses. Note that 
r > r' e P is not a feasible scheme. If r > r' G P replaced r' > r 0 P in the above 
definition 3, any two arguments with complementary conclusions would not be rebuting 
if preference hierarchy is not present. In this case, both conflicting conclusions would 
be justified. Our goal is to control conflicts even when preference hierarchy is absent. 
Thus, justifying both conflicting conclusions is unacceptable. 
Definition 4 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) Arg defeats Arg' if, 
1. Arg is empty and, Arg' undercuts itself; or 
2. Arg undercuts Arg'; or 
3. Arg rebuts Arg' and Arg' does not undercut Arg. 
Case 1 of Definition 4 describes the case of a self-attacking argument Arg'. If Arg' 
attacks itself, it is defeated even it is the only argument in a KBS. For example, the 
argument Arg = { r*i : � a ^ b, r^ : b ^ c, r3 : c ~> a } must be defeated. 
Case 2 is introduced to show that argument Argi undercutting argument Arg2 is 
sufficient to conclude a defeat even if Arg2 attacks Argi through rebuttal attacks. The 
justification behind this is the principle of "proofbeyond any reasonable doubts". If any 
part of an argument's assumption set is attacked, that argument is marked "defeated" 
as doubts are casted by others. However, it should be noted that a "defeated" argument 
can be restored to "undefeated" if all of its defeaters are subsequently defeated by some 
undefeated arguments. In that case, the argument is said to be supported by those 
undefeated arguments. 
Case 3 describes that rebuttal attack is insufficient to conclude a defeat. To be 
sufficient, an argument Arg must rebut another argument Arg' when Arg' does not 
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undercut Arg. This is actually the remaining situation not covered by cases 1 and 2 
of Definition 4. It also shows that "undercut" is significantly stronger than "rebut" in 
DAS-I. To illustrates this case, let us consider the following KBS: 
n :�trading_dimirvishing ^ export-good 
T2 : export-good ^ more-employment 
r*3 ; ">• trading-diminishing 
r4 ; trading-diminishing ~> husinessJ>ad 
r5 : business-bad ^ ^morejemployment 
From the above KBS, two arguments Argi = { n, r^ } and Arg2 = { r3, r4, r5 
} are identified. By definition, Arg^ undercuts Argi and Argx rebuts Arg2- In this 
case, Argi cannot defeat Arg2 even Argi rebuts Arg2. The rationale is clear that Arg2 
contains a "firm" proof of trading_diminishing which is assumed by Argi from all of its 
conclusions. 
We then define the asymmetric order strictly defeat as below. 
Definition 5 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) Arg strictly defeats Arg' if and only 
ifArg defeats Arg' but not Arg' defeats Arg. 
The "strictly defeat" concept resolves the situation when argument Arg and argu-
ment Arg' defeat each other. In general, the case Arg strictly defeats Arg' and Arg' 
strictly defeats Arg at the same time is impossible. Thus, "strictly defeat" is asymmet-
ric. It partially orders all arguments in a KBS into a tree form such that arguments at 
level n are strictly defeated by arguments at level n - 1 as depicted in Figure 4.3. 
4.4 Conflicts between KBSs 
In Section 4.1, we have briefly discussed the intertwining properties of indefiniteness 
and inconsistency. In this section, we consider conflicts arised in an argumentation 
system < Ags,Pg�. The following two issues must be addressed in dealing with 
Args: 
• Conflicts between two different pieces of knowledge 
This type of conflicts is classical and we have already described in the Section 
4.3. These conflicts arised because rules are inconsistent, or pairs of them have 
complmenetary conclusions (rebut), or one rule refute the assumption of another 
rule (undercut). In either case, we can see that the conflicting rules are different. 
Either they have completely different conclusions (rebut) or they have different 
assumptions (undercut). Undercuts are strong enough that there are no extra-
neous preferences affecting its determination. Thus, we only have to concentrate 
on resolving rebuts which relies on preference hierarchy. 
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• Conflicts between two variants of the same knowledge 
This type of conflicts is non-classical. They are arised not because of rebuts or 
undercuts. Rather, they are caused by the similarity of two pieces of knowledge. 
Consider the following scenario: Broker A told customer C that stock A would 
rise; and broker B told customer C that stock A or B would raise. Whom should 
customer C believe? In classical logic, we may represent brokers A and B as AgtA 
={ n ; ~> stock_A_rise } and AgtB = { r*2 •• ~> stock.A.rise V stock_B_rise }. In 
classical logic, ri undermines r2 as ri is more definitive than r2. Is this justified? 
If so, why? 
There are many answers to the first issue, for instance probabilistic, catgorical, 
specificity, . •. etc. In DAS-I, we support a consistent style in conflict resolution, i.e. 
a preference hierarchy among KBSs is employed for resolving rebuts between different 
KBSs. This is where the preference hierarchy Pg in < Ags,Pg > comes into play. 
Conflicts pertain to a single KBS can also appear in a group of KBSs. To reflect that 
rebut is based on preference hierarchy, we extend definition 3 by the following 
Definition 6 Arg of Agi e Ags rebuts Arg' of Ag2 G Ags if and only if there exists 
a rule ri in Arg and a rule r2 in Arg' such that certain(ri) 二 certain[r2) and Ag2 > 
Agi i Pg. 
偽 
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Next, we consider the second issue, i.e. conflicts pertaining to uncertainties between 
different KBSs. When knowledge is distributed over a set of agents, it is not uncommon 
to see that the same piece of knowledge represented differently in different agents. For 
example, Table 4.2 shows two agents, Agti and Agt2, each has a different interpretation 
of the same knowledge. It is intuitive to see that Agti would conclude putJnto.jail 
whereas Agt2 would not, owing to the uncertainty in r5. A direct merge of Agti and 
Agt2 would lead to putJnto-jail as Agti dominates the union in the semantics of 
classical logic. However, such a conclusion is based on the assumption that certain 
information is preferred over uncertain information. It is therefore credulous in this 
regard. It is arguable that on what basis can we bear this assumption and cherish 
certain information rather than uncertain ones? By the same token, on what basis we 
want to do it the other way round? 
Table 4.2: Example of two distributed KBSs 
AGENT KNOWLEDGE 
Agti ri :^ fingerjprint 
r*2 ： finger.print ~> murderer 
7*3 :�murderer ~> release 
r& : murderer ~> putJ,nto-jail 
Agt2 r4 :~> fingerjprint 
r5 : fingerjprint ^ murderer V owner 
re : murderer — putJnto-jail 
4.4.1 Credulous View 
From the viewpoint of classical logic, we can interpret a rule r as a revision of another 
rule r' if one shows that r' is too loose a statement (e.g. r2 can revise r5 in Table 4.2). 
We call this a credulous view of distributed knowledge. 
In many traditional common sense reasoning frameworks, without the non-prova-
bility sign 〜，credulous view can help to enlarge the set of positive information. How-
ever, this is not the case for our framework and most other non-monotonic systems 
which attack default reasoning. Consider the example in Table 4.2. If we adopt the 
approach of classical logic, Agti would out-rate Agt2. Further, r3 would be inapplica-
ble and hence, release would not be deduced^. Thus, credulous view is not necessarily 
additive. 
^This is deducible under skeptical view (see next section). 
4k 
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4.4.2 Skeptical View 
When our argumentation framework is applied to domains requiring cautious answers， 
e.g. in legal reasoning domain, credulous inference is highly undesirable as it violates the 
spirit of "proofbeyond any reasonable doubts". Consider the last example, ifownership 
is also a plausible explanation for the evidence of one's finger print on an object, then 
how could we arrive at the conclusion of murderer with certainty? In fact, it is the 
mission ofthe defense legal agent, in practice, to retrieve as many uncertain information 
as possible from legal knowledge bases and use them to presents "reasonable doubts" 
in order to attack the credibility of the accusing evidence. Under such circumstances, 
we would prefer Agt2s view to Agh. Such preference is actually a form of suppression 
and reveals conflicts between different KBSs. Notice that this type of conflict arised 
because of the close similarity between two distributed variants of the same piece of 
information. In syntactic form, we introduce 
Definition 7 A rule ri of Agti thins an argument Arg of Agt2 at rule r2 if and only 
ifr2 is in Arg and Cd{r2) = Cd{ri) and Cr1{r2) C Cn(ri). 
The semantic of thinning is self-explanatory. ri is a more general statement about 
the relation between Cd{r2) and Cr1{r2). It says that Cn{ri) - Cr1(r2) are possible 
outcomes of Cd{r2). In a modal sense, 7*2 implies that given conditions of r2 it is nec-
essary to establish the conclusions of r2 before r2 is established. Thus, the necessity 
implied by r2 is incorrect with respect to ri. Semantically，r*2 in Agt2 weakens the cer-
tainty of ri in Agti. This happens due to a skeptical view in the distributed knowledge 
environment. In general, we refer this as an inter-KBS conflict. 
Inter-KBS-conflicts pertain to any inference schema which supports qualitative un-
certainties like disjunctive in a distributed knowledge setting. A straight forward reso-
lution scheme to inter-KBS conflicts is to eliminate the discrepant literals from the two 
conclusions, i.e. Cn{ri) — Cr1(r2). 
For intra-KBS-conflicts, conflicting rules can easily be determined. It is, however, 
not the same for inter-KBS conflicts as they are arised due to the additional uncertain-
ties (e.g. due to thinning) in the conflicting rule set. We consider a set of auxiliary 
rules to determine which is preferred among the conflicts rules: 
1. If a rule n thins an argument Argi at rule r2, the set of auxiliary rules is 
auxiliary(rur2) 二 {Cd(ri) ^ q\q G (Cn(ri) - Cr1(r2))} and every rule is an 
alias of ri with the same preference hierarchy. 
2. An argument Argi defeats a rule n if r*i thins an argument Arg2 at rule r2 and 
for every auxiliary rule r of auxiliary(r1,r2) there exists a rule r' in Argi such 
that certain(r') of Argi is ^Cn(r). 
« 
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3. An argument Arg is not defeated by a rule ri if ri thins a rule r*2 in Arg and for 
every auxiliary rule r in auxiliary{r1,r2), there exists an argument defeating it. 
Further, we extend "strictly defeat" in [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] as follows: 
Definition 8 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) Argument Argi or rule n strictly de-
feats argument Arg2 or rule r2 if Argi or ri defeats Arg2 or r2 hut not Arg2 or r2 
defeats Argi or r*i. 
To illustrate these ideas, let us consider the example in Table 4.2 again. There is 
an argument Argi = {ri,r2,re} in Agti. By definition, r5 and r*2 of Argi give rise to 
inter-KBS conflict. The set of auxiliary rules is defined as, 
auxiliary(r5,r2) 
={ finger-print ^ q | q G (owner) } 
={ fingerjprint — owner } 
To maintain Argis undefeated status, additional arguments must be found to defeat 
auxiliary rules in auxiliary{r5,r2). However, there is no such a rule in Agti U Agt2. 
Similar to credulous view, skeptical view also does not give us more certain infor-
mation in reasoning. Consideration of the simple example in the last subsection can 
help illustrate this behavior. If we consider r5 as a thinning attacker, put_into_jail 
would not be derived from Agti. Thus, a skeptical view does not, in general, enlarge 
the set of facts concluded. 
4.4.3 Generalized Skeptical View 
In a skeptical view, we only focus on a particular type of similarity between disjunctive 
clauses. In this section, we extend the analysis to general similarity between two similar 
but yet distributed disjunctive clauses. 
Two rules RA and Rs are similar if and only if 
1. Conditions of RA and Rs are the same; and 
2. Conclusion of RA intersects with that of Rs-
For condition 2, we consider the following two distinguished cases: 
1. Subsumption 
Two rules RA and Rs are said to be similar with subsumption if and only if RA 
and Rs are similar, and Cn(RA) is a proper subset of Cn{RB). 
4^ 
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2. Intersection 
Two rules i2^ and Rs are said to be similar with intersection if and only if RA 
and Rs are similar, and Cn{RA)门 Cn{RB) is non-empty. 
Table 4.3 shows schemas mentioned above. 
Table 4.3: Conflicts analysis between similar clauses 
TYPE SCENARIO 
Subsumption RA : Cond ~> Conc 
RB ： Cond "> Canc V A 
Intersection RA : Cond — Conc V r 
Rs ： Cond ~> Conc V A 
The notion of similarity is an extension of skeptical view in which subsumption is 
considered. Thus, we only have to analyze the case of intersection. Consider RA and 
RB in two different arguments ArgA and Args- In this extended setting, RA and Rs 
are conflicting and Rs thins ArgA- To determine the result, we consider the status of 
the rules involved, i.e. the unique meaning of RA in ArgA-
The interesting part is the certain{) of RA- It is possible to be in Conc or r . 
In both situations, we show that a generalized skeptical view does not introduce new 
things and can be tackled by the following techniques: 
1. Case 1 : If certain{RA) G Conc, 
• There exists arguments defeating Cn(RA) 一 certain{RA)-
• r C {Cn{RA) 一 certain(RA)}-
• Thus, there exists arguments defeating F. 
• R^ degenerates to R'^ : Cond — Conc. 
• The problem is then reduced to the subsumption problem in the previous 
section 
-R'^ : Cond ^ Conc 
-RB : Cond ~> Conc V A 
2. Case 2 : If certain{RA) e F, 
• There exists arguments defeating Conc. 
• The problem degenerates into 
4k 
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-R'j^ : Cond — r 
-RB : Cond ~> Conc V A 
• The conflict criteria are no longer met and thus can be neglected. 
The simplicity achieved in Case 2 is due to our unique meaning restriction imposed 
on the argument definition. The situation would be extremely complex ifthe restriction 
was relaxed. 
4.5 Semantics 
N o w we have the bells and whistles to define our argumentation semantics for resolving 
conflicts under uncertainties. Formally, our semantics is based on a fix-point operator H 
which operates on two sets of arguments ArgSet and S. Us(ArgSet) gives a subset of S 
such that all their counter-arguments/counter-rules are strictly defeated by arguments 
in Arg. It can be proved that U is monotone in credulous view, skeptical view and 
generalized skeptical view. The fix-point operator H is essentially the same as Prakken's 
Prakken and Sartor, 1997]. Our semantics differ from his in the definition of "strictly 
defeat" which is the core concept of argumentation. Indeed, there are three kinds of 
fix-point operator. The key point is in what way the notion of counter-argument is 
interpreted. Table 4.4 summarizes the notion of counter-argument for different views 
shown in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
Table 4.4: Counter-arguments for different views 
C R E D U L O U S S K E P T I C A L 




To achieve monotonicity, the fix-point operator n relies on the notion of asymmetric 
order ("strictly defeat") which we introduced in the previous sections. By Knaster-
Tarski theorem, the fix-point U* of H with respect to a set of argument S exists and 
can be obtained as below. 
F(0) = n5(0) 
F{i) = Us{F(i - 1)) 
n j = lim“oo F(i) 
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Let ArgSet be the set of all arguments which can be constructed from an argu-
mentation system AS. A n argument Arg is justified with respect to AS if and only if 
Arg e ^ArgSev i^  is defeated if and only if there exists a justified argument Arg' G AS 
which strictly defeats it; and it is defensible, otherwise. 
4.6 Dialectical proof theory 
Dung proposed a dialectical proof theory for argumentation in [Dung, 1995]. Prakken 
adopted it in his fixed priority framework. As the proof-theory is defined on arguments, 
we show that a simplified version of it can also be used in our framework. 
A proof of an argument is defined on an argument tree. Each internal/external 
node is an argument and their child nodes are their defeaters. A n argument tree T is 
constructed as below. 
1. Level 1 is the proposition to be justified. 
2. At an odd (even) level, a proponent (opponent) makes moves to strictly defeat 
all (any) moves from the opponents (proponents) at the previous levels. 
3. In any branch, an opponent cannot make the same move twice. 
A proponent is said to win a branch of an argument tree if and only if the opponent 
cannot make any further move at the branch; and said to win an argument tree if and 
only if it wins all branches. A n argument Arg is provably justified if it wins over an 
argument tree at level 1; it is provably defeated if it is defeated by a provably justified 
argument; and it is provably defensible, otherwise. It can be shown that an argument 
Arg is provably justified with respect to an argumentation system AS if and only if it 
is justified with respect to AS ^. 
4.7 Relation to existing framework 
As Prakken's strict argumentation framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] is most sim-
ilar to ours. It is easy to see that our approach degenerates to Prakken's strict argu-
mentation framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997] in case of only one knowledge base 
or a set of knowledge bases without disjunctive information. To show this, we firstly 
highlight the differences between our framework and Prakken's as follows: 
1. Rule 
®See appendix for details 
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• Prakken's has two kinds of implications ^  (strict implication) and =>• (de-
feasible implication) whereas we only have one ~> (defeasible implication). 
• Prakken's support definite rules and ours can handle both definite and in-
definite rules. 
2. Rebuttal 
• In Prakken, a set of rules related to a conflict is determined by traversing 
all strict implications only. In DAS-I, there is no such a restriction. 
3. Thinning 
• Prakken's framework does not support the concept of distributed K B S 
whereas DAS-I does. Thinning attacks can only be modelled by DAS-I 
but not by Prakken's framework. 
4. Preference/Priority 
• Prakken's priority is defined for single K B S only. In DAS-I, priority is defined 
on two levels of hierarchy, namely one for intra-KBS conflicts and another 
for inter-KBS conflicts. 
Consider the first difference. Prakken intended to model undefeatable rules with 
strict implications. W e argue that strict implications can be modelled by defeasible 
implications with priority at the top of the preference hierarchy. Consider the following 
example®. 
Given a K B S in Prakken's form as below: 
ri : dark-cloud ^ rain 
r*2 : => dark-cloud 
�3 : =>• ~i rain 
Preference Hierarchy = { } 
Briefly, it describes a general rule "ri ; dark_cloud ~> ram" which is de-
feasible as there are exceptions, r*2 and r3 are strict rules as they are facts 
observed at that moment. In Prakken's framework, conflicts between r3 
and ri are asymmetric as r3 rebuts ri but not the other way round. W e 
can re-write the above program as follows: 
®To avoid confusion of symbols, we literally rename ~> as defeasible implication and =^ as strict 
implication in the example. 
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ri : dark_cloud ~> rain 
r*2 •• — dark-cloud 
r*3 : ">• ~i rain 
Preference Hierarchy 二 { r^ > ri, r*2 > ^i } 
The preference r3 > ri and r2 > n are added to reflect that r2 and r3 
are strict rules and any defeasible rules attacking them must be defeated. 
In general, we can transform programs of Prakken's form into their DAS-I 
equivalences through this technique. 
The second difference is an implication of the first difference. The DAS-I frame-
work is an extension of Prakken's definitions and this accounts for the third difference. 
It is significant only when knowledge is disjunctive and is distributed to serveral dif-
ferent KBSs. Thus, when only one knowledge base is present, there will not be any 
thinning attack. In that situation, our framework reduced to an extended form of 
Prakken's framework, i.e. strict argumentation with disjunctive information handling. 
If a K B S contains only non-disjunctive rules, our framework degenerates to Prakken's 
with the extension of priority handling between different KBSs. W h e n knowledge is 
non-disjucntive and is distributed, our framework is functionally identical to Prakken's 
framework without strict implication. 
The fourth difference shows that our framework can cope with distributed KBSs. 
W h e n only one knowledge base is available, the two-level preference hierarchy degen-
erates to priority relations in Prakken's framework. Further, all arguments in rebuttal 
conflicts are in doubt^ if priority is unavailable. Under this situation, our framework 
reduces to partial semantics similar to Prakken's [Prakken and Sartor, 1997 . 
4.8 Issue on paraconsistency 
As shown in Section 4.7，all rebuttal conflicts are arguable if priority is unavailable. In 
that situation, no two contradictory pair of literals can be justified. Further, we have 
shown in Section 4.3 that the definition of "strictly defeat" is asymmetric. Thus, no 
two contradictory pair of literals can be justified even if priority is present. As a result, 
our framework is paraconsistent. 
4.9 An illustrative example 
Scenario: A company would like to perform strategical planning and to seek an answer 
to the following question: Based on the current economic situations, is it profitable to 
^Formally, an argument is in doubt if it is neither justified nor defeated by another justified argument. 
It is called a defensible argument. 
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start a new production line? 
To proceed, the company consulted two strategic planning experts, experts A and 
B (see Figure 4.4.). It was hoped that individual analysis from the two independent 
sources could help review the intricacies ofthe scenario. Table 4.5 depicts the knowledge 
sets K B A and K B s extracted from experts A and B, respectively. The global order 
between the experts is A > B. 
m 翁 
V ^ ^ 1 ^ 
Expert A /f Expert B 
〇 
1 ^ 力 
^ ^ 
^ < ^ 
company product_line 
Figure 4.4: Scenario of two experts commenting on strategical actions 
Analysis: In KBA, {Ae, A1,A3, A7, A4, A2} form an argument Argi. The unique 
meaning of Argi is newjproductionJine which suggests a new production line for the 
business. {A7,A5} form another argument Arg2. Arg2 concludes that the market is 
stable which is contrary to the rule A3 in Argi. B y definition, Arg2 rebuts Argi. 
According to KBA^s preference hierarchy, Argi wins. Thus, Argi is justified with 
respect to K B A -
In K B B , {Bg,B1,B4,B2} forms an argument Arg3, {Bs} forms Arg4, {Be,Bs} 
forms Ar^5, and {B7, Bs} forms Arge. Args is undercut by Arg^ which is then rebuted 
by Arg&. Argz undercuts Arg4. According to the preference hierarchy, Arge strictly 
defeats Args and Args is then justified. Arg4 is strictly defeated by the justified 
argument Arg-^. 
Consider the notion of skeptical view, we notice that Ai of K B A and Bi of K B s are 
similar knowledge about the relation among "adversary financial factor" , "economic 
grow" and "demand grow". By definition, Bi thins Argi, the argument with Ai. The 
auxiliary rule is then, 
為 
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Table 4.5: Knowledge bases of expert A and expert B 
E X P E R T K N O W L E D G E 
KBA Ai ;�adversary_financial-factor 八 economic_grow ~> demand_grow 
A2 ： stable-market A demand-grow ^ new-productionJine V increase_prod_A 
As : "•>• stable-market 
A4 : ]raw-materiaD-enough — ^increasejprod.A 
A5 : ^raw.material^-enough ― ^stablejmarket 
Ae : ">• economic_grow 
A7 •• ― ^raw-materialJi-enough 
Preference Hierarchy = {A^ > A^] 
Bi :�adversary_financial-factor 八 economic_grow — demand_grow V 
competition_grow 
B2 : competition-grow — ^stable-market 
B3 :�]stable_market 八�adversary_financial_factor ~> 
new-productionJine 
B4 :�demand-increcise ^ ^ demand-grow 
B5 : interest-raise ~> adversary_financiaLfactor 
Be : ~> interest-raise 
Bj : ^ stock-indexjraise 
Bg : stack-indexjraise ~> ~>adversary_financial-factor 
Bg : ^ economic_grow 
Preference Hierarchy 二 {^8 > 5s} 
A{:�adversary-financial_factor A economic_grow ~> competition_grow 
To defeat Bi and restore Ar^i'sjustified status, we have to find arguments rebutting 
A\. However, there is no such arguments. Thus, we have two different conclusions from 
K B A and K B B . Credulous view suggests a new production line whereas skeptical view 
does not suggest any strategic moves. The result is close to our intuitive understanding 
of credulous reasoning and skeptical reasoning. 
4.10 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed the inherent assumption in classical logic ® and how 
it affects distributed reasoning under uncertainties. W e have proposed an integrated 
®Certain information has higher preference than uncertain information. 
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framework DAS-I which features: 
• Capability for reasoning with indefinite information 
It can modelled indefinite information in the form of disjunctive rules. 
• Capability for reasoning with inconsistent information 
It can tolerate conflicts. Moreover, it can resolve conflicts through a general 
preference hierarchy. Furthermore, it can identify non-trivial conflicts, i.e. intra-
K B S conflicts and inter-KBS conflicts, due to distributed settings and indefinite 
information. 
• Capability for reasoning with incomplete information 
It has the default negation operator 〜whidi facilitates modelling and employment 
of incomplete information. 
Emphasis was paid on having these capabilities embedded in an integrated frame-
work. This is because these types of uncertain information, although different, are 
closely inter-related in practice. Therefore treating them separatedly would be ineffec-
tive, if not infeasible. 
In the next chapter, we shall point out that DAS-I is not perfect. It still suffers from 






In Chapter 4, we have proposed DAS-L In this chapter, we show that some aspects in 
DAS-I are imperfect and propose an enhanced framework. 
In the design of DAS-I, we explore argumentation in reasoning with indefinite, 
inconsistent and incomplete information. Our objective is to integrate the three in 
one holistic framework. W e show that DAS-I can facilitate indefinite knowledge in the 
following three ways: 
1. Modelling 
It enables direct modelling of indefinite rules. 
2. Inferencing 
It enables indefinite rules to be used in the inference process through the concept 
of certain() which modelled how human beings handle indefinite knowledge. 
3. Consistency Checking 
It enables detection of implicit conflicts between distributed argumentation agents. 
Although the above facilities are useful in many reasoning applications, it does not 
support "reasoning about cases" which is commonly used in common sense reasoning. 
To illustrate this, let us consider the following example: 
ri : ^ holding_gun 
7*2 : holding-gun —+ left-hand-holding V rigkLhandJwlding 
r*3 ; left-hand-holding ^ shot 
7*4 : right-hand-holding ^ shot 
67 
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It is easy to see that shot is justified. This is proved by "considering the different 
cases" of r2's results, i.e. lefLhand_holding and rigkLhandJwlding. Both lead to the 
result of shot. This is a typical technique know as "reasoning about cases". However, 
shot cannot be deduced under the DAS-I framework. W e propose Disjunctive Argu-
mentation Semantics II (DAS-II), an extension of DAS-I with the aforesaid capability. 
The above lays down the objective of this chapter. The rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows: In Section 5.1, we briefly describe the nature and importance 
of "reasoning about cases". W e highlight the problems involved and further describe 
the philosophy behind our solution. Section 5.2 presents the formal definition of DAS-
II. W e then discuss the non-trivial conflicts between agents in Section 5.3. This is 
followed by the description of the fixpoint semantics of DAS-II in Section 5.4. In 
Section 5.5, we study the relations between DAS-II and other existing frameworks. 
The paraconsistency issue is covered in Section 5.6. A realistic example is given to 
illustrate the usefulness of our conflict analysis in Section 5.7. Finally, the conclusion 
is given in Section 5.8 1 
5.1 Background 
The idea of "reasoning about cases" is based on forward reasoning. In other words, we 
start from a set of premises pi, • • • , pn and apply forward chaining to see whether all 
chains end up at the same proposition q. If that is the case, q is said to be proved with 
respect to pi, •. • ,pn as it is entailed for "all cases，，• Figure 5.1 depicts such a scenario. 
The rule ri on the left represents the starting rule, ri's conditions pi, p2，and p3 serves 
as the starting premise. Rules in the middle represents intermediate chainings. The 
result of chaining is on the right hand side rule, i.e. Q. 
In DAS-II, the notion of certain() no longer applies. Indeed, it is certain() which 
prevents DAS-I from supporting "reasoning about cases". certain() denotes a definite 
interpretation of a rule. It ensures that an indefinite rule must find sufficient definite 
information to back itself up before advancing to the subsequent inference stage(s). In 
other words, every indefinite rule employed must be "justified" or "backed" by definite 
information. Effectively, the inference process is inductive and incremental as every 
chaining step is more focused and leads to new definite information. 
In the contrary, chaining is not focused in "reasoning about cases". By following 
all possible cases, it proceeds the inference in the danger of not finding anything. The 
chaining step is distracting and usually produces nothing definite until the ending 
step. Consider again the example in Figure 5.1. It could possibly take hundreds 
of intermediate chains just to arrive at Q. But, we do not know which is the most 
iA simplified version of this chapter has been published ,see [Ng et al., 1998a]. 
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Figure 5.1: Reasoning about cases in forward chaining 
effective choice point to take at every forwarding step. Forward reasoning is different 
from backward reasoning which is goal-oriented. The former, however, is indispensible 
for "reasoning about cases" in which knowledge is out of focused. 
Unfocused knowledge is typical in c o m m o n sense reasoning. For example, in plan-
ning, a typical AI application, indefiniteness appears at every stage involving human 
input. Each input m a y take a range of value. Proof of correctness of each planning 
step naturally requires the technique of "reasoning about cases". 
In DAS-I, the notion of certain provides a definite (i.e. certain{)) interpretation of 
an indefinite rule. W e can, hence, mimic Prakken's strict argumentation framework on 
reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information. In the design of DAS-II, the 
function of certain() is replaced by "split" [Baral and Gelfond, 1994]. Basically, "split" 
enumerates the possible cases of every indefinite rule in a knowledge base {IKBS) 
and produces a collection of definite knowledege bases DKBS1,DKBS2, • • • , DKBSn 
where DKBSi is the zth split of IKBS. After the enumeration, one can simply con-
centrate on the set of definite knowledge bases instead of their indefinite counterparts. 
This replacement process is very useful in the construction of arguments as reasoning 
about definite information is easier than indefinite one. To facilitate reasoning over the 
D K B S s , we must revamp the definition of rebut and undercut in the light of "split". 
条 
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5.2 Definition 
The basic setting of DAS-II is indifferent from DAS-I, i.e. a distributed argumentation 
environment made up of a cluster of distributed knowledge-bases/agents. W e assume 
that there is a preference hierarchy which serves as the arbitrator to resolve conflicts 
among these agents. W e capture this idea formally with the following two definitions. 
Definition 9 An argumentation system AS is a binary tuple < Ags，Pg > where Ags 
is a set of argumentation agents and Pg is a preference hierarchy over Ags. 
Definition 10 A preference hierarchy Pg is a binary relation. For two objects A and 
B，A is preferred than B, denoted A > B with respect to Pg if < A, B >G Pg. 
In DAS-I and DAS-II, the concepts of an argumentation system are similar as the 
operation environments of them both involve collections of argumentation agents. Next, 
we define the concept of a single argumentation agent. Conceptually, an argumentation 
agent is an autonomous knowledge based system which consists of a knowledge base 
and a preference hierarchy for resolving internal conflicts. This idea is represented using 
the following definition. 
Definition 11 An argumentation agent Ag is a binary-tuple < R, P > where R is 
a set of rules and P is a preference hierarchy over R. For rule ri and r2 in R, ri is 
preferred over r2, denoted ri >Agt『2，if and only if < ri, r2 > E P. 
Table 5.1 shows an example of an argumentation agent which represents the knowl-
edge of a financial expert. The upper part (i.e. Ai - ^ io) is the knowledge base and 
the lower part is the preference hierarchy. 
5.2.1 Rules 
A rule in DAS-II is an extended disjunctive logic clause. It is defined using the following 
operators V,八，，，〜and ~K Rules represent relations between propositions/literals. 
A literal 1 is an atom a or its negation ">a. Complement of a literal 1, denoted as f, is 
an atom a (~«a) if 1 is，a (a). Formally, a rule is defined as follows: 
Definition 12 A DAS-II rule is an extended disjunctive logic clause of the following 
form, ri : ai 八• • • A a^A 〜ai+i A • • • A 〜aj ^  aj+i V . • • V ak where ri is the name of 
a rule and ai, • • • ak are literals and � i s the non-provable operator. 
For a rule r*i as in the above definition, Cn(r\) = { a)+i, ...，a^}, Cd(ri) = { ai, 
.• •，Gj } and Weak(Cd(ri)) = { ai+i, . • •，aj } represent n's conclusions, conditions 
and weak literals, respectively. Assumptions of ri's are also represented by the weak 
literals. Consider the example in Table 5.1. Prom the rule Ai, we obtain: 
• 
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Table 5.1: A knowledge base fragment of expert A 
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE 
KBA v4i :�aduersary-financial-factor A economic_grow ~> demand-grow 
A2 : stable-market A demand-grow ~> new-productionJine V increase-prod-A 
As : emmigration-rateJower ^ stable-market 
A4 : ^rawjmaterialJ^-enough ~> ^increasejprod-A 
A5 : ^raw-materialJi-enough — ^ stable-market 
Ae : ">• economic_grow 
A7 : ">• ^rawjmaterialJi-enough 
Ag : immigation_rate_higher ^ stable_market 
Ag : crime_rateJower ~> emmigrutionjrate_lowcr V immgration_rateJiigher 
Aio : — crime-rateJower 
Preference Hierarchy = { < As, A^ > } 
Cn(Ai) = { demand-grow } 
Cd(Ai) = { adversary_financiaLfactor, economic_grow } 
Weak(Cd(Ai)) = { adversary_financiaLfactor } 
5.2.2 Splits 
As rules m a y be indefinite in DAS-I, the notion of certain() is defined to reduce indefinite 
rules into definite forms but it is inapplicable for "reasoning about cases" • W e introduce 
the "split" operation in DAS-II to get around this. Before defining "split", the following 
definitions are required: 
Definition 13 For a set of rules s, CN(s) = { 1 | r e s and 1 € Cn(r) }. 
Definition 14 For a set of rules s, WEAK(s) = { 1 | r e s and 1 G Weak(Cd(r)) }. 
Definition 15 For a rule r : ai 八.• •八� a > i ^ a j+ i V . . . V ak, Aux(r) = { r : ai 
八 . . -八� C L i ~> a* I a* G Cn{r) }. 
Definition 16 A rule r is applicable to a set of rules s if 
1. Cd(r) C CN(s) and 
2. Cn(r)门 CN(s) = 0 and 
3. Cn(r) n WEAK(s) = 0 and 
4. Weak(Cd(r)) n CN(s) = 0. 
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The first three restrictions define the set of conclusions C n Q of all rules in s. The 
fourth defines that a rule r is applicable with respect to a set of rules s if: 
1. it is supported, i.e. its conditions are concluded by s; and 
2. it is non-redundant, i.e. none of its conclusions are concluded by s; and 
3. it does not attack, i.e. none of its conclusions disproved assumptions of s\ and 
4. it is not attacked, i.e. non of its assumptions are disproved by s. 
To illustrate the above ideas, consider the following set of rules s. 
ri •• —>• hold_gun 
r*2 •• hold-gun ^  thief 
r*3 ; thief — calLpolice 
B y definition, CN(s) = { hold-gun，thief, calLpolice }. Consider the subset s'= 
s - r3 of s. r3 is applicable to s' as CN(s') = { hold-gun, thief }, Cd(r3) = { thief 
} and Cn(n) = { calLpolice } imply Cd(r3) C CN(s'), Cn(r3) fi CN(s') = 0 and 
Weak(Cd(r)) n CN(s') = 0. 
Definition 17 For a rule set R = {ri, • • • ,rvJ，we define Split{R) which is a set of 
rule sets derived from R. 
Split(R) can be computed from R using the following steps: 
1. Initial step ; So(R) = { { } } . 
2. i-th Iteration ; If there is an applicable rule r to s, then 
Si+i(R) = (Si(R) - {s}) U s' 
where s' is 
s' = { S U Taux I Taux ^ Aux(r) } - { S U Taux | Cn{raux) ^ CN{s) }. 
3. Terminate condition ; If there is no applicable rule, then Split{R) = Si{R) 
It is easy to see that "split" of a rule set is actually the least fix-point of an iterator 
defined in the iteration step. It consists of a set of rule sets. Each rule set must be 
non-disjunctive. 
Proposition 1 For a rule set R, every split of R is non-disjunctive. 
4k 
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This can be shown by induction. For the base case, the only set is an empty set. 
At every iteration, a rule set s incorporates rules in Aux(), which is non-disjunctive, 
to form multiple rule set s'. Thus, the final fixpoint at termination must also be non-
disjunctive. W e shall see in the next section that this property of "split" turns out to 
be very useful in the analysis of conflicts between different argumentation agents. 
Proposition 2 For a rule set R, every split s of it is consistent, i.e. there does not 
exists 1 such that 1 G CN{s) and 1 G CN{s). 
The notion of a split is similar to stable model semantics [Baral and Gelfond, 1994 . 
Next, we define the derivation symbol 卜 as follows: 
Definition 18 For a rule set R, 
1. R 卜5 1, reads as "R skeptically entails S", if and only iffor every split s ofR, 
1 e CN(s); and 
2. R 卜(7 I，reads as "R credulously entails S", if and only if there exists a split s of 
R such that 1 G CN(s). 
h5 and hc7 represent skeptical and credulous views on knowledge, respectively. In 
DAS-II, we adopt the skeptical view which can produce more sensible results. N o w we 
have sufficient restrictions to define arguments. 
Definition 19 A rule set R is an argument if and only if 
1. For every rule r in R, there exists a split s G Split{R) such that Aux{r) fl s + 0. 
忍.There exists 1 such that R 卜^ 1. 
The first condition ensures that every rules of R must participate in at least one 
split. For example, the rule set { r*i : left ^ right，r*2 : right ^ left，rs : ^ middle 
} cannot be an argument as r*i and r2 are clearly redundant. The second condition 
gurantees that the set of rule are conclusive. 
To illustrate the concept of "split", we consider a rule set R consisting of the 
following rules : 
ri : ^ hold-gun 
r*2 : hold-gun ~> thief V police 
r3 : thief — go-away 
r*4 : police ~> go_away 
r5 : thief ^ ]police 
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Split{R) is determined as follows: 
So{R) = 0 
Si(R) = { { ri ; ^ hold-gun } } 
S2{R) = { 
{ ri ; ">• hold.gun, r^ : hold—gun ^ thief } 
{ ri ; ">• hold-gun, r2 : hold_gun ~> police } } 
Sz{R) = { 
{ ri : ~> hold.gun, r2 : hold-gun — thief, r3 ； thief — go_away } 
{ 7*1 •• ~> hold-gun, r2 ： hold-gun ~> police, r4 : police ~> go_away } } 
S^{R) = { 
{ ri : 一+ hold_gun, r2 : hold_gun ^ thief, 
7*3 ; thief ^ go_away, r5 ; thief ^ ^police } 
{ 7*1 : ~> hold-gun, r2 ： hold-gun — police, r^ : police ^ go_away } } 
S5(i?) = S4(R) 
Split{R) = S5{R) 
In summary, Split(R) = { si, s2 } where 5i = { n : ^ hold_gun, r2 ： hold_gun 
"^ thief, r3 ; thief ^ go.away, r5 ; thief ~^ ^ police } and 52 = { ri : ^ hold-gun, r2 
： h o l d - g u n ~> police, r4 : police ~> go_away }. It is clear that all five rules of R satisfy 
condition 1 of Definition 19. Also, Condition 2 of Definition 19 is satisfied as R l~s { 
hold-gun, go-away}. 
5.3 Conflicts 
In the previous chapter, we show that conflicts in non-disjunctive argumentation theory 
are only of simple type. In a distributed and disjunctive setting, conflicts are more 
complicated. Besides "undercut" and "rebut", there is "thinning" conflict. Figure 5.2 
depicts different types of conflicts under the dimensions of "complementariness" and 
"balance". 
The "complementariness" dimension covers the representational part of conflicts. 
Traditionally, conflicts means complementary ideas are derivable. This is no longer 
true in a distributed disjunctive agents system as we will show in the following sec-
tions. Conceptually, a conflict is complementary if and only if it involves a pair of 
complementary literals and it is incomplementary otherwise. 
"Balance" reflects the distribution of conflicting elements. In DAS-I, every rule 
has one certain() interpretation. As conflict requires at least two parties, conflicting 
elements (i.e. conflicting literals) must be distributed over the two parties. Thus, 
4k. 
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complementary 
REBUTTAL REBUTTAL 




Figure 5.2: Dimensions of conflicts 
conflicts in DAS-I must be balanced. Formally, a conflict is balanced if both conflicting 
parties contains parts of the conflicting literals, and it is unbalanced otherwise. 
5.3.1 Undercut conflicts 
Conceptually, an argument Argi undercuts another argument Arg2 if some conclusions 
originally derivable from Arg2 are no longer derivable in the presence of Argi. 
Definition 20 Argument Argi undercuts argument Arg2 if and only if there exists 1 
such that Arg2 卜《5 1 and Argi U Arg2 Vs 1. 
This situation can only happen when default negation is allowed. To illustrate this, 
let us consider argument ArgA = {Ai,Ao) in Table 5.1 and argument Args = {^5,^6} 
in Table 5.3. It is clear that ArgA 卜5" demand.grow but ArgA^Args Vs demand_grow. 
Thus, ArgB undercuts ArgA- From this example, it becomes apparent that undercut 
conflicts are incomplementary and unbalanced. 
It is easy to show that our notion of argument is indeed self-sufficient and self-
supporting through the following proposition. Every argument Arg undercuts its un-
dercut conflicters formed from a subset of Arg. 
Proposition 3 For argument Argi, there does not exist Arg2 C Argi such that Arg2 
undercuts Argi. 
This can be argued as followed: As Arg2 undercuts Argi^ there exists 1 such that 
Argi h<s 1 and Arg2 U Argi \/s 1- Moreover, Arg2 C Argi implies that Arg2 U Argi is 
equivalent to Argi. Thus, Arg\ \/s 1. 
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Table 5.2: Unbalanced rebut 
PROGRAM C PROGRAM D 
Ci :^ a V b Di : b ^ a 
C2 ： a ~> c D2 :— b 
C3 : b ")> "ic 
C4 : c ~> d 
C5 : ~ic ~>" d 
As undercut conflicts are unbalanced, preference is of no concern here. W e adopt 
the same view as Prakken [Prakken and Sartor, 1997], i.e. undercuts always suceed. 
In this regard, undercut has nothing to do with preference hierarchy. W e define the 
resolution scheme of undercut conflicts as below: 
Definition 21 Argument Argi defeats argument Arg2 if Argi undercuts Arg2. 
Note that undercut conflict is the same as that in previous chapter. But rebuttal 
conflicts are very different from undercut. 
5.3.2 Rebuttal conflicts 
Rebutal conflicts are classical conflicts between two arguments. Conceptually, it arises 
when argument Argi and argument Arg2 are consistent by themselves but their union 
leads to contradiction. A contradiction is formed by a pair of complementary conclu-
sions. Thus, rebuttal conflicts are complementary. Formally, we define it as below: 
Definition 22 An argument Arg 卜 >^ 丄 if and only if every split s of Arg is inconsis-
tent. 
Definition 23 For argument Argi and Arg2, Argi rebuts Arg2 if and only if 
1. Arg2 does not undercut Argi ； and 
2. Argi \/s 丄 a>nd Arg2 Vs 丄/ and 
3. Argi U Arg2 h<s 丄. 
Although rebuttal conflicts are complementary, they are not necessary balanced. 
Consider the programs in Table 5.2. It is clear that the sources of contradictions in 
C U D, i.e. c and ,c, are both arised from C instead of distributed over C and D. 
To differentiate between balanced and unbalanced rebuts, the following definition 
is introduced. 
4k 
CHAPTER 5. DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTATION SEMANTICS II 77 
Definition 24 Given arguments Argi andArg2, owner{r, Argi, Arg2) equals to Argi 
or Arg2 if r is the name of a rule in Argi or Arg2, respectively. 
owner(r, Arg1,Arg2) represents the owner of a rule and Relevant{Arg1^Arg2) rep-
resents the collection rule pairs with contradictory literals in each split. U p o n 
Relevant{Arg1,Arg2), a rebuttal conflict is determined to be balanced or unbalanced. 
Definition 25 Given arguments Argi and Arg2. If Argi U Arg2 h<s 丄，the set of 
relevant conflicts is Relevant(Argi, Arg2) = { n, r2 | n and r2 belongs to the same 
split of Argi U Arg2, and Cn(r\) = Cr1(r2) }. 
Balanced rebut is the classical rebut which has been widely studied in definite 
argumentation framework [Prakken and Sartor, 1997]. W e define it as follows: 
Definition 26 Argi balancely rebuts Arg2 if 
• Argi rebuts Arg2. 
• For every < r1,r2 > G Relevant(Argi, Arg2), ri G Argi implies r2 G Arg2, and 
r2 G Argi implies ri E Arg2. 
The above definition ensures that complemenetary literals must be owned by dif-
ferent rules, i.e. balanced. Resolution scheme for balanced rebut involves preference 
hierarchy. Assume Argi and Arg2 are from agents Agti and Agt2^ respectively. W e 
define the resolution scheme formally as follows: 
Definition 27 For two arguments Argi balancely rebuts Arg2 where Argi from agent 
Agi (=< R,P >) and Arg2 from Ag2 in the same argumentation system < Ags,Pg >， 
Argi defeats Arg2 
• if Agi = Ag2 and there does not exist < ri, r2 > G Relevant( Argi ，Arg2 ) such 
that < r2,r1 > e P of Agi. 
• ifAgi + Ag2 and there does not exist < Ag2, Agi > in Pg. 
To illustrate the above definition, let us consider the following arguments Argi = 
{ A5, A7 } , Arff2 = {^3；义8，Ag, Aio} and Arg3 = { B2, Bi, B^, ^ 9}, see Table 5.1 
and Table 5.3. It is clear that ^ 7-5^ 3 rebuts Arg2 and Argi rebuts Arg2. There are two 
rebut relations here, 
• Argi balancely rebuts Arg2- As both of them are from the same agent KBA^ the 
rebut is resolved according to the preference hierarchy of expert A. By definition, 
Relevant(Argi,Arg2) = { < A^, A3 >，< A5, Ag > }. Notice that < A3, A^ > 
G r, Argi defeats Arg2. 
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• As Args is from agent B, resolution between Args and Arg2 must be done with 
respect to the global preference hierarchy Pg in the argumentation system. As-
suming expert A is stronger than expert B, i.e. < Agt1^Agt2 > G Pg, Arg2 
defeates Arg3. 
In DAS-II, we identify a new kind of rebut called unbalanced rebut. Unbalanced 
rebut represents the difficulties of reasoning with incomplete and indefinite information. 
Conceptually, unbalanced rebut happened when there is a pair of derivable complemen-
tary literals embedded in one argument. Formally, we define it as follows: 
Definition 28 If argument Argi rebuts argument Arg2 and there exists < r1,r2 >G 
Relevant{Arg1,Arg2) such that owner(r1,Arg1,Arg2) = 0wner(r2, Arg1,Arg2) = Argi, 
then Argi unbalancely rebuts Arg2. Argi and Arg2 are called conflict bearer and 
conflict initiator，respectively. 
A conflict bearer bears a pair of complementary literals in its different splits where 
as a conflict initiator does not. A conflict initiator only "joins" contradictory splits 
with the conflict bearer. Consider the example in Table 5.2. C has two splits si = 
{c ^ d, a ^ c, — a] and 52 = {^c ~> d, b — ~>c，— h}. Clearly, b ~> a of D connects si 
and S2. 
Resolution scheme for this kind of conflicts is vague. Consider the case where 
a conflict initiator shows that there are potential conflicts in a conflict bearer. B y 
skepticism, the conflict initiator always wins. 
Definition 29 If argument Argi unbalancely rebuts Arg2, Argi defeats Arg2. 
5.3.3 Thinning conflicts 
Similar to undercut conflicts, thinning conflicts do not involve any complementary 
literal pair. Thinning conflicts are unbalanced. Conceptually, thinnning conflicts arise 
because of knowledge overlapping between two different agents. In multi-agent systems, 
overlapping of knowledge is often deliberate. Multiple perspectives on the same issue 
help reveal the intricacies of scenarios as well as help prevent bias caused by a single 
perspective. Conceptually, a thinning conflict is a relation between an argument Argi 
in an agent Agi and a rule r in another agent Ag2. The distinction of Agi and Ag2 
is significant. It is assumed that agents are the most primitive units which act on 
behalf of their interested parties, r thins Argi if there is a rule r' in Argi similar to 
r. The similarity mentioned here is on conceptual level. The “~>” sign is read as an 
implication symbol. T w o rules are similar if they have the same set of conditions and 
the conclusion set of one is subsumed by the conclusion set of the other. Formally, we 
capture this notion as below : 
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Table 5.3: A knowledge base fragment of expert B 
E X P E R T K N O W L E D G E 
KBs Bi :�adversary-financial-factor 八 economic_grow ~> demand_grow V 
competition-grow 
B2 : competition-grow ^ ^stablejmarket 
B3 :�]staMe-market 八�adversary_financial_factor — 
new-productionJine 
B4 :�demancLincrecise ^ ]demand_grow 
B5 : interest_raise ~> adversary-financial-factor 
Be : ">• interest-raise 
B7 : — stockJndex-raise 
Bs : stock-indexjraise ~> ~>adversary_financial-factor 
Bg : ">• economic_grow 
Preference Hierarchy = {B8,B5} 
Definition 30 For argument Argi and a rule r of two different argumentation agents 
Agi and Ag2, respectively, r thins Argi if and only if 
• Cd{ri) — Cd(r2) and 
• Cr1{r2) C Cn{ri) and 
• there exists 1 such that Argi 卜^ > 1 and {Argi — r2} U {ri} \fs 1. 
If n and r2 are similar rules, they represent different views on implication relation 
between conditions and conclusions. Consider Table 5.3. It represents the knowledge 
of an agent on behalf of expert B. Bi is similar to Ai in Table 5.1. Both Bi and Ai 
show the implication relation between “demand-grow,, and “adversary—financiaLfactor 
八 economic-grouT. The difference lies at that B! is a more generalized statement on 
relations between the two. Bi claims that “demand-grow” is not a necessary result of 
“adversary-financial-factor A economic_grow,,. Rather, “competition-grow,, is also 
a possible outcome. Thus, Bi thins the implication power of Ai. 
As the framework adopts a skeptical view, we favour arguments which question 
others. Thus, thinning always succeeds.^ Resolution scheme for thinning conflicts is 
then defined as below. 
Definition 31 For argument Argi and a rule r, if r thins Argi then Argi is defeated 
by r. 
2por credulous view, the oppositie may be adopted. 
* 
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The set of auxiliary rules of r and Argi is constructed as follows: 
Definition 32 If a rule r\ thins an argument Argi at its rule r2, the set of auxiliary 
rules is auxiliary(ri,Argi) = {Cd{ri) ^ q\q G (Cn{ri) 一 Cr1(r2))}. 
Then, we define how arguments can help to restore the state of another thinned 
argument. 
Definition 33 An argument Argi defeats a rule ri if ri thins another argument Arg2 
and for every 1 G CN(auxiliary{r1,Arg2)), Arg2 卜5"，i-
5.4 Semantics 
After defining three different forms of conflicts, we are now ready to work out the 
unified meaning of arguments of multiple distributed argumentation agents. Base on 
the semantics of different types of conflicts and the notion of defeat, we adopt Prakken's 
version of Dung's fix-point semantics as shown below. 
Definition 34 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) Argument Argi or rule ri strictly de-
feats argument Arg2 or rule 7*2 ifArgi or ri defeats Arg2 or r2 but not Arg2 or r2 defeats 
Argi or ri. 
Definition 35 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) An argument Arg is acceptable to an 
argument set ArgSet if and only iffor every argument Arg' or rule r that strictly defeats 
Arg there exists Arg" in ArgSet which strictly defeats Arg' or r. 
Definition 36 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) For argument sets J and ArgSet, 
T(J, ArgSet) is a transformation operator which returns those arguments from ArgSet 
that is acceptable to J. T{J, ArgSet) is defined as follows: 
• To{ArgSet) = T{^,ArgSet) 
• Ti+i(ArgSet) =T(Ti(Ar*i^9et),4r"^<Set) 
• T*(ArgSet) = limi^ooTi(ArgSet) 
It is easy to show that T(J, ArgSet) is monotone and by Knaster-Tarski theorem, 
its fix-point exists and the semantics is well defined if the set of input arguments is 
finitary. As we assume a propositional system, there are no functions nor variables. As 
a result, the fix-point must exist and can be approached through iterations. 
Proposition 4 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) The transformation operator 
T(J, ArgSet) is monotone for finitary ArgSet. 
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Table 5.4: Differences between DAS-I and DAS-II 
Features DAS-I DAS-II 
• Arguments • Restriction : Each rule must • Restriction : Each arguments 
have a certain() value. must at least skeptically entails 
one literal. 
• Rebuts • Only balanced rebuts. • Both balanced and unbalanced 
rebuts. 
• Proof theory • Sound and complete proof the- • N o proof theory. 
^ 
Definition 37 ([Prakken and Sartor, 1997]) With respect to an argument set 
ArgSet, an argument Arg is 
• justified if and only ifArg is in T*{ArgSet). 
• defeated if and only if it is strictly defeated by a justified argument Arg'. 
• defensible if and only if it is neither justified nor defeat. 
In Section 5.7, we shall present a working example which illustrates how our frame-
work works as a whole. 
5.5 Relation to existing frameworks 
To see how DAS-II relates to existing frameworks, we examine its relation to skeptical 
DAS-I. In the rest of thesis, we shall use DAS-I to refer skeptical view of DAS-I. Table 
5.4 and Table 5.5 depict how DAS-II differs from and similar to DAS-I, respectively. 
From Table 5.5, it is clear that DAS-II is a close successor of DAS-I. DAS-II differs 
from DAS-I mostly on its definition of argument. DAS-II is more general and covers a 
larger set of arguments than DAS-I. This is due to the following proposition. 
Proposition 5 A DAS-I argument which does not undercut itself is also a DAS-II 
argument. 
Self-undercutting DAS-I arguments are defeated by definition. Therefore, their 
conclusions are non-provable. Moreover, they are not arguments under DAS-II by 
definition. Thus, their conclusions are also non-provable. For a DAS-I argument which 
does not undercut itself, we can inductively show that it has only one split. By definition 
of DAS-I, its conclusion must be consistent. As a result, it must be consistent under 
DAS-II. Further, the conclusions in this only one split must be skeptically entailed under 
« . 
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Table 5.5: Similarities between DAS-I and DAS-II 
Features DAS-I DAS-II 
• Conflicts • Support modelling of Undercut, • Suport modelling of Undercut, 
Rebut and Thinning conflicts. Rebut and Thinning conflicts. 
• Resolution • Support two level preference hi- • Support two level preference hi-
erarchy. erarchy. 
• Defeats • Prakken's Asymmetric Strictly • Prakken's Asymmetric Strictly 
Defeat. Defeat. 
DAS-II. As certain{) is non-empty under DAS-I, the skeptically entailed conclusion set 
must also be non-empty. This completes the argument of the above proposition. 
Theorem 1 An argument justified under DAS-I is also justified under DAS-II. 
This theorem confirms that DAS-II is significantly more general than DAS-I. To 
show that this theorem is correct, let's suppose that it is not true. There must be an 
argument Argi which is justified under DAS-I but not DAS-II. This can either be that 
Argi is not an argument or Argi is not justified under DAS-II. The former is impossible 
by Proposition 5. For the latter, there must be another argument Arg2 or rules r in 
conflict with Argi. If the conflict is undercut, balancely rebut or thinning, it should 
have been the same as in DAS-L This would contradict the assumption that Argi is 
justified in DAS-L For this reason, the conflict must be an unbalanced rebut. As Argi 
has only one split, the pair of complementary literals must be in the same split. This 
also contradicts the definition of DAS-I arguments. Thus, the contrary of Theorem 1 
must be false. 
W e have shown that DAS-I degenerated to Prakken's strict argumentation frame-
work when all knowledge was non-disjunctive. The same is also true for DAS-IL This 
is because DAS-II extends DAS-I on the ground of disjunctive knowledge. Without 
disjunctive knowledge, DAS-II degenerates into DAS-I and further to Prakken's strict 
argumentation. In that situation, DAS-II holds whatever DAS-I does. 
5.6 Issue on paraconsistency 
As a successor of DAS-I, DAS-II is also paraconsistent. The new features and concepts 
introduced in DAS-II do not undermine this nice property. Formally, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 6 DAS-II is paraconsistent. 
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To verify this proposition, it is only necessary to check the notion ofjustification in 
DAS-II. Justification in DAS-II is defined on top of "strictly defeat" • In the development 
of DAS-I and DAS-II, we intentionally keep this unchanged and at the same time, 
enrich the underlying notions of "conflicts" and "defeat". This results in an unchanged 
property at the argument level. That is there are still no two conflicting arguments 
justified at the same time. Unresolved conflicting arguments are localized in the set 
of "defensible arguments". Thus, contradiction cannot trivialize the whole system. 
Consider the argumentation system described in Table 5.6. The arguments found are 
Argi = { ri } 
Arg2 = { ri, r2 } 
Args = { ri, r3 } 
Arg4^ = { ri, r4 } 
Table 5.6: Example showing paraconsistency of DAS-II 
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE 
A ri : ">• stock-raise 
r2 : stock-raise ^ customer-index-raise 
r3 : stock-raise ^ ^customerAndexjraise 
r4 : stock-raise ~> stock-buyer-nervous 
Preference Hierarchy = 0 
By definition, Arg2 and Argz balancely rebuts each other. As the preference hierar-
chy is empty, Arg2 and Argz strictly defeat each other. Thus, Arg2 and Argz cannot be 
in the set ofjustified arguments. Argi and Arp4 are justified as they have no defeaters. 
This example shows that contradiction (e.g. between Arg2 and Argz) in DAS-II does 
not upset the whole system. 
5.7 An illustrative example 
Scenario: In a business re-engineering process, a country-wide manufacturing firm is 
going to build an autonomous strategical decision support system. The system is 
designed to provide strategical advice on future directions of the firm based on various 
economical and social factors. After extensive knowledge engineering efforts, opinions 
from two domain experts are modelled, as presented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.3. In 
addition, it was known that the two experts have professional ranking in that A is 
more professional than B. It was hoped that different perspectives of these two experts 
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could help to reveal argumentative and critical issues as well as to prevent imprudent 
decisions. 
Qualitative Analysis: Consider the problem of "whether a newjproductionJtine 
should be built ?”• Consider a set of rule Argi = { A2, A^, A7, A3，As, Ag, Aio, Ai, 
Ae }. Argi has the following two splits: 
• Split 1 of Argi = {A2,A4, A7, A3, A9(l),A10, Ai,Ae} and 
• Split 2 of Argi = {A2, A4, A7, Ag, A9(2),A10, Ai,Ae} 
Note that A9(l) and Ag(2) are just symbols used in here to denote the different 
versions of Ag enumerated in the process of spliting. Ag{l) and A9{2) are variants of 
Ag enumerated as follow: 
• A9(l) denotes Ag : crime.rateJower ~> emmigration.rateJower 
• Ag(2) denotes A^ : crime_rateJower ^ immigration_rateJower 
B y definition, Argi is an argument. There are three arguments in conflicts with 
Argi. They were: 
• Arg2 = {A5,A7} 
• Arg^^{B2,B1,B^,B^} 
• Arg4. = {^5,^6} 
Arg2 is in the same agent of Argi and is defeated by Arg^ = {^3,^8,^9,^10} as 
< A3,A5 > G T of KBA- Args and Arg4 are derived from another argument. Arg3 is 
rebut by Argi and must be resolved by preference hierarchy over agents. Argi defeats 
Argz as KBA is assumed stronger than KBs- Arg^ undercuts Argi. However, Arg/^ 
is defeated by Arg^ = {Bs,B7}. 
If thinning conflict was not considered, Args,Args,Argi G T o { K B A U K B s ) and 
Argi e Ti{KBA^KBB)- Thus, newjproduction_line would be suggested. Ifit was con-
sidered, Bi (i.e. from expert B) thinned Argi (i.e. from expert A), newjproductionJine 
would not be suggested. As a whole, there are no other derivations which could sup-
press the thinning factors competition.grow and yield newjproductionJine at the 
same time. 
B y the above reasoning, "new_productionJine" would not be suggested. If we re-
moved thinning conflicts detection, "new_productionJine" would then be derivable 
which clearly undermined the opinions of B. This would be imprudent and would 
be against our basic assumption of skeptical view. 
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5.8 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have proposed a distributed argumentation framework, DAS-II, 
which is a successor to DAS-I. DAS-II is able to capture, analyse and resolve not only 
classical conflicts like rebuttal and undercut but also thinning. Moreover, it has the 






In this chapter, we shall evaluate the two argumentation frameworks, DAS-I and DAS-
11. The evaluation is intended to show that both of them are practical and useful. 
Furthermore, we show that DAS-II is superior than DAS-I. 
There are two tests for both DAS-I and DAS-II. 
1. Katsumi Inoue's problems 
2. Sherlock Holems' problems 
The first set is from Katsumi Inoue's problem sets^ This set of testing data con-
centrates on various aspects of non-monotonic reasoning systems. It evaluates how a 
framework reasoning under inconsistent, incomplete and indefinite information with 
respect to stable semantics. The proposed answer is from Inoue's M G T P stable se-
mantics theorem prover. Also this test illustrates how DAS-I and DAS-II resemble and 
differ from stable semantics. 
The second set is a scenario based problem from a detective story of Sherlock 
Holmes. This test illustrates the capability of DAS-I and DAS-II in handling inter-
related indefinite and inconsistent information in a distributed setting. As there are no 
other existing frameworks with this capability, comparisons are mainly done between 
DAS-I and DAS-IL 
Moreover, the scenario based test also focuses on reasoning under incomplete, con-
tradictory and/or indefinite information. For reasoning under contradictory informa-
tion, the evaluation focus on conflict toleration through paraconsistency and conflict 
resolution through priority. 
iSee the following web page http://ai.tutics.tut.ac.jp/~inoue 
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Table 6.1: Entailment across different frameworks 
FRAMEWORKS ENTAILMENTS 
DAS-I A proposition p is entailed by a system if it is in its justified 
set. 
DAS-II A proposition p is entailed by a system if it is in its justified 
set. 
Stable Semantics A proposition p is entailed by a system if it is in every answer 
sets of the system. 
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2，we describe our testing method-
ology. Base on that, DAS-I and DAS-II are tested and the results are presented in 
Section 6.3 and Section 6.4, respectively. Analysis of the results are given in Section 
6.5. Finally, a summary is drawn in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Methodology 
In the evalutaion process, the following reasoning systems are involved: DAS-I, DAS-II 
and Stable Semantics. In the evaluation: 
1. A c o m m o n criteria are used to evaluate DAS-I and DAS-II against other frame-
works. 
2. W e define a higher level "entailment" see Table 6.1. 
3. Differences between these frameworks are compared through "entailment". 
For each test case, we determine the arguments, conflicts and conclusion in it ac-
cording to DAS-I and DAS-II. Conclusions are compared to the expected answer of the 
reference framework^. The resemblances and differences ofthe systems under compared 
are highlighted at the end of each test. 
DAS-I and DAS-II are propositional frameworks without variables. Several well 
known examples, e.g. Katsumi Inout's problem set, are formulated in propositional 
theory with variables. In order to make problems suitable for DAS-I and DAS-II, the 
original set is based on its Herbrand universe and instantiated. Redundant rules are 
then removed. 
A few points on Katsumi Inoue's problem set must be mentioned. Katsumi Inoue 
proposed the set of 34 examples problems for knowledge based systems. The problem 
set is collected from several works by Ken Satch, Kowalski, Gelfond, Lifschitz, Inoue, 
^The standard answers provided by the test cases. 
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Satch, Arima and Iwayama. The first 28 problems extensively test different capabilities 
of knowledge based systems including capabilities of handling various forms of incon-
sistencies, indefiniteness and incompleteness. The last 6 problems are scenarios-based 
problems which introduced no new technicalities beyond the first 28. In this chap-
ter, we concentrate on the former 28 problems. Notice that among them, there are 
three duplicated problems and five inapplicable problems^. Thus, we only consider 20 
problems (see Section 6.3). 
The second problem set is derived from the story "Silver Blaze" of Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle's famous novel sequels "Sherlock Holmes". The story plot of "Silver Blaze" is 
simple for analysis. Yet, arguments employed by Sherlock Holmes shown archetypal 
commonsense reasoning. Moreover, the articulation between Holmes and Inspector 
Gregory reflect the essence of distributed argumentation. See Appendix C.2 for details. 
6.3 DAS I 
6.3.1 Inoue's Benchmark problems 
1. The Archetypal Even Loop 
The interesting part of this problem is p and 〜p are separated by even number 
of steps and thus called an even loop. 
ri ； � q — p 
r2 ： � p — q 
Arguments : Argi = { ri }，Arg2 = { r2 }• 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts Arg2- Arg2 undercuts Argi. Argi defeats Arg�. 
Arg2 defeats Argi. 
Conclusion : Argi and Arg2 are both defensible but not justified. Thus, nothing 
is entailed. 
2. Reasoning by Cases 
ri : � q ^ p 
r2 ： � p ^ q 
r3 ; p ~> r 
r4 ; q ~> r 
^Those problems are inapplicable as our framework does not allow clauses without conclusions, i.e. 
non-conclusive. 
偽 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 89 
Arguments : Argi = { n }，Arg2 = { r2 }，Arg3 = { ri, r3 }，Arg4 = { r2； 
r4 } 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Arg2 and Arg4, Arg2 undercuts and 
defeats Argi and Arg3. 
Conclusion : All arguments are in the defensible set. 
3. Stratification 
ri : � q — p 
r*2 : � r ~> q 
A r g u m e n t s : Argi 二 { ri }，Arg2 = { r2 } 
Conflicts : Arg2 undercuts and defeats Argi. 
Conclusion : Arg2 is justified, q is entailed. 
4. Tautological Loop 
ri : � q “^ p 
r*2 ： q ^ q 
A r g u m e n t s : Argi = { ri } 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusion : Argi is justified, p is entailed. 
5. The Archetypal Odd Loop 
r\ : � p ~> p 
Arguments : Argi = { ri } 
Conflicts : Argi is defeated 0. 
Conclusion : None. 
6. Conditional Odd Loop 
ri : � p 八 q “^ p 
Arguments : None. 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusion : None. 
7. Three-Loop 
r\ : � q "•> p 
r*2 ： � r “^ q 
r*3 : � p ~> r 
4^  
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Arguments : Argi = { n }，Arg2 = { r2 }，Arg3 = { r3 } 
Conflicts : Argi defeats and undercuts Args. Arg3 defeats and undercuts Arg2. 
Arg2 defeats and undercuts Argi. 
Conclusion : Argi, Arg2 and Args are all defensible, p,q,r are defensible. 
8. Odd and Even Loop 
7*1 : � r ~> r 
r2 •• q ~> r 
r3 : � q ">• p 
r4 : � p ^ q 
Arguments : Argi = { n }, Arg2 = { n }，Args = { r4 }, Arg4 = { n，r2 } 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Argi. Arg2 undercuts and defeats Argz 
and Arp4. Arg3 undercuts and defeats Arg2. Arg4 undercuts and defeats Argi 
and Arg2 
Conclusion : p, q, r are all defensible. 
9. Conditional Odd and Even Loop 
7*1 ; p A 〜r ~> r 
r*2 : � q — p 
r3 ; � p ^ q 
Arguments : Argi = { r2 }, Arg2 = { r*3 }； ^rg^ = { r2, n } 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Arg2- Arg2 undercuts and defeats Argi. 
Args undercuts and defeats Arg2. 
Conclusion : p, q, r are all defensible. 
10. Two and Three Loop 
ri : � q ~> p 
r2 : � r ^ q 
r*3 ;〜p八〜q — r 
Arguments : Argi = { r*i }，Arg2 = { r2 }，Argz = { r3 } 
Conflicts : Arg2 undercuts and defeats Argi. Arg^ undercuts and defeats Arg2. 
Argi undercuts and defeats Arg2. 
Conclusion : p, q, r are all defensible. 
11. The Law of Exclusive Middle 
« 
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ri ： p ^ q 
r*2 •• ~> p V ^p 
Arguments : None. 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusion : None. 
12. Incoherent Even Loop 
r*i : � p ">• q 
7*2 : � q — p 
r3 : p — q 
r4 : q ~> p 
Arguments : Argi = { n }，Arg2 = { r*2 }； Args = { n, r4 }，Arg4 = { r2, 
rs} 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Arg2 and Arg^. Arg2 undercuts and 
defeats Argi and Arg3. 
Conclusion : All p, q are in defensible input mode. 
13. Inclusive Disjunction 
r*i : ~> p V q 
7*2 : p ~> q 
r3 : q ^ p 
Arguments : None. 
Conflitcs : None. 
Conclusion : None. 
14. Minimality 
ri ; — p V q 
r2 : q — P 
Arguments : None. 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusion : None. 
15. Normal Default 
4^  
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ri : bird(polly) A 〜~>/Zies(po%) — flies(polly) 
r*2 •• bird(tweety) A 〜]flies{tweety) ^ flies(tweety) 
r*3 •• penguin(polly) ^ ^flies{polly) 
r4 ; penguin(tweety) ~> ^flies{tweety) 
r*5 ; penguin(polly) ^ bird(polly) 
re : penguin(tweety) ^ bird(tweety) 
r*7 ; — bird(polly) 
rs : ~> penguin(tweety) 
Arguments : Argi = { r7 }，Arg2 = { rg }，Arg^ = { rj, n }, Arg4, = { rs, 
r4 }，Arg5 = { rg, re }； Arge = { rs, re, r2 } 
Conflicts : Arg4 rebuts and undercuts Arge- Arge rebuts Arg4. Arg4 defeats 
Arge. 
Conclusion : Arg1,Arg2, Arg3, Arg4, Arg5 are justified. Arge is defeated. 
bird(polly), penguin(tweety), flies(polly), ^flies(tweety), bird(tweety) are en-
tailed. 
16. Nixon Diamond 
n ; quaker(nixon) A 〜ab_quakerijvixon) ^ dove(nixon) 
r2 •• republican(nixon) A �ab-republican�nixon�~> hawk(nixon) 
rs : ^ quaker(nixon) 
r4 : — republican(nixon) 
r5 ; hawk(nixon) ^ ab.quaker(nixon) 
r% : dove(nixon) ~> ah-republician(nixon) 
Arguments : Argi = { r3 }，Arg2 = { r4 }，Arg3 = { r3, n }，Arg4 = { rs, 
ri, re }，Args = { r4, r2 }，Arge = { n，r2, r5 } 
Conflicts : Arg4 undercuts and defeats Arge and Arg5. Arge undercuts and 
defeats Arg4 and Arg3. 
Conclusion : Arg1,Arg2 are justified. Arg3, Arg4, Arg5, Arge are defensible. 
quaker(nixon), republican(nixon) are entailed. 
17. Barber's Non Paradox 
n : harher(noel) A citizen(casanova) A 〜shaves[casanova,casanova) 
^ shaves(noel, casanova) 
r2 ： barber(casanova) A citizen(noel)八�shmjes[noel,noer) ^ shaves( 
casanova, noel) 
rs : harher(noel)八 citizen(noel)八�shaves(noel,noeV) ^ shaves(noel,noel) 
r4 ： barber(casanova)八 citizen(casanova) A 〜shaves[casanova,casanova) 
<» 
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-+ shaves {casanova, casanova} 
r5 : barber{noel} -+ shaves{noel,noel} 
r6 : barber{casanova} -+ shaves{casanova,casanova} 
r7 : -+ barber{noel} 
rB : -+ citizen{ casanova} 
rg : barber{noel} -+ citizen{noel} 
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Arguments: Argl = { r7 }, Arg2 = { rB }, Arg3 = { r7, r5 }4, Arg4 = { r7, 
rB, rl }, Arg5 = { r7, rg }, Arg6 = { r7, rg, r3 } 
Conflicts : Arg3 undercuts and defeats Arg6. 
Conclusion: Argl, Arg2, Arg3, Arg4, Arg5 are justified. Arg6 is defeated. bar-
ber{ novel}, citizen {casanova}, shaves {noel, noel}, shaves {noel, casanova}, 
citizen{noel} are entailed. 
18~ Disjunctive and Closed World Assumption 
rl : -+ p{a} V p{b} 
r2 : dom{a} 1\ rv p(a) -+ -,p(a) 
r3 : dom{b} 1\ rv p(b) -+ -,p(b) 
r4 : -+ dom{a} 
r5 : -+ dom{b} 
Arguments: Argl = { r4 }, Arg2 = { r5 }, Arg3 = { r4, r2 }, Arg4 = { r5, 
r3 }, Arg5 = { r4, r2, rl }, Arg6 = { r5, r3, rl } 
Conflicts : Arg5 undercuts, rebuts and defeats Arg6. Arg6 undercuts, rebuts 
and defeats Arg5. Arg5 undercuts and defeats Arg4. Arg6 undercuts and defeats 
Arg3. 
Conclusion: Argl, Arg2 are justified. Arg3, Arg4, Arg5 and Arg6 are defensible. 
dom{a}, dom{b} are entailed. 
19. Naming Closed World Assumption 
rl : P -+ q 
r2 : -,p -+ q 
r3 : -+ -'q 
r4 : assume{-,p} 1\ rv p -+ -,p 
r5 : rv -,assume( -,p) -+ assume {-,p} 
r6 : rv assume(-,p) -+ -,assume(-,p) 
4Rules here are in a deliberate order to reflect derivation steps. 
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Arguments : Argi = { r3 }，Arg2 = { r5 }, Args = { re }, Arg^ = { 7*5，r4 }， 
Arg^ = { 7*5，7*4，r2 } 
Conflicts : Argi and Arg^ rebut and defeat each other. Arg2 and Args undercut 
and defeat each other. Args undercuts and defeats Arg4. 
Conclusion : None. 
20. Nonmonotonic Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System 
ri : b ~> p 
r*2 ••�p 八 a ">• q 
r3 ： � q “^ p 
r4 ;�out_a ^ a 
r*5 ••�a — out_a 
rQ :�out-b ^ b 
r7 : � b ">• out-b 
Arguments : Argi = { r3 }, Arg2 = { r4 }, Arg^ = { r5 }，Arg4 = { r^}，Arg5 
={ r7 }，Arge = { r4, r2 }, Arg7 = { re, n } 
Conflicts : Arg2 and Args undercut and defeat each other. Arg^ and Arg^ 
undercut and defeat each other. Argi and Arg7 undercut and defeat Arge- Arg5 
undercuts and defeats Arg7. 
Conclusion : None. 
Table 6.2 summaries how DAS-I compares to stable semantics. A m o n g the 20 tests, 
DAS-I scores 13. The failed seven tests can be classified into 3 groups: 
1. Inclusive Disjunctive, Minimality : 
This group requires "reasoning about cases" capability which is provided in DAS-
II. 
2. Reasoning by Cases : 
The answer in this test is arguable according to our rationale in designing DAS-I. 
In this test, it is possible to separate conflicting knowledge into two consistent 
subsets. Inoue called the process of integrating individual reasoning results from 
the two subsets as "reasoning by cases" • A "case" is a consistent subset rather 
than the result of disjunctions. Thus, "reasoning by cases" is actually reasoning 
by consistent subsets. 
It can be claimed that “〜p ~^ g" As such, these two "cases" are indeed conflicting 
in DAS-I. It is thus improper to draw further results from conflicting basis in 
DAS-I. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of DAS-I on Katsumi Inoue's problem set 
TESTS AGREED WITH EXPECTED 
RESULT? 
The Archetypel Even Loop Yes. 
Stratification Yes. 
Tautological Loop Yes. 
The Archetypal O d d Loop Yes. 
Conditional Odd Loop Yes. 
Three-Loop Yes. 
The Law of Exclusive Middle Yes. 
Incoherent Even Loop Yes. 
Normal Default Yes. 
Nixon Diamond Y e s . 
Barber's N o n Paradox Yes. 
Disjunctive and Closed World Assump- Yes. 
tion 
Nonmonotonic Assumption-based Truth Yes. 
Maintenance System 
Inclusive Disjunctive No. 
Minimality No. 
The Reasoning by Cases No. 
O d d and Even Loop No. 
Conditional O d d and Even Loop No. 
T w o and Three Loop No. 
Naming Closed World Assumption No. 
• 
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3. Odd and Even Loop, Conditional Odd and Even Loop, Two and Three 
Loop, Naming Closed World Assumption : 
Stable semantics resolves conflicts by preferring one of the conflicting part. DAS-I 
resolves conflicts by leaving both conflicting part alone if conflicts involved are 
undercut or are without priority for resolution. This difference accounts for why 
DAS-I does not entail stable semantics' results. 
6.3.2 Sherlock Holmes' problems 
1. Straker's Double Life 
In this scenario, Holmes reasoned on Whether Straker had a double life ^ . Firstly, 
he had the following facts: 
ri ； ~> carry(straker, hill) 
r*2 : ~> man(straker) 
�3 ; ">• name(hill,other) 
r4 : —>• usage(bill, dresses) 
Moreover, he had the following commonsense rules: 
r5 : carry(X,bill) — belong(bill,X) V belong(bill,other) 
rQ :�~mormal�X�A man(X) ^ normal(X) 
r7 : normal(X) A carry(X,bill) ^ ^helong{X, other) 
rs : belong(0,X) A 〜name(C^X) ~> douhleJdentity(X) 
r9 : usage(bill, dresses) — for(bill,lady) 
no : carry(0,X) A for(0,Y) — affliate(X,Y) 
m : double-identity(X) A man(X) A afftiate(X,lady) — doubleJife(X,lady) 
r12 ： double_identity(X) A woman(X) A afftiate(X,gentleman) ^ dou-
bleJife (X,gentleman) 
ri3 : ">• servant(straker) 
ri4 ; ~> huge-expense(straker) 
ri5 ; huge-expense (X) — to_earn(X) 
r*i6 : huge.expense(X) A littlejmoney(X) — crimejmotive(X) 
ri7 : to-earn(X) — to_work(X) V to.crime(X) 
ns ： servant(X) A to-work(X) — little—money(X) 
ri9 : to_crime(X) ^ crimejmotive(X) 
r20 ： douhleJife(X,lady) ^ indecent(X) 
®See Appendix C.1. for original text excerpt. 
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r*2i : crimejmotive(X)八 indecent(X) ^ suspect(X) 
Let the union of the above knowledge be K. Instantiating K on iTs Herbrand 
Universe, we have the grounded version of K’ denoted as Kg, as follows: 
r\ : ~> carry(straker, bill) 
r2 : "^ man(straker) 
r*3 : ^ name(bill,other) 
r4 : ~> usage(bill, dresses) 
r*5 : carry(straker, bill) — helong(bill,straker) V helong(hill,other) 
rQ :�，normal�8traker�八 man(straker) ~> normal(straker) 
77 ; normal(straker) A carry(straker,bill) ~> ^belong{bill, other) 
rs : belong(bill,straker) A �name{pill ,straker) — doubleJdentity(straker) 
rg ； belong(hill,other)八�name{pill,other�— double_identity(other) 
rio : usage (bill, dresses) ~> for(hill,lady) 
m : carry(straker,bill)八 for(bill,lady) — affliate (straker, lady) 
r12 : douhleJdentity(straker) A man(straker) A affliate(straker, lady) ~> 
doubleJife(straker,lady) 
r i3 : doubleJdentity(straker) A woman(straker) A affliate(straker,gentleman) 
~> douhleJife (straker,gentleman) 
ri4 ; ">• servant(straker) 
ri5 : ~> huge-expense(straker) 
ri6 ： huge-expense(straker) ~> to_earn(straker) 
m : huge-expense(straker) A little-money(straker) — crime-motive(straker) 
ri8 : to-earn(straker) ^ to-Work(straker) V to_crime(straker) 
ri9 : servant(straker)八 to_work(straker) ^ littlejmoney(straker) 
r20 •• to_crime(straker) ^ crime-motive (straker) 
r*2i ： doubleJife(straker,lady) — indecent(straker) 
r22 : crime-motive (straker)八 indecent(straker) ~> suspect(straker) 
Let the argumentation system AS =< Ags, Pg > where Ags =< Ag >, Pg =< 
0 > and Ag = < ri, •.. ,r*i3 >• The following major arguments are determined: 
Argi = {�2，re, n, r7, r5, rg } 
Arg2 = { r4, rio, ri, rii } 
Args = Argi + Arg2 + { n2 } 
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There are no conflicts and all arguments are justified. The conclusions of this 
knowledge set are carry(straker, bill)，man(straker) , name(bill, anon) , us-
age(bill, dresses) , normal(straker)，^belong(bill, other) , belong(bill, straker), 
doubleJdentity(straker), for(bill, lady), affliate(straker, lady), doubleJife (straker, 
lady), servant(straker). 
Attentions should be drawn on how r7 and r5 work together through certain{) in 
DAS-L r7 is a piece of indefinite information. There are no existing argumentation 
frameworks, to the author's best knowledge, capable of reasoning in this way. 
2. Poison Stable Boy 
In this scenario, two experts, namely Inspector Gregory and Sherlock Holmes, 
are articulating on the problem "poison stable boy"^. The problem formulated 
in plain propositional logic with variables is as follows: 
EXPERTS KNOWLEDGE 
Gregory ai ： ~> suspect(simpson) 
tt2 : ~> passby(gypies) 
03 ; suspect(X) ~> injure(X,horse) 
a4 : injure(X,horse) — take-Out(X,horse) 
a5 ; take_out(X,horse) ^ posion(stable-boy) 
ttQ : poision(X) — ]awaken[X) 
a7 :�^awaken{stableJboy) — ^take-Out{Y, horse) 
as : suspect(X) ^ want(X,benefits) 
ag ; want(X,henefits) A passby(gypies) — meet(X,gypies) 
aio : meet(X,gypies) ~> ^kilLthere{X, horse) 
Holmes 61 : — suspect(simpson) 
62 : ~> passby(gypies) 
63 : suspect(X) ">• injure(X,horse) 
64 : injure(X,horse) ~> take-Out(X,horse) V kilLthere(X,horse) 
65 : take-Out(X,horse) ~> posion(stable-boy) 
be : poision(X) ^ ^awaken{X) 
67 :�~>awaken�stableJboy�— ^take-out(V, horse) 
Preference Hierarchy = 0 
To facilitate reasoning in the propositional framework DAS-I, we instantiated the 
aforesaid knowledge, according to the Herbrand universe of the problem. This 
results in the following rules: 
®See Appendix C.2. 
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E X P E R T S KNOWLEDGE 
Gregory ai ： ^  suspect(simpson) 
fl2 : ">• passby(gypies) 
as : suspect(simpson) ^ injure(simpson,horse) 
04 ; injure(simpson,horse) — take.out(simpson,horse) 
a5 : take-Out(simpson,horse) — posion(stable-boy) 
ttQ : poision(stahle-hoy) ^ ^awaken{stableJ)oy) 
a7 :�，awaken(stable-boy) ~> ^ take-Out{simpson, horse) 
as : suspect(simpson) -> want(simpson, benefits) 
ag ; want(simpson,benefits)八 passby(gypies)— 
meet(simpson,gypies) 
flio : meet(simpson,gypies) ~> ^ killJhere(simpson, horse) 
Holmes bi : ~> suspect(simpson) 
b2 : ~> passby(gypies) 
63 ; suspect(simpson) "> injure(simpson,horse) 
64 : injure(simpson,horse) ~> take.out(simpson,horse) V 
kilLthere(simpson,horse) 
b5 ； take-Out(simpson,horse) ~> posion(stahle-hoy) 
be : poision(stableJ)oy) ~> ^awaken{stableJboy) 
67 :�~iawaken(stable-boy) ^ ]take_out[simpson, horse) 
Preference Hierarchy = 0 
Let argument system AS 二< Ags,Pg > where Ags 二< 4^^7,Ap^〉，Pg 二< 
0 � , Ago 二 {ai,-.- ,aio} and Agn = {、，•.. ’&7}- ^9G and Agn denote ar-
gumentation agent of Gregory and Holmes, respectively. T h e following major 
arguments are found: 
Argi = { ai, a2, a3, a4, a5, ae } 
Arg2 二 { CL7 } 
Args = { ai, as, ag, aio } 
Arg4 = { bi, h2, b3, b4, 67 } 
Argi from Ago is thinned by the rule 64 from Agn- Arg^ from Agc defeats 64 
for Argi. T o see h o w 64 actually affects the results, it is necessary to see that 
Arp4 is an argument similar to Argi but with completely different conclusions. 
T h e replacement of 64 with a4 results in another interpretation. 
4k 
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6.4 DAS II 
6.4.1 Inoue's benchmark problems 
In this section, we will not repeat the problem in the following tests unless the results 
in here is different from Section 6.3.1. Their original formulation can be found in the 
corresponding parts of Section 6.3.1. 
1. The Archetypal Even Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
2. Reasoning by Cases 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
3. Stratification 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
4. Tautological Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
5. The Archetypal Odd Loop 
7*1 : � p ~> p 
Arguments : None. 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusion : None. 
6. Conditional Odd Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
7. Three-Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
8. Odd and Even Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
9. Conditional Odd and Even Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
10. Two and Three Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. -
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11. The Law of Exclusive Middle 
ri : p ~> q 
r*2 : ^ p V ~>p 
The same as Section 6.3.1. Note that { n , r*2 } is not an argument as there does 
not exist a proposition p which is entailed by all the splits derived from itself. 
12. Incoherent Even Loop 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
13. Inclusive Disjunction 
r i : ^ p V q 
r*2 •• p ~> q 
rs ： q ^ P 
Arguments : Argi = { r*i，V2 }, Arg2 二 { n, r3 } 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusions : Argi and Arg2 are justified, p and q are entailed. 
14. Minimality 
r i ; ">• p V q 
r*2 : q ^ p 
Arguments : Argi = { ri, r2 } 
Conflicts : None. 
Conclusions : Argi is justified, p is entailed. 
15. Normal Default 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
16. Nixon Diamond 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
17. Barber's Paradox 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
18. Disjunctive and Closed World Assumption 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
« 
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Table 6.3: Summary of DAS-II on Katsumi Inoue's problem set 
TESTS AGREED WITH EXPECTED 
RESULT? 
The Archetypel Even Loop Yes. 
Stratification Yes. 
Tautological Loop Yes. 
The Archetypal O d d Loop Yes. 
Conditional O d d Loop Yes. 
Three-Loop Yes. 
The Law of Exclusive Middle Yes. 
Incoherent Even Loop Yes. 
Normal Default Yes. 
Nixon Diamond Yes. 
Barber's Non Paradox Yes. 
Disjunctive and Closed World Assump- Yes. 
tion 
Nonmonotonic Assumption-based Truth Yes. 
Maintenance System 
* Inclusive Disjunctive Yes. 
* Minimality Yes. 
The Reasoning by Cases No. 
O d d and Even Loop No. 
Conditional Odd and Even Loop No. 
T w o and Three Loop No. 
Naming Closed World Assumption No. 
19. Naming Closed World Assumption 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
20. Nonmonotonic Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System 
The same as Section 6.3.1. 
Table 6.3 summaries how DAS-II compares to stable semantics. DAS-II extends 
DAS-I for "Inclusive Disjunctive" and "Minimality" tests with respect to stable se-
mantics. Thus, DAS-II is closer to stable semantics than DAS-I for the Inoue's tests. 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 103 
6.4.2 Sherlock Holmes' problem 
The formulation is outlined in Section 6.3.2 and is not repeated here. 
1. Straker's Double Life 
Let the argumentation system AS =< Ags,Pg > where Ags =< Ag >, Pg =< 
0 > and Ag =< r*i, • • • ,ns〉. The following major arguments are found: 
Argi = { r2; re； n，77，r5, rg } 
Arg2 = { r4, rio, ri, rii } 
Arg3 = Argi + Arg2 + { r12 } 
Arg4, = { ri4, ri5, ri6, n%, ng； r17} 
Arg^ 二 Arp4 + {r20, r21, r22} 
Similar to result in Section 6.3.2, there are no conflicts identified. Moreover, 
All arguments are justified. Differed from Section 6.3.2, the conclusions of this 
knowledge set is extended to include suspect(straker). suspect{straker), which 
means "Straker is a suspect.", is actually the critical point of the whole story. 
This illustrates that DAS-II is significantly more powerful than DAS-I. Without 
DAS-II's "reasoning about cases" capability, the conclusion cannot be drawn at 
all. 
2. Poison Stable Boy 
The same as 6.3.2. 
6.5 Analysis 
Table 6.2 summaries how DAS-I compares to stable semantics. A m o n g the 20 tests, 
DAS-I scores 13. The failed seven tests can be classified into 3 groups: 
1. Inclusive Disjunctive, Minimality : 
This group requires "reasoning about cases" capability which is provided in DAS-
II. 
2. Reasoning by Cases : 
The answer in this test is arguable according to our rationale in designing DAS-I. 
In this test, it is possible to separate conflicting knowledge into two consistent 
subsets. Inoue called the process of integrating individual reasoning results from 
the two subsets as "reasoning by cases" • A "case" is actually a consistent subset 
but not a result of disjunction. Thus, "reasoning by cases" is actually "reasoning 
by consistent subsets". 
I 
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It can be argued that “〜p ^ q,�q ~> p,, is used to represent ~> p V q. However, 
this may mix up the meaning of undercut and disjunction. Using disjunction, we 
can intuitively define three or more possible outcomes, e.g. ^  ^JiVp2VpsV- • •. It is 
very difficult if not impossible to do so with undercut. Thus, “〜p — q,〜q ^  p" 
is not a good alternative for “~> p V q,,. 
If 〜 p — p and 〜 p ~> q are interpreted literally, they yield two consistent 
subsets which undercut each other. Both are not conflict free nor backed up 
by another consistent subset free from conflicts. Thus, they are not beyond 
reasonable doubts. By skepticism, we cannot sanction their results. 
3. Odd and Even Loop, Conditional Odd and Even Loop, Two and Three 
Loop, Naming Closed World Assumption : 
Stable semantics resolves conflicts by preferring one ofthe conflicting part. DAS-I 
resolves conflicts by leaving both conflicting part alone if conflicts involved are 
undercut or are without priority for resolution. This difference accounts for why 
DAS-I does not entail stable semantics' results. 
DAS-II significantly extends DAS-Fs result to "Inclusive Disjunctive" test and 
"Minimality" test. However, there are still five tests deviate from stable semantics. 
It does not surprise us as the results of them depends on the assumptions of stable 
semantics. 
6.5.1 Possible extension 
It is worth noting that four out of the five unsolved problems in DAS-II (see Table 6.3) 
could be handled "properly in the sense of stable semantics" by the extension proposed 
by Prakken [Prakken and Sartor, 1997]. Similary, they could be introduced to DAS-II. 
The extensions are defined as follows: 
Definition 38 Given a set of arguments A, a subset S of A is stable if S does not 
conflict with itself and for every a G A — S, S defeats a. 
Given an argumentation framework AF and its argument set Args, denotes the 
set of justified, defensible and defeated argument sets as Args^, Args^ and Args~ 
respectively. 
Definition 39 For an defensible argument set Arg of an argument framework AF, an 
argument is stably justified if it is justified in every stable subset of Arg. 
W e then use this extended notion of "justify" to test the failed five problems as 
follows: 
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2 Reasoning by Cases 
ri ; � q "">• p 
r*2 : � p — q 
rs : p ~> r 
r4 : q ^ r 
Arguments : Argi = { n }，Arg2 = { r2 }, Arg3 二 { r*i，r3 }，Arg^ = { 7*2， 
r4 } 
Conflicts : Argx undercuts and defeats Arg2 and Ar^4, ^rg^ undercuts and 
defeats Argi and Arg3. 
Conclusion : All arguments are in the defensible set. Note that {Arg1,Arg3} 
and {Arg2,Arg4} are stable, r is justified as it is justified in both of them. 
8 Odd and Even Loop 
ri ; � r ~> r 
r2 : q ^ r 
r3 :〜q ">• p 
r4 : � p ^ q 
Arguments : Argi = { n }, Arg2 = { r3 }，Args = { ^4 }； Arg4 = { r4, r2 } 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Argi. Arg2 undercuts and defeats Args 
and Arg^. Arg3 undercuts and defeats Arg2. Arg4, undercuts and defeats Argi 
and Arg2 
Conclusion : All arguments are defensible. Only {Arg4} is stable, q,r are then 
justified. 
9 Conditional Odd and Even Loop 
ri : p 八 � r ">• r 
r*2 ： � q — p 
r3 : � p ">• q 
Arguments : Argi = { r2 }, Arg2 = { r3 }, Argz = { r2, n } 
Conflicts : Argi undercuts and defeats Arg2. Arg2 undercuts and defeats Argi. 
Argz undercuts and defeats Arg2-
Conclusion : All arguments are defensible. Only {Arg2} is stable so q is justified. 
10 Two and Three Loop 
4k 
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r\ : � q ~> p 
r*2 : � r — q 
r*3 : � p 八 � q ~> r 
Arguments : Argi = { n }，Arg2 = { � 2 }，Arg^ = { r3 } 
Conflicts : Arg2 undercuts and defeats Arg\. Args undercuts and defeats Arg2. 
Arg\ undercuts and defeats Arg2. 
Conclusion : All arguments are defensible. Only {Arg2) is stable so q is justified. 
19 Naming Closed World Assumption 
ri : p ">• q 
r*2 :，p — q 
r3 : —，q 
r4 : assume(]p) A � p — ^p 
r5 ;�^assume{^p) ^ assume(]p) 
rQ :�assume{^p) ^ ^assume{^p) 
Arguments : Argi = { r3 }，Arg2 = { r5 }，Argz = { re }，Arg4^  = { r5, r4 }； 
Args = { r*5，『4，r2 } 
Conflicts : Argi and Arg^ rebut and defeat each other. Arg2 and Args undercut 
and defeat each other. Args undercuts and defeats Arg4. 
Conclusion : Only the argument set {Arg1,Arg3} is stable, so，q and 
^assume{^p) are justified. 
Combining the above results with DAS-II's original result we get Table 6.4. This 
shows that our framework can readily be extended to cover all benchmark problems. 
Although, the extension is, in our view, against our basic assumption of skepticism, 
there may still be situations whence such properties are desirable. 
6.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we evalutated the capabilities of DAS-I and DAS-IL W e show that 
both DAS-I and DAS-II are both good reasoning framework for Katsumi Inoue's tests. 
Further, we show that DAS-II can deduce more informations/rules than DAS-I. O n the 
Sherlock Holmes' test, DAS-I and DAS-II both fulfill "Poison Stable Boy" test. DAS-II 
fulfills "Straker's Double Life"test and draws more conclusions than DAS-L Thus, we 
shown that the DAS-II is superior. 
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Table 6.4: Summary of Extended DAS-II on Katsumi Inoue's problem set 
T E S T S A G R E E D W I T H E X P E C T E D 
R E S U L T ? 
The Archetypel Even Loop Yes. 
Stratification Yes. 
Tautological Loop Yes. 
The Archetypal O d d Loop Yes. 
Conditional O d d Loop Yes. 
Three-Loop Yes. 
The Law of Exclusive Middle Yes. 
Incoherent Even Loop Yes. 
Normal Default Yes. 
Nixon Diamond Yes. 
Barber's Non Paradox Yes. 
Disjunctive and Closed World Assump- Yes. 
tion 
Nonmonotonic Assumption-based Truth Yes. 
Maintenance System 
Inclusive Disjunctive Yes. 
Minimality Yes. 
* The Reasoning by Cases Yes. 
* O d d and Even Loop Yes. 
* Conditional O d d and Even Loop Yes. 
* T w o and Three Loop Yes. 




In this thesis, we have studied the problem of reasoning with indefinite, inconsistent and 
incomplete information in a distributed setting in argumentative style. W e reviewed 
the general aspects of the subject in chapters 2 and 3. W e identified logic programming 
and argumentation as our representation and philosophy frameworks, respectively. In 
particular, we found that Henry Prakken's strict argumentation could offer the required 
supports for our purpose. 
The main contribution of our work is the proposal of two disjunctive argumentation 
semantics, namely DAS-I and DAS-II. They are novel in the following aspects: 
1. Disjunctive 
Our argumentation frameworks are disjunctive and allows indefinite knowledge 
to be modelled in a prioritized framework. To our best knowledge, this is the first 
attempt in argumentation theory to combine the both. 
2. Thinning 
W e identified a new kind of conflicts known as thinning in a distributed knowl-
edge environment. Thinning concerns non-complimentary conflicts between dis-
tributed knowledge. 
3. Integrated 
DAS-I and DAS-II were designed with an integrated approach for handling in-
definite, inconsistent and incomplete information. This is effective as conflicts 
are inter-related in practice. Moreover, our way in analysing relations between 
indefinite and inconsistent information in distributed settings is novel. 
DAS-I is an extension of Henry Prakken's strict argumentation 
Prakken and Sartor, 1997]. W e introduced an indefinite information reasoning capa-
bility to the original Prakken's framework. In doing so, we managed not to ruin the 
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desirable features of Prakken's framework, e.g. the sound and complete proof proce-
dure which are inherited from Phan Minh Dung. By relocating the single knowledge 
base/agent scenario into a general distributed agents scenario, we showed that there 
could be non-trivial conflicts between different agents. To resolve this and other con-
flicts, DAS-I restricts that each indefinite rule can have only one unique interpretation 
in an argument. The single layered preference hierarchy in Prakken's is extended to 
two layers to cope with the difference between distributed agents. 
The downside of the simplistic approach of DAS-I is that it cannot support "rea-
soning about cases". Our second framework, DAS-II, was designed to overcome this 
predicament. As reasoning about cases called for forward reasoning, DAS-II has to 
adopt an alternative formulation (i.e. different from DAS-I). Base on technique bor-
rowed from logic programming research, we show that DAS-II subsumes DAS-I and 
incorporates the capability of "reasoning about cases". 
It is realized that rebut conflicts are much more complicated when indefinite rule 
is not restricted. The conflicting parts do not simply rest on two rules. There are no 
existing study dealing with this kind of subtlety. W e proposed a "bearer and initiator" 
scheme to analyze and solve the problem. 
In summary, our goal for an integrated framework for reasoning with indefinite, 
inconsistent, incomplete information is fulfilled by DAS-I and DAS-II. W e have gone 
into great details in analyzing tangling aspects of indefiniteness and inconsistency in 
coherence with the treatment of incompleteness. 
7.0.1 Possible extension of the present work 
1. Efficient computation method 
Devising an efficient computation method for DAS-I is strict forward. The same 
does not hold for DAS-II which employs forward reasoning mechanism. Enumer-
ating approach is plausible only when the problem is near-Horn, i.e. there are not 
much indefinite information. As both DAS-I and DAS-II are represented in a logic 
programming language, it is worth investigating whether program transformation 
techniques are applicable for efficient computation. 
2. Dynamic priority 
This is trivial for DAS-I as it borrowed many concepts from Prakken's strict 
argumentation. Adding dynamic priority to DAS-II requires revision of the reso-
lution schemes as the same set of schemes would also be applied on conflicts over 
priority. 
3. More or less "stable semantics" oriented 
W e concluded that stable semantics gave the most intuitive results among exist-
4^  
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ing logic programming approaches in Chapter 2. In the evaluation, we find that 
DAS-II is not fully compatible with stable semantics. It does not surprise us as 
both DAS-I and DAS-II are based on Prakken's framework. W e share the same 
skeptical view on information as Prakken. The difference is then not because of 
fault but rationale. Through the investigation, it is clear that skeptical view actu-
ally differs from "stable semantics" on finer points on conflicts resolution. Thus, 
the issues of whether extending DAS-II to be more, or less, "stable semantics" 
oriented is an interesting topics. 
4. Alternative resolution schemes 
As we mentioned above, our conflict resolution schemes are essentially biased 
as all forms of preference did. Studying of alternative resolution schemes, e.g. 
quantitative measures (like John Fox's approach [Krause P, 1993]) and rhetorical 
measures (like Chris Reed's approach [Reed et al., 1996])，for conflicts identified 
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First Oreder Logic (FOL) 
Since Prege proposed the preliminary version of first order logic (FOL) in [Frege, 1967], 
confusion between syntax and semantics have never been clarified until Alfred Tarski. 
Tarski set up a clean correspondence between syntactical reading ("what we can show") 
and semantical reading ("what we do mean"). Tarski showed that first order logic 
enjoys the nice property that there exists a semantical reading, which is lately known 
as Tarskian semantics, coincides with its syntactical reading, i.e. proof. Tarski shown 
that the notion of truth in ordinary usages is in semantical level. The correspondence 
between meaning and proof implies that problem of determining the truth status in 
ordinary usages can be done on syntactical level. 
W e briefly describe, a summary of [Davis, 1993], Tarski,s formulation of F O L as a 
prelude to logic programming. F O L uses the following logical symbols:，— A V ^ 
3V; punctuation marks [](，）} and variables V 1 , V ' 2 , — — A vocabulary is 4-tuple < 
C, F, R, d > where C is a set of constants, F functions, R relations and d is degree of 
the function and relation. Note that d is a mapping projecting F U R to integers i.e. 
giving the name of function or relation d returns its degree. A term of a vocabulary 
V is a constant, a variable, or a value of a function /(/^i,. • • ,/½) where |M is a term 
of V and d{f) = n. A n atomic formulas of V is an expression r{fj,i,... ,"n) where 
r e R and fM is a term. A n atomic formula of V is a formula of V and all variables 
of the formula are free. If A and B are formula of V, ^A, A — B, A A B, A V B, 
A <r> B, (3rr)A and (^x)A are formulas. For formulas (3x)A and (Va;)A, variables x in 
A are bounded. A sentence of V is a formula of V containing no free variables. A n 
interpretation I of V is a 4-tuples < D, CM, FM, RM > where D is the domain, CM 
the set {c/|c G C}, FM a mapping // : D^ ^ D where f e F and d(f) = n, and RM 
a mapping 77 : D^ ~> {0,1} where r G R and d{r) = n. A valuation of D is a set of 
elements {?n,. • • } from D. A valuation of I is a valuation of its domain D. The value 
of a term v in a valuation v of I is defined as Value{u, /，v) equals to c/ if v G C , Vj if 
V is variable V^, otherwise //(di, • • •，dn) if “ = /(A*i, • •.，A*n) and Value{fii, /, v) 二 di. 
118 
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Valuation of formula is defined as follow: 
• If 7 is a formula of V, Value(^, I, u) = r/(di, •..，dn) if 7 == 7^ (A^ i,. •. ’ fJ>n) is an 
atomic formula and Value(fj>i,I,v). 
m I f7 == ~ia，Value(j, /, i^) — 1 — Value(a,I,v). 
• If 7 = (a — /?), Value(j, I, u) = 1 一 Value(a, /, v) + Value(P, I, v). 
• If 7 = a V P, Value{j, /，u) = Value(a, /, v) + Value(P, I, v). 
• If 7 = a A beta, Value{j, /, p) = Value(a, /, v) x Value[j3, /, v). 
• If 7 = a ^ P, Value{j, /,") = Value{a — /3, /，v) x Value[(3 — a, /, v). 
• If 7 = (3^j)a (7 = (VV>j)), Value{^, I, u) = 1(0) if there is a valuation v' of D 
s.t. v'. = V and Value(a, I,v') 二 1(0) otherwise Value{j, /, v) = 0(1). 
J 
T w o sentences o. and /? are truth equivalent if a ^ /3. For a sentence 7, Value{j, I) 
means Value(j, I, v) does not depend at all on v. I is a model of 7，iff Value{j, I) 二 1. 
I is a model of a set of sentences S iff I is a model of every sentence of S. For two 
sentence sets a and A, A entails a, denoted A |= a, if model of A is also model of a. 
A sentence set A is consistent if it has at least one model and otherwise inconsistent. 
Prom the above formulation of Tarskian F O L , it is clear that nothing was mentioned 
about the feasibility of proofing a thesis. Jacques Herbrand shown that "if a set of first-
order logic statements T is inconsistent, there exists a finite grounded subset of it which 
is inconsistent". Herbrand also introduced the prenex form which is a transformation 
of a sentence a to a' such that all (3a;) and (Va;) symbols are moved to left-hand 
side and a <H> a'. Skolem shown that it is possible to removing existential quantifiers 
(3rr) in a prenex sentence by instantiating existential variables with value of a Skolem 
function. Skolem function is nothing more than giving a name to the existed value 
of variable. As existence of a value may be more than one, Skolen transformation of 
prenex sentence does not preserve truth equivalence. Interestingly, Skolem shown that 
Skolem transformation is model preserving in the sense that if a prenex sentence has a 
model, Skolem transformed of it also has a model. Skolem transformed sentences are 
lately called clauses with the following form: "(Vrci)(Vrc2)... (Va;n)i^ " where P is an 
atomic formula or an atomic formula preceded by a negation ~« in disjunctive normal 
form with variables xi, x2,. •.，Xn- A n atomic formula is in disjunctive normal form if 
it is in the form of '7i V ... V /„" where k is an atomic formula. In the following text, 
we assume any sentences being universal quantified if not specified otherwise. Martin 
Davis and Hilary Putnam showed that Herbrand's theorem could be very useful in 
computing models of clauses. As it is possible to show a thesis P is inconsistent with 
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a theory T in finite time, we can proof a thesis P with respect to T by showing 
~iP is inconsistent with T. Davis and Putnam's procedure computes on grounded 
sentences. Robinson in [Robinson, 1965] showed that Davis-Putnam's procedure could 
be improved through a technique known as lifting (resolution + unification) which 
was indeed a rediscovered result of [Herbrand, 1967]. Empirical results showed that 
Robinson's resolution procedure reduced the search space a lot and could compute far 
better than Davis-Putnam procedure. 
Robert Kowalski was the first one who perceived the implication of Robinson's 
result. In [Kowalski, 1974], he showed that procedural readings of a clause could be 
obtained by the truth-equivalence between material implication A ~> B and ^A V B. 
For a sentence h V . • .V/n, we define L + = {li]k is an atomic formula } and L~ = {ai]li 
is an atomic formual ai preceded with，} then the sentence can be transformed to 
八 a ^ V b. L~ and L + are called conditions and conclusions of the sentence. 
aeL- heL+ 
Semantically, a sentence “八 a ^ V b “ can be read as “八 a is the precon-
aeL- beL+ aeL-
ditions of V "^- In procedural w a y ,八 a must be proved (executed) to complete 
heL+ aeL-






Before going into the soundness and completeness proof, we shall introduce the following 
notations to simplify the proof procedure. For an argument Arg^ 
• tiee(Arg) is the argument tree in which Arg wins; 
• branch(T) is the set of branches of an argument tree T; 
• length(B) is the length of a branch; 
• move(B, n) is the nth move of a branch B] 
• player(M) is the player that responsible for the move M. 
The proofs shown here are in Lamport style [Lamport,1993]. 
B.1 Monotone proof 
Lemma 1 Given a set of argument S and conflict free subset Si and Si C 5i+i. If an 
argument Arg is in Us(Si) then Arg is also in Us(Si+i). 
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the thesis by contradiction. We assume there is an argu-
ment Arg in Us(Si) but not in Us(Si+i). Using the definition of fix-point iteration, a 
contradiction is shown. 
ASSUME: 1. 3 argument Arg, s.t Arg G Us{Si) and Arg 0 Us(Si+i) 
(1)1. 3DArg defeating Arg which is not defeated by arguments in Si+i. 
(1)2. Si C Si^i implies DArg is also not defeated by Si. 
(1)3. 3DArg defeating Arg which is not defeated hy arguments in Si. 
(1)4. By definition, Arg G Us(Si) implies ^DArg defeating Arg which is not defeated 
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Theorem 2 The fix-point operator n is monotone. 
PROOF.i4 direct rephrasing of lemma 1. 
B.2 Soundness proof 
Lemma 2 If arguments Arg is provably justified, then there exists an argument tree 
such that every move of the proponent in every branch involves only justified arguments. 
PROOF SKETCH; We prove the lemma by induction on the level of tree(Arg). Let h be 
the height of tree(Arg). We argue that all proponent moves at level h are justified. By 
backward induction, we argue that proponent moves at odd level i must also be justified 
based on justified proponent moves at level i + 2. 
ASSUME; 1. 3 tree(Arg) s.t. Arg wins all branches. 
2. n = length (tree (Arg)) 
3. level(Arg, i) = {m\m G move( branch( tree(Arg) ), i) } 
(1)1. Basis : at level h = n, Vm E level(Arg,h), m is justified 
(2)1. player(m) = proponent 
(2)2. 771 is the last move implies ^fh defeating m 
{2)3. m is justified by definition 
{2)4. Q.E.D. 
(1)2. Induction Step : Ifi is odd and level(Arg,i + 2) is justified, then level(Arg,i) 
is also justified 
ASSUME: 1. level(Arg, i + 2) is justified. 
2. leaf = {m\m G level(Arg,i) and m is not the last move of the branch } 
3. non-leaf = level(Arg,i) - leaf 
(2)1. leaf is justified, by the same reason in (1)1. 
(2)2. Vm e non-leaf, 3fh G level(Arg,i + 1) strictly defeat it. 
(2)3. since m E non-leaf and end move of every branch is by proponent, there exists 
a move m* by proponent after rh. 
(2)4. m* is justified as m* in level(Arg,i 4- 2). 
(2)5. Vm ofm, fh is strictly defeated. 
(2)6. m is justified by fix-point definition. 
{2)7. Q.E.D. 
(1)3. Completion : For all odd integer i < n, level(Arg,i) is justified. Moves of 
proponent only occur at odd level of an argument tree. 
• 
Theorem 3 All provably justified arguments are justified. 
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PROOF SKETCH; Every provably justified argument, Arg, has an argument tree in which 
all proponent moves are justified. Arg is one of those proponent moves and the result 
follows. 
(1)1. By lemma 2, 3t G tree(Arg) s.t. all proponent moves oft are justified. 
(1)2. Root oft is justified. 
(1)3. Arg is root oft. 
(1)4. Arg is justified. 
• 
B.3 Completeness proof 
L e m m a 3 If Arg is a justified argument, then there exists an argument tree such that 
every moves of the proponent involves only justified arguments. 
PROOF SKETCH; We start to construct a tree inductively with a justified argument 
Arg. At every odd level i, we show that there exists justified arguments DArg strictly 
defeating the defeaters ofleveli. DArg can then form level i + 2 's move. Then, we can 
inductively construct an argument tree hy non repetitive moves of the opponent 
ASSUME; 1. Arg is justified. 
2. T is an argument tree. 
3. Arg is at level 1 ofT. 
(1)1. Basis : Level 3 is justified. 
AssuME; 1. D is the set of defeaters defeating level(Arg, 1). 
(2)1. Vd G D, 3d E fix-point strictly defeating d. 
(2)2. DArg = {d\d G D} is justified by definition. 
(2)3. let level(Arg,3) = DArg 
(2)4. Q.E.D. 
(1)2. Induction Step : If level i is justified, there exists justified level(Arg,i + 2) 
defeating level(Arg,i + 1) 
AssuME; 1. level(Arg,i) is justified. 
2. level(Arg, i + 1) is non-empty. 
3. arguable = {m\m G level(Arg,i) Am is defeated by level(Arg,i + 1) } 
(2)1. level(Arg,i + i)defeatslevel(Arg,i) 
(2)2. V m G arguable, there exists fh in fix-point defeating level(Arg,i + 1) 
(2)3. level(Arg,i + 2) = {fh\m G arguable } 
(2)4. level(Arg, i + 2 is justified and defeats level(Arg,i + 1) 
(2)5. Q.E.D. 
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<l�3. Completion : Thus, there exists a proof tree in which every proponent level 
involves only justified arguments. 
• 
Theorem 4 All justified arguments are provable. 
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the thesis by contradiction. Start with there exists a justified 
argument Arg that is not provable. Using lemma 3 we find an argument tree to support 
Arg and lead to a contradiction. 
A s s u M E : 1. Arg is justified. 
2. By Lemma 8 and the hypothesis, 3T, an argument tree such that 
a. every move of a proponent is justified 
b. a proponent cannot move in a branch B 
(1)1. Let 
1. m = move(B,length(B)) 
2. fh = move(B,length(B)-l) 
(1)2. m is justified. 
(1)3. 3m' , s.t m' strictly defeats m. 




Sherlock Holmes' Silver Blaze 
Excerpts 
C.1 Double life 
•.. "Undoubtedly. But in examining his belongings I was fortunate enough to discover 
not only the method of the crime but even its motives. As a m a n of the world, Colonel, 
you know that men do not carry other people's bills about in their pockets. W e have 
most of us quite enough to do to settle our own. I at once concluded that Straker 
was leading a double life and keeping a second establishment. The nature of the bill 
showed that there was a lady in the case, and one who had expensive tastes. Liberal 
as you are with your servants, one can hardly expect that they can buy twenty-guinea 
walking dresses for their ladies. I questioned Mrs. Straker as to the dress without her 
knowing it, and, having satisfied myself that it had never reached her, I made a note of 
the milliner's address and felt that by calling there with Straker's photograph I could 
easily dispose of the mythical Derbyshire.- • • 
C.2 Poison stable boy 
..• "Undoubtedly. He has neither a knife nor any sign of a wound. The evidence 
against him is certainly very strong. He had a great interest in the disappearance of 
the favourite. He lies under suspicion of having poisoned the stable-boy; he was un-
doubtedly out in the storm; he was armed with a heavy stick, and his cravat was found 
in the dead man's hand. I really think we have enough to go before a jury." 
Holmes shook his head. "A clever counsel would tear it all to rags," said he. " W h y 
should he take the horse out of the stable? If he wished to injure it, why could he 
not do it there? Has a duplicate key been found in his possession? What chemist sold 
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horse, and such a horse as this? What is his own explanation as to the paper which he 




1 Evaluation Questions 
1. (the archetypal even loop) 
p <- not q 
q <- not p 
2. (reasoning by cases) 
< - n o t q 
q <- not p 
r <- p 
r <_ q 
3. (stratification) 
p <- not q 
q <- not r 
4. (tautological loop) 
p <- not q 
q <- q 
5. (the archetypal odd loop) 
p <- not p 
6. (conditional odd loop) 
p <- q, not p 
7. (3-loop) 
p <- not q 
q <- not r 
r <- not p 
8. (odd loop + even loop) 
r <- not r 
r <_ q 
p <- not q 
q <- not p 
9. (odd loop + even loop; inefficient version) 
r <- not r 
r <- not p 
p <- not q 
q <- not p 
z 
10. (conditional odd loop + even loop) 
r <- p, not r 




q <- not p 
11. (2&3-loop) 
p <- not q 
q <- not r 
r <- not p, not q 
12. (query as an integrity constraint) 
r <- q 
r <- t 
t <- s 
q <- not p 
s <- not p 
p <- not t 
t <- not p 
< - n o t r •/•*/• This is the query. 
13. (the law of exclusive middle) 
q <- p 
p 丨 - p <-
14. (incoherent even loop) 
q <- not p 
p <- not q 
q <- P p <- q 
15. (inclusive disjunction) 
p 丨 q <-
q <- P p <- q 
16. (minimality) 
P 丨 q <-
p <- q 
17. (disjunctive + integrity constraint) 
P 丨 q <-
p <- q 
< - n o t q 
18. (normal default) 
flies(X) <- bird(X), not -flies(X) 
-flies(X) <- penguin(X) 
/ bird(X) <- penguin(X) 
bird(polly) <-
penguin(tweety) <-
19. (naming defaults; another formalization) 
*. 
2 
flies(X) <- bird(X), -ab(X) 
-flies(X) <- penguin(X) 
bird(X) <- penguin(X) 
bird(polly) <-
penguin(tweety) <-
-ab(X) <- bird(X), not ab(X) 
ab(X) <- -flies(X) 
20. (bad formalization for Nixon diamond) 
dove(X) <- quaker(X), not ab_quaker(X) 




21. (correct formalization for Nixon diamond) 
dove(X) <- quaker(X), not ab_quaker(X) 
hawk(X) <_ republician(X), not ab_republician(X) 
quaker(nixon) <-
republician(nixon) <-
ab_quaker(X) <- hawk(X) 
ab_republician(X) <- dove(X) 
22. (barber,s "non-"paradox) 
shaves(X,Y) <- barber(X), citizen(Y), not shaves(Y,Y) 
shaves(X,X) <- barber(X) 
citizen(X) <- barber(X) 
barber(noel) <-
citizen(casanova) <-
23. (incoherent closed world assumption) 
< p(a), -p(b) 
-p(X) <- dom(X), not p(X) 
dom(a) <-
dom(b) <-
24. (modified closed world assumption) 
< p(a), -p(b) 
< - n o t -p(a), not -p(b) 
-p(X) <- dom(X), not p(X) 
p(X) <- dom(X), not -p(X) 
dom(a) <-
dom(b) <-
25/ (disjunctive + closed world assumption) 
p(a) I p(b) < -




26. (naming CWA) 
q <- P 
q < - - p 
- q <_ 
-p <- assume(-p), not p 
assume(-p) <- not -assume(-p) 
-assume(-p) <- not assume(-p) 
27. (nonmonotonic ATMS) 
p <- b 
q <- a, not p 
p <- not q 
a <- not out_a 。/•/, Either "a" is assumed 
out_a <- not a 。/•/• or "a" is not assumed, 
b <- not out_b •/••/• Either "b" is assumed 
out_b <- not b y,y, or "b" is not assumed. 
28. (abduction) 
p <- b 
q <- a 
< - q , b 
< - n o t q, not b 
a <- not -a 
-a <- not a 
b <- not -b 
-b <- not b 
< - n o t q •/••/• This is the query. 
29. (definition of terminal nodes) 
-terminal(X) <- arc(X,Y) 










30. (story of employees) 
adequate_income(X) <- employed(X,Y) 
/ no_income(X) <- person(X), not adequate_income(X) 









31. (story of university students) 
eligible(X) <- highGPA(X) 
eligible(X) <- minority(X), fairGPA(X) 
-eligible(X) <- -fairGPA(X) 









highGPA(keiko) | fairGPA(keiko) <-
32. (Yale shooting; bad formalization) 
holds(P,result(A,S)) <- holds(P,S), next_action(A,S), not ab(P,A,S) 
holds(alive,sO) <-
holds(loaded,result(load,S)) <-
holds(dead,result(shoot,S)) <- holds(loaded,S) 
















cand(X,self,Y) <- person(X), day(Y), not busy(X,self,Y) 
cand(X,agent,Y) <- busy(X,self,Y), not busy(X,agent,Y) 
/ openroom(Room,Day) <- day(Day), room(Room), not reserved(Room,Day) 
selves_meeting <- holdmeeting(Day,Room,self,self) 
holdmeeting(Day,Room,self,self) <-










attracts(X,Y) <- astroheavy(X), object(Y) 
attracts(X,Y) <- poselect(X), negelect(Y) 







revolves(X,Y) <- not contra, appli, apartfrom(X,Y), attracts(Y,X) 
appli <- apartfrom(X,Y), attracts(Y,X), revolves(X,Y) 




•/••/• Answers (not verified completely) by Katsumi Inoue 
•/••/• 
1. {p}, {q} 

























24. {-p(a),p(b)}, {p(a)rp(b)} 
25. rp(a),p(b)}, {p(a)rp(b)} 
26. {~q,~assume_neg_p} 
























32. (Yale shooting (2)--modified; 1991.10.24) 
holds(P,result(A,S)) <- holds(P,S), next_action(A,S), not ab(P,A,S) 
holds(alive,sO) <-
holds(loaded,result(load,S)) <- next_action(load,S) 
holds(dead,result(shoot,S)) <- holds(loaded,S) 






















32. (Yale shooting (3)--a la Gelfond & Lifschitz; 1995.10.27) 
holds(alive,sO). 
-holds(loaded,sO). 
holds(loaded,result(load,S)) <- situation(S). 
-holds(loaded,result(shoot,S)) <- situation(S). 
-holds(alive,result(shoot,S)) <- holds(loaded,S). 
holds(loaded，S) <——holds(alive，result(shoot,S)), holds(alive,S)• 
-holds(loaded,S) <- holds(alive,result(shoot,S)). 
holds(F,result(A,S)) <- holds(F,S), action(A), not ab(F,A,S). 
-holds(F,result(A,S)) <- -holds(F,S), action(A), not ab(F,A,S). 
holds(F,S) <- holds(F,result(A,S)), not ab(F,A,S). 
-holds(F,S) <- -holds(F,result(A,S)), not ab(F,A,S). 
ab(loaded,load,S) <- situation(S). 
ab(alive,shoot,S) <- situation(S), not -holds(loaded,S). 
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